OpenClaw before 2026.5.18 allows an attacker with trusted operator access to manipulate marketplace extension metadata, redirecting plugin loading to unscanned package payloads outside the reviewed entry points — effectively a security-scanner bypass that terminates in arbitrary code execution within the agent's runtime. While EPSS data is not yet available and CISA has not added this to KEV, the attack vector is network-accessible with low complexity (CVSS 8.8), and real-world abuse of OpenClaw's extension ecosystem is already documented in AIID incident #1368, where malicious skills delivered credential-stealing malware at scale. Patch immediately to 2026.5.18+; if patching is blocked, audit all installed marketplace extensions for unexpected metadata redirects and restrict operator-level access to the extension configuration surface.
What is the risk?
High risk. The vulnerability sits at the intersection of supply chain compromise and AI agent plugin ecosystems — an increasingly targeted attack surface. CVSS 8.8 with AV:N/AC:L makes exploitation technically straightforward once operator access is obtained. The package carries 155 prior CVEs, signaling a historically weak security posture. Although there are only 4 downstream dependents tracked, OpenClaw is categorized as an ai_agent platform, meaning successful exploitation affects not just the host system but any AI-driven workflows, tool invocations, and data the agent has access to. The absence of a public exploit or Nuclei template marginally reduces immediate opportunistic risk, but the low complexity and existing ecosystem abuse history elevate the credible threat window.
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
7 steps-
Patch: Upgrade OpenClaw to 2026.5.18 or later immediately — this is the only complete remediation.
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Audit extensions: Review all installed marketplace extensions; compare declared entry points in metadata against actual loaded module paths. Flag any discrepancy.
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Restrict operator access: Apply least-privilege to the extension configuration surface; require MFA and approval workflows for metadata changes.
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Pin extension versions: Where possible, lock extensions to specific verified versions and block runtime metadata updates without explicit review.
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Sandbox agent execution: Run OpenClaw agents in isolated environments (containers, VMs) with egress filtering to limit lateral movement if code execution is achieved.
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Monitor for IOCs: Watch for OpenClaw processes spawning unexpected child processes or making anomalous outbound connections — consistent with AMOS-style stealer payloads documented in AIID #1368.
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Reference the vendor advisory at github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-v6r2-jh58-xx6w for patch notes and any additional workarounds.
What does CISA's SSVC say?
Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-53810?
OpenClaw before 2026.5.18 allows an attacker with trusted operator access to manipulate marketplace extension metadata, redirecting plugin loading to unscanned package payloads outside the reviewed entry points — effectively a security-scanner bypass that terminates in arbitrary code execution within the agent's runtime. While EPSS data is not yet available and CISA has not added this to KEV, the attack vector is network-accessible with low complexity (CVSS 8.8), and real-world abuse of OpenClaw's extension ecosystem is already documented in AIID incident #1368, where malicious skills delivered credential-stealing malware at scale. Patch immediately to 2026.5.18+; if patching is blocked, audit all installed marketplace extensions for unexpected metadata redirects and restrict operator-level access to the extension configuration surface.
Is CVE-2026-53810 actively exploited?
No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-53810 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.
How to fix CVE-2026-53810?
1. Patch: Upgrade OpenClaw to 2026.5.18 or later immediately — this is the only complete remediation. 2. Audit extensions: Review all installed marketplace extensions; compare declared entry points in metadata against actual loaded module paths. Flag any discrepancy. 3. Restrict operator access: Apply least-privilege to the extension configuration surface; require MFA and approval workflows for metadata changes. 4. Pin extension versions: Where possible, lock extensions to specific verified versions and block runtime metadata updates without explicit review. 5. Sandbox agent execution: Run OpenClaw agents in isolated environments (containers, VMs) with egress filtering to limit lateral movement if code execution is achieved. 6. Monitor for IOCs: Watch for OpenClaw processes spawning unexpected child processes or making anomalous outbound connections — consistent with AMOS-style stealer payloads documented in AIID #1368. 7. Reference the vendor advisory at github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-v6r2-jh58-xx6w for patch notes and any additional workarounds.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-53810?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: AI agent frameworks, marketplace and plugin ecosystems, agent-driven automation pipelines, AI tool chains with operator-managed configurations.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-53810?
CVE-2026-53810 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.8 (HIGH). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.42%.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0010.001 AI Software AML.T0010.005 AI Agent Tool AML.T0011.001 Malicious Package AML.T0011.002 Poisoned AI Agent Tool AML.T0074 Masquerading AML.T0081 Modify AI Agent Configuration AML.T0104 Publish Poisoned AI Agent Tool AML.T0107 Exploitation for Defense Evasion AML.T0110 AI Agent Tool Poisoning Compliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
OpenClaw before 2026.5.18 contains a code execution vulnerability where marketplace runtime extension metadata can redirect loading toward unscanned package payloads. Attackers with trusted operator access can manipulate extension metadata to load plugin code outside reviewed package entry points, bypassing security scanning.
Exploitation Scenario
An adversary with trusted operator access to an OpenClaw deployment — obtained via compromised credentials, insider threat, or social engineering — modifies the runtime extension metadata for a legitimately-installed marketplace skill. The metadata edit redirects the plugin loader to a secondary payload location outside the package's reviewed entry point. When OpenClaw next initializes or reloads the extension (triggered by a user action satisfying the UI:R requirement), it loads the attacker-controlled code without triggering marketplace security scans. The injected code executes within the agent's runtime with full inherited permissions — enabling credential harvesting, data exfiltration, or deployment of persistent malware. This mirrors the documented AIID #1368 AMOS stealer campaign, where malicious OpenClaw skills exfiltrated credentials by abusing the same extension trust model.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-284 Improper Access Control
Primary
CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Primary
CWE-829 Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
Primary
CWE-829 Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
Primary
CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Primary
CWE-829 Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere CWE-284 — Improper Access Control: The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.
- [Architecture and Design, Operation] Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
- [Architecture and Design] Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H References
- github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-v6r2-jh58-xx6w vendor-advisory patch
- vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-arbitrary-code-execution-via-unscanned-marketplace-runtime-extension-metadata third-party-advisory
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-v6r2-jh58-xx6w
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53810
Timeline
Related Vulnerabilities
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