CVE-2026-12481: Keras: safe_mode=None bypass enables Lambda RCE
GHSA-5gwj-m78q-7pq3CRITICALCISA: ATTENDKeras 3.14.0 contains a logic flaw in its Lambda layer deserialization guard: the safety check treats `safe_mode=None` (the default when `from_config()` is called outside a `SafeModeScope`) as if it were explicitly disabled, allowing attacker-controlled marshal bytecode to execute arbitrary OS commands during model load. This matters because Keras sits at the base of countless model-serving, fine-tuning, and notebook pipelines, and any code path that calls `keras.layers.deserialize()`, `keras.models.clone_model()`, or `Lambda.from_config()` without wrapping it in `SafeModeScope(True)` is silently exposed by default, not by misconfiguration. There is no CISA KEV listing, no public exploit, and no Nuclei template yet, and EPSS sits at 0.4% (top 68th percentile) — so this looks pre-weaponization rather than actively exploited, but the vulnerability class (unsafe pickle/marshal-style deserialization in ML model loading) has a long track record of rapid PoC turnaround once details circulate via the huntr bounty writeup. Upgrade past the affected 3.14.0 release as soon as a patched Keras version is available, and in the interim explicitly enforce `SafeModeScope(True)` (or `safe_mode=True`) around every `from_config`/`deserialize`/`clone_model` call and treat any model file from an untrusted source as executable code, not data.
What is the risk?
Moderate-to-high latent severity, currently low observed exploitation. The flaw grants arbitrary OS-level code execution — the worst-case outcome for a deserialization bug — but exploitation requires an attacker to supply a crafted model/config that gets loaded through an unguarded Keras deserialization path, which typically means either a malicious model file (supply chain) or an application that loads user-supplied models/configs. No CVSS score is published yet, EPSS is low (0.4%, 68th percentile), it is not in CISA KEV, and there is no public exploit or Nuclei template. The real risk driver is Keras's ubiquity as a foundational ML library: any organization loading third-party or user-supplied `.keras`/`.h5` models or configs without an explicit safe-mode wrapper is exposed by default, making this a supply-chain-adjacent risk rather than a directly internet-facing one.
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Keras | pip | < 3.12.3 | 3.12.3 |
Do you use Keras? You're affected.
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
1 step1) Upgrade Keras past 3.14.0 once a patched release addressing
_raise_for_lambda_deserialization()is available — track the huntr advisory and keras-team release notes. 2) Until patched, explicitly wrap everykeras.layers.deserialize(),keras.models.clone_model(), andLambda.from_config()call inwith keras.saving.SafeModeScope(True):rather than relying on the default. 3) Never load Keras models or configs from untrusted or unauthenticated sources (user uploads, public model hubs, third-party partners) without this guard. 4) Detection: audit codebases forfrom_config(,clone_model(, andlayers.deserialize(call sites lacking an enclosingSafeModeScope; add a static-analysis or CI grep rule to catch regressions. 5) Where feasible, run model-loading services in a sandboxed/least-privilege container so that even successful marshal bytecode execution has minimal blast radius.
What does CISA's SSVC say?
Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-12481?
Keras 3.14.0 contains a logic flaw in its Lambda layer deserialization guard: the safety check treats `safe_mode=None` (the default when `from_config()` is called outside a `SafeModeScope`) as if it were explicitly disabled, allowing attacker-controlled marshal bytecode to execute arbitrary OS commands during model load. This matters because Keras sits at the base of countless model-serving, fine-tuning, and notebook pipelines, and any code path that calls `keras.layers.deserialize()`, `keras.models.clone_model()`, or `Lambda.from_config()` without wrapping it in `SafeModeScope(True)` is silently exposed by default, not by misconfiguration. There is no CISA KEV listing, no public exploit, and no Nuclei template yet, and EPSS sits at 0.4% (top 68th percentile) — so this looks pre-weaponization rather than actively exploited, but the vulnerability class (unsafe pickle/marshal-style deserialization in ML model loading) has a long track record of rapid PoC turnaround once details circulate via the huntr bounty writeup. Upgrade past the affected 3.14.0 release as soon as a patched Keras version is available, and in the interim explicitly enforce `SafeModeScope(True)` (or `safe_mode=True`) around every `from_config`/`deserialize`/`clone_model` call and treat any model file from an untrusted source as executable code, not data.
Is CVE-2026-12481 actively exploited?
No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-12481 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.
How to fix CVE-2026-12481?
1) Upgrade Keras past 3.14.0 once a patched release addressing `_raise_for_lambda_deserialization()` is available — track the huntr advisory and keras-team release notes. 2) Until patched, explicitly wrap every `keras.layers.deserialize()`, `keras.models.clone_model()`, and `Lambda.from_config()` call in `with keras.saving.SafeModeScope(True):` rather than relying on the default. 3) Never load Keras models or configs from untrusted or unauthenticated sources (user uploads, public model hubs, third-party partners) without this guard. 4) Detection: audit codebases for `from_config(`, `clone_model(`, and `layers.deserialize(` call sites lacking an enclosing `SafeModeScope`; add a static-analysis or CI grep rule to catch regressions. 5) Where feasible, run model-loading services in a sandboxed/least-privilege container so that even successful marshal bytecode execution has minimal blast radius.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-12481?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: model serving, training pipelines, ml-ops platforms, notebook/research environments.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-12481?
CVE-2026-12481 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.8 (CRITICAL). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.72%.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0010.001AI SoftwareAML.T0011.000Unsafe AI ArtifactsAML.T0018.002Embed MalwareAML.T0050Command and Scripting InterpreterCompliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
A vulnerability in keras-team/keras version 3.14.0 allows for arbitrary code execution due to improper handling of deserialization in the `Lambda` layer. Specifically, the `_raise_for_lambda_deserialization()` function fails to enforce the safe-mode guard when `safe_mode` is set to `None`, which is the default value when `from_config()` is called outside of a `SafeModeScope` context. This logic error conflates `None` (unset/default-deny) with `False` (explicitly disabled), bypassing the guard and allowing attacker-controlled `marshal` bytecode to be deserialized. Affected call sites include `keras.layers.deserialize(config)`, `keras.models.clone_model(model)`, and any direct invocation of `Lambda.from_config(config)` without an enclosing `SafeModeScope(True)`. This vulnerability can be exploited to achieve arbitrary OS-level code execution in the context of the server or user process.
Exploitation Scenario
An attacker crafts a malicious `.keras` model file (or a bare model config) containing a `Lambda` layer whose serialized function is Python `marshal` bytecode that executes an OS command on load — e.g., a reverse shell or credential-harvesting payload. The attacker distributes this file via a public model-sharing platform, a pull request to an ML repo, or directly to a victim organization's model upload/inference endpoint, disguised as a legitimate fine-tuned model. When the victim's application calls `keras.models.clone_model()` or `keras.layers.deserialize()` on the file without wrapping it in `SafeModeScope(True)` — the default, unguarded behavior — the marshal bytecode executes with the privileges of the loading process, giving the attacker code execution on the model-serving host or the data scientist's workstation.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-502Deserialization of Untrusted DataPrimaryCWE-502Deserialization of Untrusted DataPrimaryCWE-502Deserialization of Untrusted DataCWE-502 — Deserialization of Untrusted Data: The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.
- [Architecture and Design, Implementation] If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
- [Implementation] When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HReferences
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-5gwj-m78q-7pq3
- github.com/keras-team/keras/commit/55888d3becbdbb45dc16a55b489900f911e2dde5
- github.com/keras-team/keras/commit/d338a45204bdc787c8b3c4a9b82c1911cd52dedf
- github.com/keras-team/keras/pull/23048
- github.com/keras-team/keras/pull/23165
- github.com/keras-team/keras/releases/tag/v3.12.3
- github.com/keras-team/keras/releases/tag/v3.15.0
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12481
- huntr.com/bounties/59ceaed1-c8a3-4135-8f94-169ade02823d
Timeline
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