JupyterLab, Notebook and JupyterLite let a pasted code cell carry attacker-controlled metadata.trusted, so HTML output is treated as trusted and its script runs in the authenticated Jupyter origin without the cell ever being executed. The result is stored/DOM-style XSS with high confidentiality and integrity impact (CVSS 8.1). It needs user interaction, and the system clipboard paste feature must be active with pasteCodeCellsWithoutOutput disabled. The blast radius is wide: 1,892 downstream dependents, and Jupyter servers commonly hold cloud credentials, API keys, datasets and model artifacts. Exploitation risk today is moderate rather than urgent. EPSS is 0.00196 (top 91% percentile), it is not in CISA KEV, there is no public exploit or Nuclei template, and CISA SSVC says TRACK. Patch to JupyterLab 4.5.11 or 4.6.4, Notebook 7.6.3 and JupyterLite Core 0.8.4. Until then, tell data scientists not to paste cells from untrusted sources, and prioritize multi-user and internet-reachable Jupyter deployments.
What is the risk?
Rated high (CVSS 8.1) but contextual risk is medium. Exploitation needs a victim to paste crafted cell JSON from the clipboard, plus a non-default-looking configuration (useSystemClipboardForCells active, pasteCodeCellsWithoutOutput disabled). EPSS is low (0.00196, top 91%), there is no KEV listing, no public PoC and no scanner template. Impact is high: script runs in the authenticated Jupyter origin, which can reach the kernel API, so it can lead to code execution as the user, token theft and data exfiltration. Exposure is greatest on shared JupyterHub, cloud-hosted notebooks and JupyterLite deployments where users routinely copy cells from tutorials, forums or chat. The package has an OpenSSF Scorecard of 5.8/10 and 94 other CVEs, which signals a recurring patch burden.
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jupyter | pip | >= 4.6.0, <= 4.6.3 | 4.6.4 |
| Jupyter | pip | >= 0.7.0, <= 0.8.3 | 0.8.4 |
| Jupyter | pip | >= 0.7.0, <= 0.8.3 | 0.8.4 |
| Jupyter Notebook | pip | >= 7.5.0, <= 7.6.2 | 7.6.3 |
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
1 step1) Upgrade JupyterLab to 4.5.11 or 4.6.4, Notebook to 7.6.3, and jupyterlite-core and jupyterlite to 0.8.4, and rebuild any static JupyterLite sites. 2) Workaround: disable useSystemClipboardForCells, or enable pasteCodeCellsWithoutOutput so pasted cells drop outputs and trust metadata. 3) Train users not to paste cells from untrusted sources and to review them in a plain-text editor first. 4) Harden deployments: set a strict CSP, isolate user servers on separate origins, use short-lived tokens, and avoid storing long-lived cloud or LLM API keys in notebook environments. 5) Detection: inventory versions with pip list or SBOM tooling, and audit notebooks for metadata.trusted:true in code cells with text/html outputs. Review Jupyter server logs for unexpected kernel or API calls shortly after paste events.
What does CISA's SSVC say?
Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-102831?
JupyterLab, Notebook and JupyterLite let a pasted code cell carry attacker-controlled metadata.trusted, so HTML output is treated as trusted and its script runs in the authenticated Jupyter origin without the cell ever being executed. The result is stored/DOM-style XSS with high confidentiality and integrity impact (CVSS 8.1). It needs user interaction, and the system clipboard paste feature must be active with pasteCodeCellsWithoutOutput disabled. The blast radius is wide: 1,892 downstream dependents, and Jupyter servers commonly hold cloud credentials, API keys, datasets and model artifacts. Exploitation risk today is moderate rather than urgent. EPSS is 0.00196 (top 91% percentile), it is not in CISA KEV, there is no public exploit or Nuclei template, and CISA SSVC says TRACK. Patch to JupyterLab 4.5.11 or 4.6.4, Notebook 7.6.3 and JupyterLite Core 0.8.4. Until then, tell data scientists not to paste cells from untrusted sources, and prioritize multi-user and internet-reachable Jupyter deployments.
Is CVE-2026-102831 actively exploited?
No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-102831 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.
How to fix CVE-2026-102831?
1) Upgrade JupyterLab to 4.5.11 or 4.6.4, Notebook to 7.6.3, and jupyterlite-core and jupyterlite to 0.8.4, and rebuild any static JupyterLite sites. 2) Workaround: disable useSystemClipboardForCells, or enable pasteCodeCellsWithoutOutput so pasted cells drop outputs and trust metadata. 3) Train users not to paste cells from untrusted sources and to review them in a plain-text editor first. 4) Harden deployments: set a strict CSP, isolate user servers on separate origins, use short-lived tokens, and avoid storing long-lived cloud or LLM API keys in notebook environments. 5) Detection: inventory versions with pip list or SBOM tooling, and audit notebooks for metadata.trusted:true in code cells with text/html outputs. Review Jupyter server logs for unexpected kernel or API calls shortly after paste events.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-102831?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: Interactive ML development notebooks, JupyterHub multi-user environments, Browser-based JupyterLite/Pyodide notebooks, Training pipelines launched from notebooks, Managed notebook platforms.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-102831?
CVE-2026-102831 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.1 (HIGH). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.24%.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0011User ExecutionAML.T0049Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationCompliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
JupyterLab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. From JupyterLab 4.5.0 until 4.5.11 and 4.6.4, from Notebook 7.5.0 until 7.6.3, and from JupyterLite Core 0.7.0 until 0.8.4, the system clipboard cell-paste path accepts attacker-controlled cell JSON without clearing metadata.trusted. When useSystemClipboardForCells is active and pasteCodeCellsWithoutOutput is disabled, a pasted code cell can mark HTML output as trusted, bypass output sanitization, and execute script in the authenticated JupyterLab origin without executing the cell. Markdown and raw cells are not affected because their output is sanitized. This issue is fixed in JupyterLab 4.5.11 and 4.6.4, Notebook 7.6.3, and JupyterLite Core 0.8.4.
Exploitation Scenario
An attacker publishes a helpful-looking notebook snippet in a tutorial, forum post, chat or ticket, delivered as cell JSON that the browser copies to the clipboard. The cell has metadata.trusted set to true and a text/html output containing a script payload. A data scientist with the vulnerable JupyterLab pastes the cell into their notebook. The HTML output renders without sanitization and the script runs in the authenticated Jupyter origin without the cell being executed. The script then uses the Jupyter REST and kernel APIs to read environment variables and files, exfiltrate cloud and LLM API keys and datasets, or run code in the kernel to establish persistence.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-345Insufficient Verification of Data AuthenticityPrimaryCWE-345Insufficient Verification of Data AuthenticityPrimaryCWE-79Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page GenerationPrimaryCWE-79Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')PrimaryCWE-345Insufficient Verification of Data AuthenticityCWE-79Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page GenerationCWE-345 — Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity: The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:NReferences
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-6966-vjj6-99xv
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102831
- github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/commit/1a10a7da5ff655849b21581c2633b46483ae0be9
- github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/commit/7f9f29e29e0c83fb17b0f11da57d06b3c6a40d96
- github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/commit/cf6e89a8d315c4134cefa50c220bca296da466a7
- github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/releases/tag/v4.5.11
- github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/releases/tag/v4.6.4
- github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/security/advisories/GHSA-6966-vjj6-99xv
Timeline
Related Vulnerabilities
CVE-2023-2557410.0JupyterHub LTI13: JWT forgery enables full auth bypass
Same package: jupyterCVE-2024-3970010.0JupyterLab extension-template: CI workflow RCE
Same package: jupyterCVE-2026-441809.8Jupyter Enterprise Gateway: root privilege bypass in Kubernetes
Same package: jupyterCVE-2026-235379.1Feast: unauth file write to RCE via /save-document
Same package: jupyterCVE-2026-545279.0jupyterlab-git: stored XSS escalates to full RCE
Same package: jupyter