If your organization runs vLLM between 0.10.1 and 0.13.x, patch to 0.14.0 immediately — this is a pre-auth RCE that fires at model load, before your WAF or API gateway sees a single packet. Any attacker who can influence which model your vLLM instance loads (via a malicious HuggingFace repo or poisoned local path) can own the inference host with zero friction. Audit your model sourcing pipeline and pin to verified checksums while patching.
Affected Systems
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| vllm | pip | >= 0.10.1, < 0.14.0 | 0.14.0 |
| vllm | pip | — | No patch |
Severity & Risk
Recommended Action
- 1. PATCH: Upgrade vLLM to >= 0.14.0 immediately — this is the only complete fix. 2. INTERIM WORKAROUND: Explicitly set trust_remote_code=False; audit all currently loaded model paths for auto_map keys in config.json files. 3. MODEL PROVENANCE: Implement SHA-256 checksum verification for all HuggingFace model downloads before serving; pin models to specific commit hashes rather than branch or tag references. 4. NETWORK ISOLATION: Route all model downloads through an approved internal registry or proxy — block direct vLLM-to-HuggingFace egress in production. 5. DETECTION: Alert on unexpected outbound connections from vLLM processes at startup; monitor for child processes spawned by vLLM during model load; review auto_map entries in all loaded model configs. 6. SUPPLY CHAIN: Enforce an approved model allowlist in production; prohibit ad-hoc model loading from user-specified paths.
Classification
Compliance Impact
This CVE is relevant to:
Technical Details
NVD Description
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). Starting in version 0.10.1 and prior to version 0.14.0, vLLM loads Hugging Face `auto_map` dynamic modules during model resolution without gating on `trust_remote_code`, allowing attacker-controlled Python code in a model repo/path to execute at server startup. An attacker who can influence the model repo/path (local directory or remote Hugging Face repo) can achieve arbitrary code execution on the vLLM host during model load. This happens before any request handling and does not require API access. Version 0.14.0 fixes the issue.
Exploitation Scenario
An adversary creates a malicious model repository on HuggingFace and embeds a reverse shell or credential harvester in the auto_map field of the model's config.json as attacker-controlled Python code. The adversary engineers model adoption via social engineering targeting ML engineers ('try this fine-tuned model'), compromising an upstream model dependency, or gaining write access to a CI/CD pipeline configuration specifying model paths. When the unpatched vLLM instance initializes, it resolves and executes the auto_map module with vLLM process privileges — before serving any requests and before any API-layer security controls engage — achieving full host compromise. No vLLM API credentials are required, only influence over the model path.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H References
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-2pc9-4j83-qjmr
- github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/78d13ea9de4b1ce5e4d8a5af9738fea71fb024e5
- github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/32194
- github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.14.0
- github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-2pc9-4j83-qjmr
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22807
- github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/78d13ea9de4b1ce5e4d8a5af9738fea71fb024e5 Patch
- github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/32194 Issue Patch
- github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.14.0 Product Release
- github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-2pc9-4j83-qjmr Patch Vendor