CVE-2025-68477: langflow: SSRF allows internal network access
GHSA-5993-7p27-66g5MEDIUMPoC AVAILABLECISA: TRACK*If your team runs Langflow in any cloud or internal environment, patch to 1.7.1 now—do not wait. An attacker with any valid API key can weaponize the API Request component to hit cloud metadata endpoints (AWS/GCP/Azure IMDS) and steal IAM credentials, turning a CVSS 6.5 into a full cloud account compromise. Treat this as critical in cloud-hosted deployments and restrict API key distribution immediately while patching.
What is the risk?
NVD rates this medium (CVSS 6.5), but environmental risk is substantially higher for cloud-hosted Langflow instances. The SSRF is non-blind—full response bodies are returned—and requires only a valid API key with low complexity and no user interaction. Cloud metadata endpoint access (169.254.169.254) is the critical escalation path: successful exploitation yields ephemeral IAM tokens with the instance's full cloud permissions. EPSS is low (0.00026) indicating no current active exploitation, but the attack is trivial to execute and the payoff is high, making this a near-term exploitation target as the framework's adoption grows.
What systems are affected?
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
6 stepsPATCH immediately: Upgrade Langflow to >= 1.7.1.
Network egress controls: Block outbound traffic from the Langflow server to 169.254.169.254 (cloud metadata), RFC-1918 ranges (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16), and loopback interfaces at the host/container/firewall level.
If patching is delayed: Disable the API Request component in Langflow's component settings or restrict which components users can add to flows.
API key hygiene: Rotate all Langflow API keys. Assume any key accessible to external or untrusted parties is compromised—revoke and reissue.
Cloud hardening: Enable IMDSv2 on all AWS EC2 instances running Langflow (requires session-oriented requests, blocking simple SSRF). Apply equivalent protections on GCP and Azure.
Detection: Alert on outbound HTTP connections from the Langflow process to RFC-1918, 169.254.x.x, or localhost ranges. Monitor /api/v1/run endpoint calls for URL parameters containing private IP patterns.
What does CISA's SSVC say?
Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2025-68477?
If your team runs Langflow in any cloud or internal environment, patch to 1.7.1 now—do not wait. An attacker with any valid API key can weaponize the API Request component to hit cloud metadata endpoints (AWS/GCP/Azure IMDS) and steal IAM credentials, turning a CVSS 6.5 into a full cloud account compromise. Treat this as critical in cloud-hosted deployments and restrict API key distribution immediately while patching.
Is CVE-2025-68477 actively exploited?
Proof-of-concept exploit code is publicly available for CVE-2025-68477, increasing the risk of exploitation.
How to fix CVE-2025-68477?
1. PATCH immediately: Upgrade Langflow to >= 1.7.1. 2. Network egress controls: Block outbound traffic from the Langflow server to 169.254.169.254 (cloud metadata), RFC-1918 ranges (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16), and loopback interfaces at the host/container/firewall level. 3. If patching is delayed: Disable the API Request component in Langflow's component settings or restrict which components users can add to flows. 4. API key hygiene: Rotate all Langflow API keys. Assume any key accessible to external or untrusted parties is compromised—revoke and reissue. 5. Cloud hardening: Enable IMDSv2 on all AWS EC2 instances running Langflow (requires session-oriented requests, blocking simple SSRF). Apply equivalent protections on GCP and Azure. 6. Detection: Alert on outbound HTTP connections from the Langflow process to RFC-1918, 169.254.x.x, or localhost ranges. Monitor /api/v1/run endpoint calls for URL parameters containing private IP patterns.
What systems are affected by CVE-2025-68477?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: agent frameworks, LLM orchestration platforms, cloud-hosted AI workflows, multi-agent pipelines, agentic workflow automation.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2025-68477?
CVE-2025-68477 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.5 (MEDIUM). The EPSS exploitation probability is 6.30%.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0036Data from Information RepositoriesAML.T0037Data from Local SystemAML.T0040AI Model Inference API AccessAML.T0049Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationAML.T0053AI Agent Tool InvocationAML.T0055Unsecured CredentialsAML.T0075Cloud Service DiscoveryAML.T0085.001AI Agent ToolsCompliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.0, Langflow provides an API Request component that can issue arbitrary HTTP requests within a flow. This component takes a user-supplied URL, performs only normalization and basic format checks, and then sends the request using a server-side httpx client. It does not block private IP ranges (127[.]0[.]0[.]1, the 10/172/192 ranges) or cloud metadata endpoints (169[.]254[.]169[.]254), and it returns the response body as the result. Because the flow execution endpoints (/api/v1/run, /api/v1/run/advanced) can be invoked with just an API key, if an attacker can control the API Request URL in a flow, non-blind SSRF is possible—accessing internal resources from the server’s network context. This enables requests to, and collection of responses from, internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases/services, leading to information disclosure and providing a foothold for further attacks. Version 1.7.0 contains a patch for this issue.
Exploitation Scenario
Attacker acquires a Langflow API key via a leaked .env file in a public GitHub repository or a compromised developer machine. They POST to /api/v1/run/{flow_id} with the API Request component URL set to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ on an AWS-hosted instance. The response reveals the attached IAM role name. A second request to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/{role_name} returns AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, and SessionToken. The attacker now holds valid AWS credentials with the instance role's full permissions—potentially S3 read/write, RDS access, or admin-level IAM rights—with zero victim interaction and no forensic trace in Langflow's application logs beyond standard API call records.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-918 — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
- [Implementation, Operation] If there is a known list of applications, IP, hostname, and/or domains to which the product is allowed to communicate, then use allowlists to ensure that outgoing requests are restricted to these known entities. The allowlists could be in the application code or possibly enforced by firewalls or network segmentation [REF-1511].
- [Implementation, Operation] If the product is expected to be able to connect to arbitrary IP addresses or domains, consider using a denylist that includes private network addresses, internal domain names, etc. The denylist could be in the application code or possibly enforced by firewalls or network segmentation [REF-1511].
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NReferences
Timeline
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