CVE-2026-54771: Langroid: auth bypass invokes disabled tools via raw JSON

GHSA-gjgq-w2m6-wr5q HIGH CISA: ATTEND
Published July 6, 2026
CISO Take

Langroid, an open-source AI agent framework, lets developers register tools with `use=False, handle=True` intending to make them callable only as a result of the LLM's own reasoning — but the dispatch path never checks whether a message came from the LLM or from the end user, so anyone chatting with a Langroid-based interface can invoke that tool directly by sending its raw JSON schema as a message. This is a design-level authorization gap, not a novel injection technique, and it's trivial to exploit: no special access, no jailbreak, no LLM cooperation required, just knowledge of the tool's JSON shape. There's no EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public exploit tooling yet, and the package's own footprint is modest (4 downstream dependents), so this isn't a mass-exploitation event today — but the impact per successful hit is severe (CVSS 8.1, confidentiality and integrity both rated High) since affected tools can include file read/write, database queries, or internal orchestration functions. Any team running Langroid-based chatbots exposed to external or semi-trusted users should upgrade to 0.65.3 immediately and, in the interim, audit every tool registered with `handle=True` as if it were directly reachable by any chat participant.

Sources: NVD GitHub Advisory ATLAS

What is the risk?

High severity (CVSS 8.1) with trivial exploitability — no authentication bypass tooling or AI-specific expertise needed, just the ability to send a JSON-shaped chat message. Confidentiality and integrity impact are High; availability is unaffected. Real-world risk is currently tempered by a small downstream footprint (4 known dependents) and the absence of EPSS scoring, KEV listing, or public PoC/scanner coverage, but the underlying flaw — treating `use=False` as a security boundary when it is not — is a common misunderstanding pattern in agent framework design, so similar issues may exist in other tool-calling frameworks that CISOs should check for.

How does the attack unfold?

Initial Access
Adversary gains access to a Langroid-powered chat interface as a normal, untrusted end user.
AML.T0049
Direct Tool Invocation
Adversary sends a raw JSON payload matching a registered tool's schema instead of natural-language chat input, bypassing the intended LLM-mediated invocation gate.
AML.T0053
Unauthorized Execution
Langroid's handle_message() dispatches to the tool handler without verifying the message originated from the LLM, executing the tool's underlying code path.
AML.T0085.001
Impact
Depending on the tool's capability, the adversary reads sensitive files, queries internal databases, or triggers other orchestration actions the developer believed were inaccessible to users.
AML.T0086

What systems are affected?

Package Ecosystem Vulnerable Range Patched
Langroid pip <= 0.65.2 0.65.3
4.1K 4 dependents Pushed 22d ago 100% patched ~14d to patch Full package profile →

Do you use Langroid? You're affected.

How severe is it?

CVSS 3.1
8.1 / 10
EPSS
0.3%
chance of exploitation in 30 days
Higher than 20% of all CVEs
Exploitation Status
Exploit Available
Exploitation: MEDIUM
Sophistication
Trivial
Exploitation Confidence
medium
CISA SSVC: Public PoC
Composite signal derived from CISA KEV, VulnCheck KEV, CISA SSVC, EPSS, Metasploit, Exploit-DB, trickest/cve, Nuclei templates, and inthewild.io exploitation reports.

What is the attack surface?

AV AC PR UI S C I A
AV Network
AC Low
PR Low
UI None
S Unchanged
C High
I High
A None

What should I do?

1 step
  1. Upgrade to langroid >= 0.65.3 immediately. Until patched, audit all tools registered with handle=True and treat them as directly user-invokable regardless of the use flag — remove or gate any that perform sensitive file, database, or internal-system operations from user-facing agents. Add an explicit origin check in any custom tool dispatch logic (verify Entity.LLM origin before executing handler code) if extending or forking Langroid's dispatch path. For detection, log and alert on chat inputs that parse as valid JSON matching a registered tool's request schema but did not originate from a model completion — this is a strong indicator of direct tool-invocation attempts.

What does CISA's SSVC say?

Decision Attend
Exploitation poc
Automatable No
Technical Impact total

Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.

How is it classified?

Which compliance frameworks are affected?

This CVE is relevant to:

EU AI Act
Article 15 - Accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity
ISO 42001
A.6.2.6 - AI system verification and validation
NIST AI RMF
MANAGE 4.1 - Risk response and residual risk monitoring
OWASP LLM Top 10
LLM06:2025 - Excessive Agency

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-54771?

Langroid, an open-source AI agent framework, lets developers register tools with `use=False, handle=True` intending to make them callable only as a result of the LLM's own reasoning — but the dispatch path never checks whether a message came from the LLM or from the end user, so anyone chatting with a Langroid-based interface can invoke that tool directly by sending its raw JSON schema as a message. This is a design-level authorization gap, not a novel injection technique, and it's trivial to exploit: no special access, no jailbreak, no LLM cooperation required, just knowledge of the tool's JSON shape. There's no EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public exploit tooling yet, and the package's own footprint is modest (4 downstream dependents), so this isn't a mass-exploitation event today — but the impact per successful hit is severe (CVSS 8.1, confidentiality and integrity both rated High) since affected tools can include file read/write, database queries, or internal orchestration functions. Any team running Langroid-based chatbots exposed to external or semi-trusted users should upgrade to 0.65.3 immediately and, in the interim, audit every tool registered with `handle=True` as if it were directly reachable by any chat participant.

Is CVE-2026-54771 actively exploited?

No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-54771 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.

How to fix CVE-2026-54771?

Upgrade to langroid >= 0.65.3 immediately. Until patched, audit all tools registered with `handle=True` and treat them as directly user-invokable regardless of the `use` flag — remove or gate any that perform sensitive file, database, or internal-system operations from user-facing agents. Add an explicit origin check in any custom tool dispatch logic (verify `Entity.LLM` origin before executing handler code) if extending or forking Langroid's dispatch path. For detection, log and alert on chat inputs that parse as valid JSON matching a registered tool's `request` schema but did not originate from a model completion — this is a strong indicator of direct tool-invocation attempts.

What systems are affected by CVE-2026-54771?

This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: agent frameworks, conversational AI / chat interfaces, tool-augmented LLM agents.

What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-54771?

CVE-2026-54771 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.1 (HIGH). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.28%.

What is the AI security impact?

Affected AI Architectures

agent frameworksconversational AI / chat interfacestool-augmented LLM agents

MITRE ATLAS Techniques

AML.T0053 AI Agent Tool Invocation
AML.T0086 Exfiltration via AI Agent Tool Invocation
AML.T0101 Data Destruction via AI Agent Tool Invocation

Compliance Controls Affected

EU AI Act: Article 15
ISO 42001: A.6.2.6
NIST AI RMF: MANAGE 4.1
OWASP LLM Top 10: LLM06:2025

What are the technical details?

Original Advisory

Langroid is a framework for building large-language-model-powered applications. Prior to version 0.65.3, a Langroid application exposing a chat interface to untrusted users may allow direct tool invocation via raw JSON payloads, even when tools are registered with `use=False, handle=True`. Version 0.65.3 fixes the issue.

Exploitation Scenario

A company deploys a Langroid-based support chatbot with a `file_lookup` tool registered as `use=False, handle=True` — intended only for the LLM to invoke autonomously when it decides a lookup is needed, never something the end user should trigger directly. An attacker inspects the bot's behavior or guesses the tool's JSON schema (e.g., from open-source Langroid docs or examples), then sends `{"request":"file_lookup","path":"/etc/passwd"}` as a normal chat message. Because `handle_message()` never checks whether the message came from the user or the LLM, the handler executes immediately and returns the file contents in the chat response — no prompt injection, jailbreak, or model cooperation needed at all.

Weaknesses (CWE)

CWE-74 — Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection'): The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component.

  • [Requirements] Programming languages and supporting technologies might be chosen which are not subject to these issues.
  • [Implementation] Utilize an appropriate mix of allowlist and denylist parsing to filter control-plane syntax from all input.

Source: MITRE CWE corpus.

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Timeline

Published
July 6, 2026
Last Modified
July 10, 2026
First Seen
July 7, 2026

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