CVE-2025-15031: mlflow: Path Traversal enables file access

GHSA-fhff-qmm8-h2fp CRITICAL CISA: ATTEND
Published March 18, 2026
CISO Take

MLflow is the de facto MLOps backbone in enterprise AI pipelines — this path traversal vulnerability turns any trusted user with artifact upload rights into a potential RCE threat actor. A crafted model bundle can overwrite arbitrary files on the MLflow server, including cron jobs, SSH keys, or application configs. Immediately restrict artifact uploads to authenticated internal users only and sandbox MLflow extraction processes until a patch is available.

Risk Assessment

HIGH in any multi-tenant or externally-accessible MLflow deployment. The attack complexity is low: any actor with artifact upload capability can exploit it without elevated privileges. No CVSS score assigned yet, but the combination of CWE-22 (path traversal) + arbitrary file write + potential RCE in a widely-deployed AI infrastructure component warrants treating this as Critical. Risk degrades to MEDIUM only in air-gapped, single-tenant deployments with strict access control and no external artifact ingestion. Container-based deployments with host mounts face container escape risk, compounding severity.

Affected Systems

Package Ecosystem Vulnerable Range Patched
mlflow pip < 3.9.0rc0 3.9.0rc0
25.7K OpenSSF 4.5 624 dependents Pushed 7d ago 24% patched ~64d to patch Full package profile →

Do you use mlflow? You're affected.

Severity & Risk

CVSS 3.1
9.1 / 10
EPSS
0.4%
chance of exploitation in 30 days
Higher than 58% of all CVEs
Exploitation Status
Exploit Available
Exploitation: MEDIUM
Sophistication
Advanced
Exploitation Confidence
medium
CISA SSVC: Public PoC
Composite signal derived from CISA KEV, CISA SSVC, EPSS, trickest/cve, and Nuclei templates.

Attack Surface

AV AC PR UI S C I A
AV Network
AC Low
PR None
UI None
S Unchanged
C High
I High
A None

Recommended Action

6 steps
  1. IMMEDIATE

    Restrict MLflow artifact upload access to authenticated, known-good internal accounts only. Revoke or audit any external/partner upload credentials.

  2. WORKAROUND

    Run MLflow artifact extraction in ephemeral, isolated containers with no host mounts and a read-only filesystem outside the extraction target directory.

  3. DETECTION

    Scan existing artifact storage for tar.gz/tar archives containing path traversal sequences (../ or absolute paths starting with /). Use: python3 -c "import tarfile, sys; t=tarfile.open(sys.argv[1]); [print(m.name) for m in t.getmembers() if m.name.startswith('/') or '../' in m.name]" <artifact>.

  4. MONITORING

    Alert on file creation events in system directories (e.g., /etc, /usr, ~/.ssh) from MLflow process lineage.

  5. PATCH

    Track the huntr.com disclosure for official fix; prioritize patching as soon as MLflow releases a remediated version.

  6. VERIFY

    After patching, confirm the fix replaces tarfile.extractall with path-sanitized extraction using tarfile.extractall with a custom filter or manual member validation.

CISA SSVC Assessment

Decision Attend
Exploitation poc
Automatable No
Technical Impact total

Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.

Classification

Compliance Impact

This CVE is relevant to:

EU AI Act
Article 15 - Accuracy, Robustness and Cybersecurity Article 9 - Risk Management System
ISO 42001
A.6.1.2 - AI Supply Chain Management A.8.4 - AI System Security
NIST AI RMF
GOVERN 1.7 - Policies and procedures are in place for third-party AI risks MANAGE 2.2 - Mechanisms are in place to respond to and recover from AI risks
OWASP LLM Top 10
LLM05:2025 - Insecure Output Handling / Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2025-15031?

MLflow is the de facto MLOps backbone in enterprise AI pipelines — this path traversal vulnerability turns any trusted user with artifact upload rights into a potential RCE threat actor. A crafted model bundle can overwrite arbitrary files on the MLflow server, including cron jobs, SSH keys, or application configs. Immediately restrict artifact uploads to authenticated internal users only and sandbox MLflow extraction processes until a patch is available.

Is CVE-2025-15031 actively exploited?

No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2025-15031 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.

How to fix CVE-2025-15031?

1. IMMEDIATE: Restrict MLflow artifact upload access to authenticated, known-good internal accounts only. Revoke or audit any external/partner upload credentials. 2. WORKAROUND: Run MLflow artifact extraction in ephemeral, isolated containers with no host mounts and a read-only filesystem outside the extraction target directory. 3. DETECTION: Scan existing artifact storage for tar.gz/tar archives containing path traversal sequences (`../` or absolute paths starting with `/`). Use: `python3 -c "import tarfile, sys; t=tarfile.open(sys.argv[1]); [print(m.name) for m in t.getmembers() if m.name.startswith('/') or '../' in m.name]" <artifact>`. 4. MONITORING: Alert on file creation events in system directories (e.g., /etc, /usr, ~/.ssh) from MLflow process lineage. 5. PATCH: Track the huntr.com disclosure for official fix; prioritize patching as soon as MLflow releases a remediated version. 6. VERIFY: After patching, confirm the fix replaces `tarfile.extractall` with path-sanitized extraction using `tarfile.extractall` with a custom filter or manual member validation.

What systems are affected by CVE-2025-15031?

This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: MLOps platforms, training pipelines, model registries, model serving, CI/CD ML pipelines, multi-tenant ML platforms, automated model evaluation workflows.

What is the CVSS score for CVE-2025-15031?

CVE-2025-15031 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.1 (CRITICAL). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.36%.

Technical Details

NVD Description

A vulnerability in MLflow's pyfunc extraction process allows for arbitrary file writes due to improper handling of tar archive entries. Specifically, the use of `tarfile.extractall` without path validation enables crafted tar.gz files containing `..` or absolute paths to escape the intended extraction directory. This issue affects the latest version of MLflow and poses a high/critical risk in scenarios involving multi-tenant environments or ingestion of untrusted artifacts, as it can lead to arbitrary file overwrites and potential remote code execution.

Exploitation Scenario

An adversary with access to an MLflow tracking server — via compromised internal credentials, a malicious insider, or an upstream supply chain compromise — uploads a pyfunc model bundle packaged as a crafted tar.gz file. The archive contains entries with path traversal sequences such as `../../etc/cron.d/mlflow-backdoor` or `../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys`, each containing attacker-controlled content. When MLflow processes this artifact during model registration, loading, or automated evaluation in a CI/CD pipeline, `tarfile.extractall` writes these files to their traversed destinations without validation. On a bare-metal MLflow server, this achieves persistent RCE via cron or SSH key injection. On a Kubernetes pod with host path mounts (common in ML training setups), the traversal escapes the container and achieves host-level code execution — full cluster compromise is then a lateral movement step away.

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Timeline

Published
March 18, 2026
Last Modified
March 23, 2026
First Seen
March 18, 2026

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