CVE-2026-56278: Flowise: hardcoded default secret enables session forgery
CRITICAL CISA: TRACK*Flowise versions before 3.1.0 ship with a hardcoded fallback secret ('flowise') for signing express-session cookies whenever operators forget to set EXPRESS_SESSION_SECRET, and because that string lives in public source code, anyone can forge a validly-signed session cookie and impersonate any user, including admins, with zero credentials. This is a full authentication bypass (CVSS 9.1, AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) on a widely deployed open-source AI agent-building platform that typically holds LLM API keys, vector-DB credentials, and business logic inside its flows — a successful forgery hands the attacker the keys to the whole AI stack, not just a web app login. It is not in CISA KEV and EPSS sits at 0.38% (top 70th percentile), and no public exploit or Nuclei template exists yet, so there is no evidence of active mass exploitation today — but the trivial exploitability (the secret is public, no scanning or brute force needed) means that calculus can flip the moment a PoC or scanner template lands. Confirm EXPRESS_SESSION_SECRET is explicitly set to a unique, high-entropy value in every Flowise deployment (self-hosted or cloud), upgrade to 3.1.0+ regardless, and rotate/invalidate all existing sessions after remediation since any cookie signed with the default secret must be treated as compromised.
What is the risk?
Critical severity is justified by the combination of network-reachable attack surface, zero required privileges, zero user interaction, and a secret that is trivially known (it is a literal string in the public GitHub repo, not something requiring brute force or leakage). This is effectively a 'skeleton key' vulnerability: any Flowise instance deployed with default configuration is exploitable by anyone who can craft an express-session cookie, which is a well-documented, low-skill technique. The only mitigating factor keeping this from being an active-exploitation emergency today is the absence of a KEV listing, public PoC, or scanner template, and a modest EPSS score — but those are lagging indicators, not evidence of low risk, given how mechanical the exploit is once discovered. Confidentiality and integrity impact are both high (full account impersonation); availability impact is none, since this is an auth bypass, not a disruption vector.
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Flowise | npm | — | No patch |
Do you use Flowise? You're affected.
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
1 step-
1) Upgrade to Flowise 3.1.0 or later immediately. 2) Regardless of version, explicitly set EXPRESS_SESSION_SECRET to a unique, randomly generated, high-entropy value in every environment (self-hosted, Docker, cloud) — never rely on the application default. 3) Treat any session cookie issued before remediation as potentially forgeable and force session invalidation / require re-authentication for all users after rotating the secret. 4) Audit access and admin action logs for anomalous session activity (logins without corresponding credential submission, unfamiliar session tokens, actions inconsistent with a known user's usage pattern) covering the exposure window. 5) Restrict network exposure of Flowise admin/API endpoints where possible (VPN, IP allowlisting) as defense-in-depth while patching rolls out fleet-wide.
What does CISA's SSVC say?
Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-56278?
Flowise versions before 3.1.0 ship with a hardcoded fallback secret ('flowise') for signing express-session cookies whenever operators forget to set EXPRESS_SESSION_SECRET, and because that string lives in public source code, anyone can forge a validly-signed session cookie and impersonate any user, including admins, with zero credentials. This is a full authentication bypass (CVSS 9.1, AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) on a widely deployed open-source AI agent-building platform that typically holds LLM API keys, vector-DB credentials, and business logic inside its flows — a successful forgery hands the attacker the keys to the whole AI stack, not just a web app login. It is not in CISA KEV and EPSS sits at 0.38% (top 70th percentile), and no public exploit or Nuclei template exists yet, so there is no evidence of active mass exploitation today — but the trivial exploitability (the secret is public, no scanning or brute force needed) means that calculus can flip the moment a PoC or scanner template lands. Confirm EXPRESS_SESSION_SECRET is explicitly set to a unique, high-entropy value in every Flowise deployment (self-hosted or cloud), upgrade to 3.1.0+ regardless, and rotate/invalidate all existing sessions after remediation since any cookie signed with the default secret must be treated as compromised.
Is CVE-2026-56278 actively exploited?
No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-56278 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.
How to fix CVE-2026-56278?
1) Upgrade to Flowise 3.1.0 or later immediately. 2) Regardless of version, explicitly set EXPRESS_SESSION_SECRET to a unique, randomly generated, high-entropy value in every environment (self-hosted, Docker, cloud) — never rely on the application default. 3) Treat any session cookie issued before remediation as potentially forgeable and force session invalidation / require re-authentication for all users after rotating the secret. 4) Audit access and admin action logs for anomalous session activity (logins without corresponding credential submission, unfamiliar session tokens, actions inconsistent with a known user's usage pattern) covering the exposure window. 5) Restrict network exposure of Flowise admin/API endpoints where possible (VPN, IP allowlisting) as defense-in-depth while patching rolls out fleet-wide.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-56278?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: agent frameworks, RAG pipelines, model serving, vector databases.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-56278?
CVE-2026-56278 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.1 (CRITICAL). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.37%.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0002 Acquire Public AI Artifacts AML.T0012 Valid Accounts AML.T0049 Exploit Public-Facing Application AML.T0083 Credentials from AI Agent Configuration AML.T0091 Use Alternate Authentication Material Compliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
Flowise before 3.1.0 (affected versions 3.0.13 and earlier) uses a weak hardcoded default secret ('flowise') for the express-session middleware when the EXPRESS_SESSION_SECRET environment variable is not set (packages/server/src/enterprise/middleware/passport/index.ts). Because this default secret is publicly visible in the source code, an attacker can forge valid signed session cookies to impersonate any user and bypass authentication.
Exploitation Scenario
An attacker scans for internet-facing Flowise instances and fingerprints the version as pre-3.1.0. Knowing from the public GitHub source that the express-session middleware falls back to the hardcoded secret 'flowise' when EXPRESS_SESSION_SECRET is unset, the attacker crafts a session cookie signed with that secret, setting the session's user ID to that of a known or guessed admin account. The attacker submits this forged cookie to the Flowise web UI or API and is granted a fully authenticated session with no password, MFA, or credential of any kind. From there, the attacker browses and exports existing chatflows to harvest embedded LLM provider API keys and vector database credentials, modifies flows to add malicious tool calls or exfiltration steps, and pivots into any backend systems the flows were authorized to reach — all while appearing in logs as legitimate activity by the impersonated user.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-798 — Use of Hard-coded Credentials: The product contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key.
- [Architecture and Design] For outbound authentication: store passwords, keys, and other credentials outside of the code in a strongly-protected, encrypted configuration file or database that is protected from access by all outsiders, including other local users on the same system. Properly protect the key (CWE-320). If you cannot use encryption to protect the file, then make sure that the permissions are as restrictive as possible [REF-7]. In Windows environments, the Encrypted File System (EFS) may provide some protection.
- [Architecture and Design] For inbound authentication: Rather than hard-code a default username and password, key, or other authentication credentials for first time logins, utilize a "first login" mode that requires the user to enter a unique strong password or key.
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N References
Timeline
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