CVE-2021-43615: InsydeH2O UEFI: SMM memory corruption escalates to Ring -2
UNKNOWNThis is a memory corruption bug in the HddPassword SMM handler of Insyde's InsydeH2O UEFI firmware, letting a privileged local attacker write fixed or predictable data into SMRAM and escalate from OS/kernel privilege to System Management Mode — a hardware protection ring that sits below the OS, hypervisor, and even Secure Boot enforcement. This is a firmware supply-chain issue, not an AI/ML framework flaw; its 'ml_library' tag here reflects the CVE feed's classification, not an actual dependency on any AI package, and the affected-products field is unresolved (n/a), so real-world scope is unclear. Exploitation signals are weak: EPSS sits at 0.29% (top 78th percentile, still low absolute probability), it is not in CISA KEV, and there is no public exploit code or Nuclei template. Where it matters is any bare-metal AI training or inference host — GPU servers, edge AI appliances — running affected InsydeH2O firmware versions, since an SMM implant would survive OS reinstalls and evade EDR. Action: identify OEM hardware running InsydeH2O firmware in your GPU/AI server fleet, apply the vendor BIOS/UEFI update incorporating Insyde's patched kernel (5.16.23/5.26.23/5.35.23/5.43.22/5.51.22 or later), and check the NetApp and Siemens advisories if you run their affected platforms.
What is the risk?
Low-to-moderate priority. Severity is technically unrated (no CVSS published) but the primitive (SMM memory corruption to Ring -2) is high-impact in principle. However, exploitation requires an attacker who already has significant local/kernel-level privilege to trigger the vulnerable SMI handler, EPSS is low (0.29%), there is no CISA KEV listing, no public PoC, and no scanner coverage. This is a firmware-supply-chain risk relevant to hardware fleet management, not an actively-exploited or AI-specific threat.
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| n/a | — | — | No patch |
Do you use n/a? You're affected.
How severe is it?
What should I do?
1 step1) Inventory hardware running Insyde InsydeH2O firmware in your AI/ML infrastructure (training servers, GPU nodes, edge AI devices), especially NetApp and Siemens platforms named in the referenced advisories. 2) Apply OEM BIOS/UEFI updates incorporating InsydeH2O kernel versions 05.16.23, 05.26.23, 05.35.23, 05.43.22, or 05.51.22 (or later) as soon as your hardware vendor publishes them. 3) Track vendor-specific advisories (security.netapp.com, cert-portal.siemens.com) for patch availability and timelines. 4) Where firmware updates are delayed, restrict local administrative/kernel access to affected hosts to reduce the attack surface for triggering the vulnerable SMI handler. 5) Use firmware integrity tooling (e.g., CHIPSEC) to detect anomalous SMM behavior on high-value AI compute assets.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2021-43615?
This is a memory corruption bug in the HddPassword SMM handler of Insyde's InsydeH2O UEFI firmware, letting a privileged local attacker write fixed or predictable data into SMRAM and escalate from OS/kernel privilege to System Management Mode — a hardware protection ring that sits below the OS, hypervisor, and even Secure Boot enforcement. This is a firmware supply-chain issue, not an AI/ML framework flaw; its 'ml_library' tag here reflects the CVE feed's classification, not an actual dependency on any AI package, and the affected-products field is unresolved (n/a), so real-world scope is unclear. Exploitation signals are weak: EPSS sits at 0.29% (top 78th percentile, still low absolute probability), it is not in CISA KEV, and there is no public exploit code or Nuclei template. Where it matters is any bare-metal AI training or inference host — GPU servers, edge AI appliances — running affected InsydeH2O firmware versions, since an SMM implant would survive OS reinstalls and evade EDR. Action: identify OEM hardware running InsydeH2O firmware in your GPU/AI server fleet, apply the vendor BIOS/UEFI update incorporating Insyde's patched kernel (5.16.23/5.26.23/5.35.23/5.43.22/5.51.22 or later), and check the NetApp and Siemens advisories if you run their affected platforms.
Is CVE-2021-43615 actively exploited?
No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2021-43615 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.
How to fix CVE-2021-43615?
1) Inventory hardware running Insyde InsydeH2O firmware in your AI/ML infrastructure (training servers, GPU nodes, edge AI devices), especially NetApp and Siemens platforms named in the referenced advisories. 2) Apply OEM BIOS/UEFI updates incorporating InsydeH2O kernel versions 05.16.23, 05.26.23, 05.35.23, 05.43.22, or 05.51.22 (or later) as soon as your hardware vendor publishes them. 3) Track vendor-specific advisories (security.netapp.com, cert-portal.siemens.com) for patch availability and timelines. 4) Where firmware updates are delayed, restrict local administrative/kernel access to affected hosts to reduce the attack surface for triggering the vulnerable SMI handler. 5) Use firmware integrity tooling (e.g., CHIPSEC) to detect anomalous SMM behavior on high-value AI compute assets.
What systems are affected by CVE-2021-43615?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: training pipelines, model serving.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2021-43615?
No CVSS score has been assigned yet.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
Compliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
An issue was discovered in HddPassword in Insyde InsydeH2O with kernel 5.1 before 05.16.23, 5.2 before 05.26.23, 5.3 before 05.35.23, 5.4 before 05.43.22, and 5.5 before 05.51.22. An SMM memory corruption vulnerability allows an attacker to write fixed or predictable data to SMRAM. Exploiting this issue could lead to escalating privileges to SMM.
Exploitation Scenario
An attacker who has already achieved kernel-level (Ring 0) code execution on an AI training server or GPU inference host — for example via a separate OS-level exploit or insider access — sends a crafted System Management Interrupt (SMI) to the vulnerable HddPassword SMM handler. The handler writes fixed or predictable attacker-influenced data into SMRAM, corrupting memory and letting the attacker execute code in System Management Mode (Ring -2). From there, the attacker installs a firmware-level implant that persists across OS reinstalls and evades OS/hypervisor security controls, enabling long-term stealthy access to sensitive AI training data, model weights, or credentials on the compromised host.
References
- cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-306654.pdfx_refsource_CONFIRM
- security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20220216-0010/x_refsource_CONFIRM
- insyde.com/security-pledgex_refsource_MISC
- insyde.com/security-pledge/SA-2022013x_refsource_MISC
Timeline
Related Vulnerabilities
CVE-2024-291210.0BentoML: RCE via insecure deserialization (CVSS 10)
Same attack type: Code ExecutionCVE-2026-2185810.0n8n: Input Validation flaw enables exploitation
Same attack type: Code ExecutionCVE-2025-512010.0smolagents: sandbox escape enables unauthenticated RCE
Same attack type: Code ExecutionCVE-2025-5952810.0Flowise: Unauthenticated RCE via MCP config injection
Same attack type: Code ExecutionGHSA-vvpj-8cmc-gx3910.0picklescan: security flaw enables exploitation
Same attack type: Code Execution