CVE-2026-19299: Langflow: authenticated path traversal leaks files
MEDIUMIBM Langflow OSS versions 1.0.0 through 1.11.2 contain a path traversal flaw (CWE-22) that lets any authenticated user — even one with low privileges — read arbitrary files outside the application's intended directory over the network, with no user interaction required. There's no public exploit, no Nuclei template, no EPSS score, and it isn't in CISA KEV, so this looks like a low-noise disclosure rather than an active campaign, but Langflow deployments routinely store API keys, LLM provider credentials, and agent tool configurations inside flow files, so a successful read can hand an attacker secrets that unlock far more than the Langflow instance itself. The requirement for a valid low-privilege account meaningfully raises the bar versus an unauthenticated bug, which is consistent with the medium CVSS score (6.5) and confidentiality-only impact (no integrity or availability loss). Patch to the fixed release referenced in IBM's advisory as soon as it's available, and in the meantime restrict Langflow account provisioning, review any self-service signup or shared low-privilege accounts, and audit access logs for `../` traversal sequences against file-serving endpoints. Treat any deployment with credentials embedded in flow definitions as at-risk and rotate those secrets after patching.
What is the risk?
Medium severity per CVSS (6.5, AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/C:H/I:N/A:N) — network-reachable and low complexity, but gated behind low-privilege authentication, which limits the blast radius to insiders, compromised low-priv accounts, or environments with open self-registration. No EPSS data, no CISA KEV listing, no public PoC, and no Nuclei scanner coverage exist yet, indicating exploitation is currently theoretical rather than observed in the wild. The confidentiality-only impact (no code execution, no write, no DoS) caps the direct damage to information disclosure, but because Langflow flows commonly embed LLM API keys and tool credentials, the practical risk is higher than the raw CVSS suggests for any deployment that hasn't segmented secrets from flow storage.
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Langflow | pip | — | No patch |
Do you use Langflow? You're affected.
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
1 step1) Upgrade to the Langflow release that fixes this issue per IBM's advisory (https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7285641) as soon as it's confirmed available. 2) Until patched, restrict who can hold low-privilege authenticated accounts on the instance — disable open self-registration and review existing low-priv accounts for necessity. 3) Move secrets (LLM API keys, DB credentials) out of flow definitions and into a secrets manager or environment-scoped config not reachable via the affected file paths. 4) Monitor access/application logs for path traversal indicators (
../, encoded traversal sequences, unexpected file paths) hitting file-serving or export endpoints. 5) Network-restrict Langflow instances (VPN/allowlist) to reduce the pool of accounts that could be compromised and used as the low-privilege foothold.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-19299?
IBM Langflow OSS versions 1.0.0 through 1.11.2 contain a path traversal flaw (CWE-22) that lets any authenticated user — even one with low privileges — read arbitrary files outside the application's intended directory over the network, with no user interaction required. There's no public exploit, no Nuclei template, no EPSS score, and it isn't in CISA KEV, so this looks like a low-noise disclosure rather than an active campaign, but Langflow deployments routinely store API keys, LLM provider credentials, and agent tool configurations inside flow files, so a successful read can hand an attacker secrets that unlock far more than the Langflow instance itself. The requirement for a valid low-privilege account meaningfully raises the bar versus an unauthenticated bug, which is consistent with the medium CVSS score (6.5) and confidentiality-only impact (no integrity or availability loss). Patch to the fixed release referenced in IBM's advisory as soon as it's available, and in the meantime restrict Langflow account provisioning, review any self-service signup or shared low-privilege accounts, and audit access logs for `../` traversal sequences against file-serving endpoints. Treat any deployment with credentials embedded in flow definitions as at-risk and rotate those secrets after patching.
Is CVE-2026-19299 actively exploited?
No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-19299 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.
How to fix CVE-2026-19299?
1) Upgrade to the Langflow release that fixes this issue per IBM's advisory (https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7285641) as soon as it's confirmed available. 2) Until patched, restrict who can hold low-privilege authenticated accounts on the instance — disable open self-registration and review existing low-priv accounts for necessity. 3) Move secrets (LLM API keys, DB credentials) out of flow definitions and into a secrets manager or environment-scoped config not reachable via the affected file paths. 4) Monitor access/application logs for path traversal indicators (`../`, encoded traversal sequences, unexpected file paths) hitting file-serving or export endpoints. 5) Network-restrict Langflow instances (VPN/allowlist) to reduce the pool of accounts that could be compromised and used as the low-privilege foothold.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-19299?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: agent frameworks, low-code LLM application builders, multi-tenant LLM orchestration platforms.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-19299?
CVE-2026-19299 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.5 (MEDIUM). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.66%.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0037Data from Local SystemAML.T0049Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationAML.T0083Credentials from AI Agent ConfigurationCompliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.11.2 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to path traversal.
Exploitation Scenario
An attacker obtains or is granted a low-privileged Langflow account — via self-registration, a shared team invite, or credential compromise of a junior team member. Using that valid session, they send a crafted request containing path traversal sequences to a vulnerable file-handling endpoint (e.g., a flow export/import or media-serving route), escaping the intended storage directory. This lets them read arbitrary files on the host filesystem, including other users' flow JSON files or environment configuration containing embedded LLM provider API keys and tool credentials. The attacker then reuses those harvested credentials to access the organization's LLM provider account directly, run up usage costs, or pivot to other systems the exposed credentials touch — all without ever needing elevated Langflow privileges or executing code on the host.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-22Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted DirectoryPrimaryCWE-22Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted DirectoryCWE-22 — Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory: The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
- [Implementation] Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylis
- [Architecture and Design] For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NReferences
Timeline
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