CVE-2026-3340: IBM Langflow: SSRF enables internal network enumeration
MEDIUMIBM Langflow Desktop versions 1.0.0 through 1.8.4 contain an SSRF flaw that coerces the application server into issuing unauthorized HTTP requests to internal network resources on behalf of an attacker. Despite a medium CVSS score of 6.5, EPSS data places this in the top 91st percentile for exploitation likelihood — a signal that real-world conditions favor exploitation faster than severity alone suggests, and the CVSS vector (PR:N, AC:L) contradicts the advisory's 'authenticated attacker' qualifier, warranting treatment as potentially pre-auth. Langflow's architectural position as an LLM workflow orchestrator — typically wired to internal model endpoints, vector databases, and cloud APIs — amplifies the blast radius well beyond a standard SSRF: cloud metadata endpoints (AWS/GCP/Azure IMDS), internal credential stores, and connected AI services are all reachable. Update to the remediated release per the IBM advisory and apply strict egress filtering on the Langflow host to block RFC1918, link-local, and loopback targets pending patching.
What is the risk?
Moderate-to-elevated risk for any organization running Langflow adjacent to cloud infrastructure or internal AI services. The CVSS attack complexity is low and the attack vector is network, meaning no special positioning is required. The discrepancy between the CVSS vector (PR:N — no privileges) and the advisory description ('authenticated attacker') is unresolved; organizations should conservatively assume the flaw may be reachable without authentication. EPSS top-91st percentile indicates elevated exploitation probability relative to the broader CVE corpus. Absence from CISA KEV and lack of a public exploit or Nuclei template reduce immediate urgency, with SSVC decision TRACK appropriate.
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Langflow | pip | — | No patch |
Do you use Langflow? You're affected.
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
5 steps-
Patch: Apply the remediated IBM Langflow Desktop version per the advisory at https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7271096 immediately.
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Egress filtering: Enforce strict outbound HTTP allowlisting on the Langflow host — deny requests to RFC1918 ranges (10.x, 172.16-31.x, 192.168.x), link-local (169.254.x.x), and loopback (127.x).
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Network segmentation: Isolate Langflow instances from sensitive internal AI services, model APIs, and cloud control planes using firewall rules or service mesh policy.
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Detection: Alert on outbound HTTP requests from the Langflow process to internal IP ranges, cloud metadata addresses, or unexpected external hosts.
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Authentication enforcement: Given the CVSS PR:N discrepancy, verify authentication is enforced on all exposed Langflow instances and disable anonymous access if present.
What does CISA's SSVC say?
Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-3340?
IBM Langflow Desktop versions 1.0.0 through 1.8.4 contain an SSRF flaw that coerces the application server into issuing unauthorized HTTP requests to internal network resources on behalf of an attacker. Despite a medium CVSS score of 6.5, EPSS data places this in the top 91st percentile for exploitation likelihood — a signal that real-world conditions favor exploitation faster than severity alone suggests, and the CVSS vector (PR:N, AC:L) contradicts the advisory's 'authenticated attacker' qualifier, warranting treatment as potentially pre-auth. Langflow's architectural position as an LLM workflow orchestrator — typically wired to internal model endpoints, vector databases, and cloud APIs — amplifies the blast radius well beyond a standard SSRF: cloud metadata endpoints (AWS/GCP/Azure IMDS), internal credential stores, and connected AI services are all reachable. Update to the remediated release per the IBM advisory and apply strict egress filtering on the Langflow host to block RFC1918, link-local, and loopback targets pending patching.
Is CVE-2026-3340 actively exploited?
No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-3340 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.
How to fix CVE-2026-3340?
1. Patch: Apply the remediated IBM Langflow Desktop version per the advisory at https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7271096 immediately. 2. Egress filtering: Enforce strict outbound HTTP allowlisting on the Langflow host — deny requests to RFC1918 ranges (10.x, 172.16-31.x, 192.168.x), link-local (169.254.x.x), and loopback (127.x). 3. Network segmentation: Isolate Langflow instances from sensitive internal AI services, model APIs, and cloud control planes using firewall rules or service mesh policy. 4. Detection: Alert on outbound HTTP requests from the Langflow process to internal IP ranges, cloud metadata addresses, or unexpected external hosts. 5. Authentication enforcement: Given the CVSS PR:N discrepancy, verify authentication is enforced on all exposed Langflow instances and disable anonymous access if present.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-3340?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: LLM workflow orchestration platforms, agent frameworks, AI development environments, cloud-hosted AI pipelines.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-3340?
CVE-2026-3340 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.5 (MEDIUM). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.17%.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0006 Active Scanning AML.T0037 Data from Local System AML.T0049 Exploit Public-Facing Application AML.T0075 Cloud Service Discovery Compliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
IBM Langflow Desktop 1.0.0 through 1.8.4 IBM Langflow is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks.
Exploitation Scenario
An attacker — authenticated or potentially unauthenticated given the PR:N CVSS vector — accesses an internet-facing IBM Langflow Desktop instance and creates a flow containing an HTTP Request node targeting http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ (AWS IMDS). Langflow's backend processes the flow and returns the cloud IAM temporary credentials to the attacker. With these credentials the attacker pivots directly into the cloud account hosting the AI stack: accessing S3 buckets containing training data, calling model inference APIs under the victim's identity, or enumerating the internal VPC to find vector databases and other AI services that lack public authentication.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-918 — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N References
Timeline
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