CVE-2026-55414: nl-portal: GraphQL SSRF exposes Objecten-API auth token

## Summary The public GraphQL resolvers `getFormDefinitionByObjectenApiUrl(url)` and the deprecated `getFormDefinitionById(id)` fetch a caller-supplied URL using the **privileged Objecten-API token**. Because the `/graphql` endpoint is `permitAll()` and these resolvers do not declare a `CommonGroundAuthentication` parameter, an **unauthenticated** caller can make the backend issue an outbound request carrying `Authorization: Token <objecten-api-token>` to a **caller-influenced URL on the configured Objecten-API host**. This is a constrained (same-host) server-side request forgery combined with missing authorization. Reported responsibly and confirmed in a local lab build against the project's own WebFlux security stack. No production system was accessed. ## Affected - `nl.nl-portal:form` (the public resolver / entry point) together with `nl.nl-portal:objectenapi` (where the host guard lives). - First shipped in **1.1.0.RELEASE** (2023-10-31); the vulnerable code was introduced on 2023-08-12 (commit `b2f87ca`) and is present in every release since (1.1.x, 1.2.5, 1.3.0, the 3.0.x line, and 3.1.0 / `next-minor`, HEAD `45abcd2`). Fixed in 3.0.4.RELEASE (see Fix below). ## Data flow (confirmed in source) 1. `form/.../graphql/FormDefinitionQuery.kt` — `@QueryMapping getFormDefinitionByObjectenApiUrl(@Argument url)`, **no** `CommonGroundAuthentication` parameter (same for `getFormDefinitionById`). 2. → `form/.../service/ObjectsApiFormDefinitionService.kt` — passes the URL through unvalidated. 3. → `zgw/objectenapi/.../service/ObjectenApiService.kt` `getObjectByUrl(url)` — the only guard is host equality (`URI.create(url).host == objectsApiClientConfig.url.host`); **no scheme/port/path check**. 4. → `zgw/objectenapi/.../client/ObjectsApiClient.kt` `getObjectByUrl(url)` via `webClientWithoutBaseUrl()`, which attaches the default header `Authorization: Token <token>` to the fully caller-supplied URL. **Reachability:** `/graphql` is `permitAll()` (`core/.../security/OauthSecurityAutoConfiguration.kt`). Authentication is only enforced on resolvers that declare a `CommonGroundAuthentication` parameter; these do not, and there is no `@PreAuthorize`/instrumentation safety net. The project's own `GraphQLEndpointAuthorizationIT` lists `getFormDefinitionByObjectenApiUrl` as an intentionally public operation — so the unauthenticated reachability is by design; the defect is that an intentionally-public resolver forwards a privileged token to a caller-influenced URL. **Secondary (defense-in-depth):** `zgw/zaken-api/.../service/ZakenApiService.kt` `getZaakDetails` calls `objectsApiClient.getObjectByUrl` **directly**, bypassing the service-level host guard. It is currently only reachable via the authenticated `ZaakQuery.zaakdetails` field resolver with server-derived URLs, so it is not an unauthenticated vector today — but it shows why the guard belongs in the client. ## Proof of concept (lab, against the real WebFlux stack) - An unauthenticated `POST /graphql` calling `getFormDefinitionByObjectenApiUrl(url: ...)` executes without authentication. - With the configured Objecten-API host pointed at a mock server, an outbound request to a **caller-chosen port/path on that host** carried `Authorization: Token <configured-token>` — confirming the token is attached to caller-influenced URLs. ## Impact and severity — important limitations Assessed as **Medium** because two code-level facts constrain practical impact: 1. **No cross-host SSRF / token exfiltration in standard deployments.** The token only travels to the *configured* Objecten-API host. Exfiltration requires an attacker-controlled listener at that host (a different port/path routing elsewhere) — generally not the case in managed deployments. A range of URL-parser bypass payloads was tested (userinfo `@`, `%2f`/`%00`/`%09`, backslash, `#`/`?`, double-host, trailing-dot, IDN/Unicode full-stop, fraction-slash, IPv6); **no parser differential** was found between the `java.net.URI`-based guard and the Spring/Netty URI builder used by WebClient — every payload either kept the request on the configured host or was rejected (fail-closed). The lab token-leak PoC works only because the configured host there is `localhost`; this does not generalize to production. 2. **Arbitrary PII object read is blocked by typed deserialization.** The response is deserialized into `ObjectsApiObject<ObjectsApiFormIoFormDefinition>`, whose envelope fields and `data.formDefinition` are all non-nullable Kotlin properties (Jackson `KotlinModule` registered). An object without a top-level `data.formDefinition` (e.g. taken/berichten/zaakdetails) fails to deserialize (`DecodingException`) and returns no data. The resolver can therefore only return objects shaped like a form definition — and form definitions are intentionally public (loaded pre-login). **Escalation conditions** that would raise severity toward High: - the Objecten-API host shares infrastructure with an attacker-controllable endpoint (other port/path), enabling capture of the privileged token; or - a URL-parser differential is later found that escapes the host guard. ## Remediation - Move the host validation out of `ObjectenApiService.getObjectByUrl` and into `ObjectsApiClient.getObjectByUrl` so the direct caller `ZakenApiService.getZaakDetails` is covered too, and tighten it from host-only to **scheme + host + port + path-prefix**. Preferably, do not accept a full URL at all: validate/extract the object UUID and rebuild the URL from the fixed configured base (reuse the existing `ObjectsApiClient.getObjectById` pattern, `/api/v2/objects/{uuid}`). - Separately decide whether `getFormDefinitionByObjectenApiUrl` / `getFormDefinitionById` should remain unauthenticated. They are currently intentionally public (forms load before login); for a stricter posture, add a `CommonGroundAuthentication` parameter as in the other resolvers — noting this breaks pre-login form loading. ## Credit Reported responsibly by **Ray Sabee** (https://whitehatsecurity.nl), independent security researcher — GitHub [@raysabee](https://github.com/raysabee). ## Fix Fixed in **3.0.4.RELEASE** (commit `39ad80f`, PR #700, "rework form module"): - The unauthenticated resolvers `getFormDefinitionByObjectenApiUrl` and the deprecated `getFormDefinitionById` were **removed** from both `FormDefinitionQuery` and the GraphQL schema. - `getFormDefinitionByName` now requires a `CommonGroundAuthentication` parameter (no longer public). - The URL-based service method `findObjectsApiFormDefinitionByUrl(url)` was removed and replaced by `getObjectsApiFormDefinitionById(objectId: UUID)`, which fetches by UUID via the fixed `/api/v2/objects/{uuid}` path (no caller-supplied URL, so no SSRF) and validates the object type against the configured form-definition object type. - Form definitions are now retrieved through the new authenticated query `getFormDefinitionByTaskId(taskId)` in `nl.nl-portal:taak`, which authorizes the caller against the task (`CommonGroundAuthentication`, BSN/KVK match, else `401`) and derives the form-definition UUID from the task's own server-side data, not from caller input. - No resolver feeds caller-controlled input into `ObjectenApiService.getObjectByUrl` anymore. The `objectenapi` module itself was not changed; the fix lives entirely in `nl.nl-portal:form` and the new `nl.nl-portal:taak` query. ## Upgrade instructions - **Backend:** upgrade `nl.nl-portal:*` to **3.0.4** (or later). - **Frontend:** upgrade `nl-portal-frontend-libraries` to **v3.0.3** (or later). This is required: the removed GraphQL queries (`getFormDefinitionByObjectenApiUrl`, `getFormDefinitionById`) and the now-authenticated `getFormDefinitionByName` are a breaking change. Frontend v3.0.3 uses the new authenticated `getFormDefinitionByTaskId` / `getFormDefinitionByName` queries.

An attacker discovers a public-facing nl-portal citizen portal and confirms /graphql accepts unauthenticated POSTs. They craft a request calling getFormDefinitionByObjectenApiUrl with a URL pointing to a non-standard path or port on the configured Objecten-API host — for example, http://objecten-api.internal:9090/metrics. The backend validates only host equality (passes), then issues an outbound GET carrying Authorization: Token <configured-token> to the attacker-specified path. In a shared-tenant or misconfigured cloud environment where the attacker controls a service at an alternate port on the Objecten-API host, the token arrives at the attacker's listener. Armed with the privileged token, the attacker directly queries the Objecten-API for citizen task records, case files, and PII-bearing objects — entirely outside the portal's typed deserialization boundary that limited the GraphQL response.