CVE-2026-100846: MONAI: unsafe pickle deserialization allows RCE

HIGHPoC AVAILABLECISA: ATTEND
Published September 27, 2026
CISO Take

MONAI versions before 1.5.2 contain an unsafe deserialization flaw in algo_from_pickle (monai/auto3dseg/utils.py), which passes the contents of a .pkl file straight to pickle.loads, so a crafted file executes attacker code with the application's privileges. The package has 126 downstream dependents and 14 other tracked CVEs, and it is widely used in medical imaging pipelines where hosts often hold sensitive patient data. Exploitation likelihood is currently low: EPSS is 0.00292 (top 80th percentile), it is not in CISA KEV, and no public exploit or Nuclei template exists. Still, pickle RCE is trivial to weaponize once a victim loads an attacker-supplied file, and the CVSS of 8.8 reflects full confidentiality, integrity and availability loss. Upgrade to MONAI 1.5.2 or later, and until then block untrusted .pkl files from reaching Auto3DSeg workflows.

Sources:NVDEPSSGitHub Advisoryvulncheck.comOpenSSFATLAS

What is the risk?

High severity (CVSS 8.8) but low near-term exploitation likelihood (EPSS 0.00292, no public exploit, not in KEV, no scanner template). Exploitation requires the application to call algo_from_pickle on an attacker-controlled file, which means user interaction or an exposed file-ingestion path. Once triggered, impact is arbitrary code execution with full CIA impact. Exposure is concentrated in research and clinical ML environments that exchange Auto3DSeg algorithm artifacts, which are often shared between teams and downloaded from external sources. The OpenSSF Scorecard of 7.9/10 and package risk score of 26/100 indicate a reasonably maintained project, and the repository is actively pushed to.

How does the attack unfold?

Artifact Delivery
Attacker distributes a malicious .pkl algorithm file via a shared repository, download or collaborator exchange.
AML.T0010.001
User Execution
A user or pipeline calls algo_from_pickle on the attacker-supplied file, triggering pickle.loads.
AML.T0011.000
Code Execution
The object's __reduce__ method runs arbitrary commands in the MONAI process context.
AML.T0050
Impact
Attacker steals patient imaging data, model weights and credentials, and tampers with models or pivots into the network.
AML.T0025

What systems are affected?

PackageEcosystemVulnerable RangePatched
MONAIpip—No patch
8.8KOpenSSF 7.8129 dependentsPushed 4d ago41% patched~22d to patchFull package profile →

Do you use MONAI? You're affected.

How severe is it?

CVSS 3.1
8.8 / 10
EPSS
0.4%
chance of exploitation in 30 days
Higher than 30% of all CVEs
Exploitation Status
Exploit Available
Exploitation: MEDIUM
Sophistication
Trivial
Exploitation Confidence
medium
○CISA SSVC: Public PoC
○Public PoC indexed (trickest/cve)
Composite signal derived from CISA KEV, VulnCheck KEV, CISA SSVC, EPSS, Metasploit, Exploit-DB, trickest/cve, Nuclei templates, and inthewild.io exploitation reports.

What is the attack surface?

AVACPRUISCIA
AVNetwork
ACLow
PRNone
UIRequired
SUnchanged
CHigh
IHigh
AHigh

What should I do?

1 step
  1. 1) Upgrade MONAI to 1.5.2 or later (pip install -U monai) and rebuild container images. 2) Until patched, do not call algo_from_pickle on files from untrusted or unverified sources; restrict write access to Auto3DSeg working directories and algorithm template stores. 3) Verify integrity of shared algorithm artifacts with checksums or signatures and keep them in access-controlled storage. 4) Scan pickle artifacts with picklescan or fickling before loading, and prefer non-executable formats where possible. 5) Run training and experimentation jobs with least privilege in sandboxed containers with restricted egress and no ambient cloud credentials. 6) Detect: hunt for unexpected child processes (shell, curl, python -c) spawned by MONAI/Auto3DSeg Python processes, unusual outbound connections from training hosts, and unexpected .pkl files in project directories. 7) Inventory MONAI usage via SBOM and dependency scanning.

What does CISA's SSVC say?

DecisionAttend
Exploitationpoc
AutomatableNo
Technical Impacttotal

Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.

How is it classified?

Which compliance frameworks are affected?

This CVE is relevant to:

EU AI Act
Art. 15-Accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity
ISO 42001
A.10.3-Suppliers
NIST AI RMF
MANAGE 2.3-Procedures to respond to and recover from unknown risks
OWASP LLM Top 10
LLM05-Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-100846?

MONAI versions before 1.5.2 contain an unsafe deserialization flaw in algo_from_pickle (monai/auto3dseg/utils.py), which passes the contents of a .pkl file straight to pickle.loads, so a crafted file executes attacker code with the application's privileges. The package has 126 downstream dependents and 14 other tracked CVEs, and it is widely used in medical imaging pipelines where hosts often hold sensitive patient data. Exploitation likelihood is currently low: EPSS is 0.00292 (top 80th percentile), it is not in CISA KEV, and no public exploit or Nuclei template exists. Still, pickle RCE is trivial to weaponize once a victim loads an attacker-supplied file, and the CVSS of 8.8 reflects full confidentiality, integrity and availability loss. Upgrade to MONAI 1.5.2 or later, and until then block untrusted .pkl files from reaching Auto3DSeg workflows.

Is CVE-2026-100846 actively exploited?

Proof-of-concept exploit code is publicly available for CVE-2026-100846, increasing the risk of exploitation.

How to fix CVE-2026-100846?

1) Upgrade MONAI to 1.5.2 or later (pip install -U monai) and rebuild container images. 2) Until patched, do not call algo_from_pickle on files from untrusted or unverified sources; restrict write access to Auto3DSeg working directories and algorithm template stores. 3) Verify integrity of shared algorithm artifacts with checksums or signatures and keep them in access-controlled storage. 4) Scan pickle artifacts with picklescan or fickling before loading, and prefer non-executable formats where possible. 5) Run training and experimentation jobs with least privilege in sandboxed containers with restricted egress and no ambient cloud credentials. 6) Detect: hunt for unexpected child processes (shell, curl, python -c) spawned by MONAI/Auto3DSeg Python processes, unusual outbound connections from training hosts, and unexpected .pkl files in project directories. 7) Inventory MONAI usage via SBOM and dependency scanning.

What systems are affected by CVE-2026-100846?

This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: training pipelines, medical imaging ML workflows, model/artifact sharing and registries, Jupyter-based research environments, MLOps automation (AutoML).

What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-100846?

CVE-2026-100846 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.8 (HIGH). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.36%.

What is the AI security impact?

Affected AI Architectures

training pipelinesmedical imaging ML workflowsmodel/artifact sharing and registriesJupyter-based research environmentsMLOps automation (AutoML)

MITRE ATLAS Techniques

AML.T0010.001AI Software
AML.T0011.000Unsafe AI Artifacts
AML.T0018.002Embed Malware
AML.T0050Command and Scripting Interpreter

Compliance Controls Affected

EU AI Act: Art. 15
ISO 42001: A.10.3
NIST AI RMF: MANAGE 2.3
OWASP LLM Top 10: LLM05

What are the technical details?

Original Advisory

MONAI before 1.5.2 contains a deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability in the algo_from_pickle function in monai/auto3dseg/utils.py. The function reads a .pkl file and passes its contents to pickle.loads without validating the data source or content. If an application invokes algo_from_pickle on an attacker-supplied pickle file, an object defining __reduce__ is executed during deserialization, resulting in arbitrary code execution in the context of the application.

Exploitation Scenario

An attacker publishes or shares a seemingly legitimate Auto3DSeg algorithm package or a pre-trained pipeline bundle (for example, on a forum, shared drive or a collaborator's repository) containing a malicious .pkl file whose object defines __reduce__ to launch a reverse shell. A researcher or automated pipeline loads it with algo_from_pickle to resume or reuse the algorithm. The payload executes immediately in the context of the MONAI process, exfiltrating imaging datasets and cloud credentials from the GPU workstation, then pivoting to internal storage or PACS systems.

Weaknesses (CWE)

CWE-502 — Deserialization of Untrusted Data: The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

  • [Architecture and Design, Implementation] If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • [Implementation] When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.

Source: MITRE CWE corpus.

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Timeline

Published
September 27, 2026
Last Modified
October 8, 2026
First Seen
September 27, 2026

Related Vulnerabilities