CVE-2025-68477

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.0, Langflow provides an API Request component that can issue arbitrary HTTP requests within a flow. This component takes a user-supplied URL, performs only normalization and basic format checks, and then sends the request using a server-side httpx client. It does not block private IP ranges (127[.]0[.]0[.]1, the 10/172/192 ranges) or cloud metadata endpoints (169[.]254[.]169[.]254), and it returns the response body as the result. Because the flow execution endpoints (/api/v1/run, /api/v1/run/advanced) can be invoked with just an API key, if an attacker can control the API Request URL in a flow, non-blind SSRF is possible—accessing internal resources from the server’s network context. This enables requests to, and collection of responses from, internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases/services, leading to information disclosure and providing a foothold for further attacks. Version 1.7.0 contains a patch for this issue.

Attacker acquires a Langflow API key via a leaked .env file in a public GitHub repository or a compromised developer machine. They POST to /api/v1/run/{flow_id} with the API Request component URL set to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ on an AWS-hosted instance. The response reveals the attached IAM role name. A second request to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/{role_name} returns AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, and SessionToken. The attacker now holds valid AWS credentials with the instance role's full permissions—potentially S3 read/write, RDS access, or admin-level IAM rights—with zero victim interaction and no forensic trace in Langflow's application logs beyond standard API call records.