CVE-2026-35615: PraisonAI: path traversal exposes full filesystem via agent tools

### Executive Summary: The path validation has a critical logic bug: it checks for `..` AFTER `normpath()` has already collapsed all `..` sequences. This makes the check completely useless and allows trivial path traversal to any file on the system. The path validation function also does not resolve the symlink wich could potentially cause path traversal. ### Details: `_validate_path()` calls `os.path.normpath()` first, which collapses `..` sequences, then checks for `'..'` in normalized. Since `..` is already collapsed, the check always passes. **Vulnerable File:** `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/file_tools.py` **Lines:** 42-49 ```python class FileTools: """Tools for file operations including read, write, list, and information.""" @staticmethod def _validate_path(filepath: str) -> str: # Normalize the path normalized = os.path.normpath(filepath) absolute = os.path.abspath(normalized) # Check for path traversal attempts (.. after normalization) # We check the original input for '..' to catch traversal attempts if '..' in normalized: raise ValueError(f"Path traversal detected: {filepath}") return absolute ``` **Severity:** CRITICAL **CVSS v3.1:** 9.2 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N **CWE:** CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') ### Proof of concept (PoC) **Prerequisites:** - Ability to specify a file path can call file operations **Steps to reproduce:** poc.py ```python from praisonaiagents.tools.file_tools import FileTools print(FileTools._validate_path('/tmp/../etc/passwd')) # Returns: /etc/passwd print(FileTools.read_file('/tmp/../etc/passwd')) # Returns: content of /etc/passwd ``` **Why this works:** ```python # Current vulnerable code: normalized = os.path.normpath(filepath) # Collapses .. HERE absolute = os.path.abspath(normalized) if '..' in normalized: # Check AFTER collapse - ALWAYS FALSE! raise ValueError(...) ``` ### Impact: - **Complete bypass** of path traversal protection - Access to ANY file on the system with path from any starting directory - Read sensitive files: `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa` - Write arbitrary files if combined with write operations - Affect file operations `read_file`, `write_file`, `list_files`, `get_file_info`, `copy_file`, `move_file`, `delete_file`, `download_file` ### Additional Notes: - **Fix:** Check for `'..' in filepath` BEFORE calling `normpath()`, not after - `_validate_path` uses `os.path.normpath` and `os.path.abspath`, which don't resolve symlinks, making it vulnerable to path traversal via symlink if attacker can control the symlink.

An adversary targeting an organization running a PraisonAI-powered document processing agent sends a crafted query: 'Read the file at /tmp/../etc/ssh/sshd_config'. The agent passes this to `_validate_path()`, which calls `os.path.normpath('/tmp/../etc/ssh/sshd_config')` → `/etc/ssh/sshd_config`, then checks `'..' in '/etc/ssh/sshd_config'` → False, and returns the path without error. The agent reads and returns the full file contents. The adversary escalates: subsequent requests exfiltrate /etc/passwd, /root/.ssh/id_rsa, and .env files containing database credentials and API keys. If write access is available, the adversary plants a backdoor in a startup script or overwrites application configuration to redirect outbound traffic to an attacker-controlled endpoint.