CVE-2026-54058

## Summary When Pillow loads an uncompressed image whose tile uses the `raw` codec and a mode in `Image._MAPMODES`, and the image was opened **from a filename**, it memory-maps the file and builds the image's row pointers directly into the mapping via `PyImaging_MapBuffer` (`src/map.c`). The per-row spacing (`stride`) is taken from the tile arguments. `map.c` validates `offset + ysize*stride <= buffer_len` but **never checks that `stride` is at least the natural row width `xsize * pixelsize`**. The **McIdas** AREA plugin (`McIdasImagePlugin.py`) derives `stride`, `offset`, `xsize`, and `ysize` directly from attacker-controlled 32-bit header words with no validation. By supplying a `stride` far smaller than the row width, an attacker makes each row pointer read `xsize*pixelsize` bytes that run past the mapped region. Accessing the pixels (e.g. `Image.tobytes()`, `getpixel`, `convert`, `save`) then reads adjacent process memory (information disclosure) or faults (SIGBUS, denial of service). ## Complete Code Trace **Step 1: `McIdasImageFile._open`** - turns attacker header words into image size, file offset, and row stride with no validation. ```python # src/PIL/McIdasImagePlugin.py:41-70 s = self.fp.read(256) if not _accept(s) or len(s) != 256: # _accept: prefix == b"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04" raise SyntaxError(...) self.area_descriptor = w = [0, *struct.unpack("!64i", s)] # w[1..64] = signed BE int32, ALL attacker-controlled if w[11] == 1: mode = rawmode = "L" # pixelsize 1, in _MAPMODES elif w[11] == 2: mode = rawmode = "I;16B" # pixelsize 2, in _MAPMODES ... self._mode = mode self._size = w[10], w[9] # (xsize, ysize) <-- attacker offset = w[34] + w[15] # <-- attacker stride = w[15] + w[10] * w[11] * w[14] # <-- attacker (set w[14]=0, w[15]=1 => stride=1) self.tile = [ ImageFile._Tile("raw", (0, 0) + self.size, offset, (rawmode, stride, 1)) ] ``` **Step 2: `ImageFile.load` (mmap branch)** - selects mmap and delegates to `map_buffer`. ```python # src/PIL/ImageFile.py:322-348 if use_mmap: # use_mmap = self.filename and len(self.tile) == 1 decoder_name, extents, offset, args = self.tile[0] if (decoder_name == "raw" and isinstance(args, tuple) and len(args) >= 3 and args[0] == self.mode and args[0] in Image._MAPMODES): if offset < 0: # only lower-bound guard on offset raise ValueError("Tile offset cannot be negative") with open(self.filename) as fp: self.map = mmap.mmap(fp.fileno(), 0, access=mmap.ACCESS_READ) if offset + self.size[1] * args[1] > self.map.size(): # == offset + ysize*stride; NO stride>=linesize check raise OSError("buffer is not large enough") self.im = Image.core.map_buffer( self.map, self.size, decoder_name, offset, args # args = ("L", stride, 1) ) ``` **Step 3: `PyImaging_MapBuffer`** - builds row pointers at `stride` spacing into the mmap; validates everything except `stride >= row width`. ```c /* src/map.c:65-140 */ if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "O(ii)sn(sii)", &target, &xsize, &ysize, &codec, &offset, &mode_name, &stride, &ystep)) return NULL; ... const ModeID mode = findModeID(mode_name); /* "L" */ if (stride <= 0) { /* attacker sets stride=1 (>0) -> NOT recomputed */ if (mode == IMAGING_MODE_L || mode == IMAGING_MODE_P) stride = xsize; else if (isModeI16(mode)) stride = xsize * 2; else stride = xsize * 4; } if (stride > 0 && ysize > PY_SSIZE_T_MAX / stride) {/* overflow guard only */ PyErr_SetString(PyExc_MemoryError, "Integer overflow in ysize"); return NULL; } size = (Py_ssize_t)ysize * stride; /* = 1*1 = 1 */ if (offset > PY_SSIZE_T_MAX - size) { ... } ... if (offset + size > view.len) { /* 1 + 1 = 2 <= 256 -> PASSES */ PyErr_SetString(PyExc_ValueError, "buffer is not large enough"); PyBuffer_Release(&view); return NULL; } im = ImagingNewPrologueSubtype(mode, xsize, ysize, sizeof(ImagingBufferInstance)); /* im->linesize = xsize * pixelsize = 200000 (the REAL per-row read width) */ /* setup file pointers -- NO check that stride >= im->linesize */ if (ystep > 0) { for (y = 0; y < ysize; y++) { im->image[y] = (char *)view.buf + offset + y * stride; /* row points into mmap, spacing=1 */ } } else { ... } ``` `im->linesize` (the number of bytes any consumer reads per row) is `xsize * pixelsize = 200000`, but the row pointers are only `stride = 1` byte apart and the buffer is only `offset + ysize*stride = 2` bytes "claimed". Nothing reconciles the two. **Step 4: pixel access (`Image.tobytes()` → raw encoder `copy1`)** - reads `linesize` bytes from `im->image[0]`, i.e. `xsize` bytes starting at `view.buf + offset`, running far past the mmap. ```c /* the raw "L" packer copies linesize (=xsize) bytes per row from im->image[y]; for row 0 that is view.buf+1 .. view.buf+1+200000, vs a 256-byte file. */ ``` ## Chain Summary ``` SOURCE: McIdas AREA header words w[9],w[10],w[11],w[14],w[15],w[34] (Image.open on a path) ↓ McIdasImagePlugin._open: stride = w[15]+w[10]*w[11]*w[14] -> attacker sets stride=1 [McIdasImagePlugin.py:66] ↓ tile = ("raw", (0,0,xsize,1), offset, ("L", 1, 1)) [McIdasImagePlugin.py:68] GADGET: ImageFile.load mmap branch -- only checks offset+ysize*stride<=len <- BUG: no stride>=linesize check [ImageFile.py:343] ↓ core.map_buffer(map, (xsize,1), "raw", offset, ("L",1,1)) [ImageFile.py:346] SINK: PyImaging_MapBuffer: im->image[0] = view.buf + offset + 0*stride; linesize=xsize [map.c:134] ↓ Image.tobytes() raw "L" encoder reads linesize (=xsize) bytes from im->image[0] IMPACT: reads xsize bytes from a tiny mmap -> OOB read of adjacent process memory (leak) or SIGBUS (DoS) ``` ## Proof of Concept See attached [poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/28460498/poc.zip) ## Impact on a Parent Application Any application that opens image files supplied by users **from a path on disk** (the common pattern: save upload to a temp file, then `Image.open(path)`), has the default plugin set (McIdas is registered by default), and subsequently reads/returns/re-encodes the decoded pixels (thumbnailing, format conversion, serving a preview), is exposed: - **Information disclosure (High):** the decoded "image" contains bytes of the worker process's adjacent heap/mapped memory, which the app then serves or stores - potentially leaking secrets, credentials, or other users' data. - **Denial of service (High):** a larger `xsize` reliably crashes the worker with SIGBUS. ## Suggested fix Core fix in `src/map.c` (`PyImaging_MapBuffer`): reject `offset < 0` and `stride < im->linesize`. Defense-in-depth in `McIdasImagePlugin._open`: reject `offset < 0` or `stride < xsize*pixelsize` .

No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-54058 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.

Update to patched version: Microsoft APM 12.3.0.

No CVSS score has been assigned yet.