CVE-2026-48737: pyload-ng: IPv6 SSRF bypass evades internal-IP guard

## Summary `is_global_address` in [`src/pyload/core/utils/web/check.py`](https://github.com/pyload/pyload/blob/1b12dc7f348db8c144e0f39215680415e90ca4d2/src/pyload/core/utils/web/check.py) is the central guard against SSRF-style outbound connections in pyload-ng. It tests whether a given IP is "globally routable" via Python's `ipaddress.ip_address(value).is_global`, and callers treat `not is_global` as "deny": ```python def is_global_address(value): try: return ipaddress.ip_address(value).is_global except ValueError: return False def is_global_host(value): ips = host_to_ip(value) return ips and all((is_global_address(ip) for ip in ips)) ``` Python's `ipaddress.IPv6Address.is_global` classifies the NAT64 well-known prefix as **globally routable** on every supported Python version (3.9 through 3.14 confirmed), and on older Pythons (3.9-3.11) the 6to4 prefix as well: | address | `is_global` on Py 3.9-3.11 | `is_global` on Py 3.12+ | wrapped IPv4 | |----------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------| | `2002:7f00:0001::` (6to4) | True | False | 127.0.0.1 | | `2002:0a00:0001::` (6to4) | True | False | 10.0.0.1 | | `2002:a9fe:a9fe::` (6to4) | True | False | 169.254.169.254 (IMDS)| | `64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe` (NAT64) | True | True | 169.254.169.254 | | `64:ff9b::7f00:1` (NAT64) | True | True | 127.0.0.1 | pyload-ng declares `python_requires = >=3.9` (`setup.cfg`), so deployments on Python 3.9-3.11 see the 6to4 path too. The NAT64 path is universal. `is_global` returns True for these wrappers, so `is_global_address` returns True and the deny check passes. The pycurl `PREREQFUNC` at [`src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:680`](https://github.com/pyload/pyload/blob/1b12dc7f348db8c144e0f39215680415e90ca4d2/src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py#L680) consults the same helper just before TCP-connect: ```python if not self.allow_private_ip: is_proxy_ip = self.http_proxy_host and self.http_proxy_host == (conn_primary_ip, conn_primary_port) if not is_global_address(conn_primary_ip) and not is_proxy_ip: return pycurl.PREREQFUNC_ABORT return pycurl.PREREQFUNC_OK ``` On a host with 6to4 routing (legacy operator tunnels; `2002::/16` still configurable) or NAT64 (cloud IPv6-only subnets with NAT64 gateway), the encoded form routes to the embedded IPv4 and the curl connection terminates at the internal endpoint, defeating the deny. `is_global_host` (the helper that callers like `parse_urls` use against a URL hostname) feeds through `host_to_ip` which pins `family=AF_INET`, so hostname-based reach to these forms relies on the attacker supplying an IPv6 literal in the URL — but the curl PREREQFUNC sees the actual resolved IP (the AAAA returned for the hostname), so a hostname with an AAAA record set to one of the bypass forms reaches the same gap. Cross-reference: this is the same incomplete-coverage class as pydantic-ai's [GHSA-cqp8-fcvh-x7r3](https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-ai/security/advisories/GHSA-cqp8-fcvh-x7r3) / CVE-2026-46678. pyload-ng's prior SSRF advisories [GHSA-7gvf-3w72-p2pg](https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-7gvf-3w72-p2pg) and [GHSA-8rp3-xc6w-5qp5](https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-8rp3-xc6w-5qp5) both went through `is_global_host` / `is_global_address`; the IPv6 transition gap is orthogonal to those redirect-bypass classes. ## Severity **MEDIUM** — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L` = **4.7** - `AC:H` — exploitation requires the host network to route 6to4 (`2002::/16` traffic), have a NAT64 gateway, or otherwise resolve the IPv6 transition form to an internal IPv4 endpoint at the TCP layer. - `PR:L` — `parse_urls` ([`src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:582`](https://github.com/pyload/pyload/blob/1b12dc7f348db8c144e0f39215680415e90ca4d2/src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py#L582)) requires `Perms.ADD`, which any account capable of adding links holds. The curl PREREQFUNC at [`http_request.py:680`](https://github.com/pyload/pyload/blob/1b12dc7f348db8c144e0f39215680415e90ca4d2/http_request.py#L680) is reached by every downloader plugin that runs after `is_global_host` passed. - `C:L/A:L` — internal-network recon and timing-based confirmation; cloud-metadata exfiltration on networks where the transition form actually routes. **CWE-918**: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). ## Affected versions `pyload-ng` from the introduction of `is_global_address` / `is_global_host` in [`src/pyload/core/utils/web/check.py`](https://github.com/pyload/pyload/blob/1b12dc7f348db8c144e0f39215680415e90ca4d2/src/pyload/core/utils/web/check.py) up to and including the current main HEAD as of filing. ## Vulnerable code [`src/pyload/core/utils/web/check.py`](https://github.com/pyload/pyload/blob/1b12dc7f348db8c144e0f39215680415e90ca4d2/src/pyload/core/utils/web/check.py): ```python def is_global_address(value): try: return ipaddress.ip_address(value).is_global except ValueError: return False ``` `Python ipaddress.IPv6Address.is_global` returns True for every address in `2002::/16` (6to4) and `64:ff9b::/96` (NAT64) regardless of the IPv4 they wrap, so this guard is a one-line bypass for the prefix the attacker chooses. ## Reproduction [`research_wave5/poc/pyload_ipv6_ssrf/poc.py`](https://github.com/pyload/pyload/blob/1b12dc7f348db8c144e0f39215680415e90ca4d2/research_wave5/poc/pyload_ipv6_ssrf/poc.py) drives both `is_global_address` and `is_global_host` against IPv6 transition forms whose embedded IPv4 points at loopback, RFC 1918, and AWS IMDS. The helper returns "globally routable" for every form. A second pass replays the same forms through the `PREREQFUNC` logic in [`http_request.py:680`](https://github.com/pyload/pyload/blob/1b12dc7f348db8c144e0f39215680415e90ca4d2/http_request.py#L680) and shows the connection would be ALLOWED in each case. ## Suggested fix Treat IPv6 transition-encoding forms by unwrapping the embedded IPv4 and re-running the global check, plus an explicit blocklist of well-known embedding prefixes for defence in depth: ```python import ipaddress _NAT64_WELL_KNOWN = ipaddress.IPv6Network("64:ff9b::/96") _NAT64_DISCOVERY = ipaddress.IPv6Network("64:ff9b:1::/48") def _embedded_ipv4(addr): if isinstance(addr, ipaddress.IPv6Address): if addr.ipv4_mapped is not None: return addr.ipv4_mapped if addr.sixtofour is not None: # 2002::/16 6to4 return addr.sixtofour if addr in _NAT64_WELL_KNOWN or addr in _NAT64_DISCOVERY: return ipaddress.IPv4Address(addr.packed[-4:]) return None def is_global_address(value): try: addr = ipaddress.ip_address(value) except ValueError: return False embedded = _embedded_ipv4(addr) if embedded is not None: addr = embedded return addr.is_global ``` A patch implementing this approach (plus tests covering 6to4 and NAT64 wraps for 127.0.0.1, 10.0.0.1, 172.16.0.1, 192.168.1.1, 100.64.0.0/10, and 169.254.169.254) accompanies the fix PR. ## Credits Reported by tonghuaroot.

An authenticated user with `Perms.ADD` (or an AI agent acting on their behalf) submits a download URL whose hostname has an AAAA record set to `64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe` (NAT64-encoded 169.254.169.254). `is_global_host` resolves the hostname, sees an address inside the NAT64 well-known prefix, and `is_global_address` reports it as globally routable because Python's `ipaddress.is_global` doesn't unwrap the embedded IPv4. The SSRF guard passes, the pycurl `PREREQFUNC` allows the connect, and pyload's downloader establishes a TCP connection to the cloud metadata service. The response — potentially containing IAM credentials or instance metadata — is written back into the downloaded file or job output, which the attacker (or the orchestrating agent, if compromised via a separate vector) can then retrieve through pyload's normal UI/API.