CVE-2026-42862: Flowise: mass assignment breaks tenant isolation

GHSA-x5v6-pj28-cwwm HIGH CISA: ATTEND
Published May 14, 2026
CISO Take

FlowiseAI versions up to 3.1.1 contain a mass assignment vulnerability in the tool update API (PUT /api/v1/tools/{toolId}) that lets any authenticated user inject server-controlled fields — including workspaceId — directly into database entities, effectively crossing workspace boundaries without authorization. For organizations running Flowise as a shared AI agent platform across teams or clients, this breaks the tenant isolation model entirely: a user in workspace A can silently reassign tools to workspace B, and can also falsify audit timestamps (createdDate, updatedDate) to cover the activity. There is no public exploit and no CISA KEV entry, but exploitation is trivially easy for any authenticated user — a single modified HTTP request is sufficient — and this package carries 69 known CVEs, signaling a pattern of insufficient input validation across its codebase. Upgrade to flowise 3.1.2 immediately; if patching is blocked, use a WAF rule to strip workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate from PUT /api/v1/tools/* request bodies and audit your database for tools with unexpected workspaceId values.

Sources: NVD GitHub Advisory ATLAS

What is the risk?

Moderate-High for multi-tenant or shared deployments; Low for single-tenant self-hosted instances where all users are equally trusted. Exploitation requires valid credentials but zero AI/ML expertise — it is a basic HTTP parameter injection. The blast radius in a multi-workspace environment is significant: any authenticated user in any workspace can move tools across tenants without triggering standard access control alerts. The 69 prior CVEs in the flowise package indicate systemic input validation gaps, increasing the probability that adjacent bypass vectors exist. No EPSS data is available, and the vulnerability is not actively exploited in the wild as of publication date.

How does the attack unfold?

Initial Access
Attacker authenticates to the Flowise instance using valid credentials for any workspace, obtained through credential theft, phishing, or legitimate account creation on a shared instance.
AML.T0012
API Exploitation
Attacker crafts a PUT /api/v1/tools/{toolId} request injecting workspaceId of a target tenant into the JSON body; the server accepts and persists all attacker-controlled fields without validation.
AML.T0049
Evidence Tampering
Attacker sets createdDate and updatedDate to historical values in the same request to erase forensic evidence of the reassignment from audit logs.
AML.T0081
Tenant Isolation Breach
Reassigned tools — potentially containing embedded API keys, privileged system access, or sensitive schemas — are now accessible to all users in the target workspace, fully breaking multi-tenant boundaries.
AML.T0053

What systems are affected?

Package Ecosystem Vulnerable Range Patched
Flowise npm <= 3.1.1 3.1.2

Do you use Flowise? You're affected.

How severe is it?

CVSS 3.1
N/A
EPSS
0.2%
chance of exploitation in 30 days
Higher than 9% of all CVEs
Exploitation Status
Exploit Available
Exploitation: MEDIUM
Sophistication
Trivial
Exploitation Confidence
medium
CISA SSVC: Public PoC
Composite signal derived from CISA KEV, VulnCheck KEV, CISA SSVC, EPSS, Metasploit, Exploit-DB, trickest/cve, Nuclei templates, and inthewild.io exploitation reports.

What should I do?

5 steps
  1. Patch: Upgrade flowise to version 3.1.2 immediately — this is the vendor-confirmed fix.

  2. Workaround (if patching is blocked): Deploy a WAF or reverse proxy rule that strips workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate from the body of any PUT /api/v1/tools/* request before it reaches the application.

  3. Detection: Query your Flowise database for tools whose workspaceId does not match their creation context, or for tools with createdDate/updatedDate values in the distant past (pre-2020) that were not present before a specific date. Enable API request logging if not already active and alert on PUT /api/v1/tools/* requests containing the workspaceId field.

  4. Access control: Until patched, restrict the tool update endpoint to admin-role users only via network policy or API gateway.

  5. Audit: In any multi-workspace environment, enumerate all tool records and validate workspaceId integrity against expected ownership.

What does CISA's SSVC say?

Decision Attend
Exploitation poc
Automatable No
Technical Impact total

Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.

How is it classified?

Which compliance frameworks are affected?

This CVE is relevant to:

EU AI Act
Article 9 - Risk management system
ISO 42001
A.6.1.2 - AI roles and responsibilities — access authorization A.9.7 - AI system operation — access control to AI artifacts
NIST AI RMF
GOVERN 6.1 - Policies and procedures for AI risk management
OWASP LLM Top 10
LLM08:2025 - Excessive Agency

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-42862?

FlowiseAI versions up to 3.1.1 contain a mass assignment vulnerability in the tool update API (PUT /api/v1/tools/{toolId}) that lets any authenticated user inject server-controlled fields — including workspaceId — directly into database entities, effectively crossing workspace boundaries without authorization. For organizations running Flowise as a shared AI agent platform across teams or clients, this breaks the tenant isolation model entirely: a user in workspace A can silently reassign tools to workspace B, and can also falsify audit timestamps (createdDate, updatedDate) to cover the activity. There is no public exploit and no CISA KEV entry, but exploitation is trivially easy for any authenticated user — a single modified HTTP request is sufficient — and this package carries 69 known CVEs, signaling a pattern of insufficient input validation across its codebase. Upgrade to flowise 3.1.2 immediately; if patching is blocked, use a WAF rule to strip workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate from PUT /api/v1/tools/* request bodies and audit your database for tools with unexpected workspaceId values.

Is CVE-2026-42862 actively exploited?

No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-42862 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.

How to fix CVE-2026-42862?

1. Patch: Upgrade flowise to version 3.1.2 immediately — this is the vendor-confirmed fix. 2. Workaround (if patching is blocked): Deploy a WAF or reverse proxy rule that strips workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate from the body of any PUT /api/v1/tools/* request before it reaches the application. 3. Detection: Query your Flowise database for tools whose workspaceId does not match their creation context, or for tools with createdDate/updatedDate values in the distant past (pre-2020) that were not present before a specific date. Enable API request logging if not already active and alert on PUT /api/v1/tools/* requests containing the workspaceId field. 4. Access control: Until patched, restrict the tool update endpoint to admin-role users only via network policy or API gateway. 5. Audit: In any multi-workspace environment, enumerate all tool records and validate workspaceId integrity against expected ownership.

What systems are affected by CVE-2026-42862?

This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: AI agent frameworks, Multi-tenant AI platforms, Enterprise AI workflow automation.

What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-42862?

No CVSS score has been assigned yet.

What is the AI security impact?

Affected AI Architectures

AI agent frameworksMulti-tenant AI platformsEnterprise AI workflow automation

MITRE ATLAS Techniques

AML.T0012 Valid Accounts
AML.T0049 Exploit Public-Facing Application
AML.T0053 AI Agent Tool Invocation
AML.T0081 Modify AI Agent Configuration

Compliance Controls Affected

EU AI Act: Article 9
ISO 42001: A.6.1.2, A.9.7
NIST AI RMF: GOVERN 6.1
OWASP LLM Top 10: LLM08:2025

What are the technical details?

Original Advisory

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to version 3.1.2, a mass assignment vulnerability exists in the tool update endpoint of FlowiseAI. The endpoint allows authenticated users to modify server-controlled properties such as workspaceId, createdDate, and updatedDate when updating a tool resource. Due to missing server-side validation and authorization checks, an attacker can manipulate the workspaceId field and reassign tools to arbitrary workspaces. This breaks tenant isolation in multi-workspace environments. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.2.

Exploitation Scenario

An attacker obtains valid credentials to a low-privilege workspace in a shared Flowise deployment — through credential theft, account takeover, or legitimate signup on a multi-tenant instance. Using the standard Flowise UI, they capture a tool update request via browser developer tools or a proxy. They modify the JSON body to inject a target workspaceId (obtained through enumeration, leaked configuration, or insider knowledge) and send the manipulated PUT request. The server accepts and persists the attacker-controlled workspaceId without validation, moving the tool into the target workspace. The attacker also sets createdDate and updatedDate to historical values to obscure the modification in audit logs. If the reassigned tool contained embedded API keys or privileged system access in its schema/func fields, those credentials are now accessible to anyone in the target workspace. The attacker repeats across multiple tools and workspaces, systematically dismantling tenant isolation while appearing as a normal authenticated user in access logs.

Weaknesses (CWE)

CWE-284 — Improper Access Control: The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.

  • [Architecture and Design, Operation] Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
  • [Architecture and Design] Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

Source: MITRE CWE corpus.

Timeline

Published
May 14, 2026
Last Modified
June 9, 2026
First Seen
May 14, 2026

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