LiteLLM Proxy before 1.83.9 has a server-side request forgery flaw: an authenticated caller with a valid virtual key can hide an api_base inside the user_config request body, evading the check that blocks top-level api_base and base_url. The proxy then builds its outbound router from that value, so the caller can steer server-side requests to internal or external hosts, potentially reaching metadata services, internal APIs or admin endpoints they could not otherwise access. Exploitation likelihood is low to moderate (EPSS 0.44%, top 64%), there is no public exploit or Nuclei template, it is not in CISA KEV, and CISA SSVC says TRACK. The concern is that LiteLLM often sits as a central AI gateway holding provider credentials, and this package already has 44 other CVEs, so issued virtual keys (including those held by internal teams or contractors) become a pivot into the network. Upgrade to litellm 1.83.9 or later, and until then restrict egress from the proxy and review who holds virtual keys.
What is the risk?
Medium. Exploitation needs a valid virtual key (low privilege, network-reachable), but no user interaction and the request is trivial to craft once the bypass is known. EPSS is low (0.00439), there is no public exploit, no scanner template and no KEV listing. Impact depends on deployment: in cloud environments with reachable metadata endpoints or flat internal networks, SSRF can escalate to credential theft or internal service access. Package risk is elevated (score 79/100, 44 other CVEs, OpenSSF Scorecard 6.1/10), though only 6 known downstream dependents.
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| LiteLLM | pip | <= 1.83.8 | 1.83.9 |
Do you use LiteLLM? You're affected.
How severe is it?
What should I do?
1 step1) Upgrade litellm to 1.83.9 or later (fix in commit 47214be and PR #25827, advisory GHSA-hx8v-g79f-8w5f). 2) Until patched, apply egress filtering so the proxy can only reach approved LLM provider hosts, and block access to cloud metadata (169.254.169.254) and internal ranges; enforce IMDSv2 on AWS. 3) Add a WAF or API gateway rule rejecting request bodies containing user_config with api_base or base_url keys. 4) Audit and rotate virtual keys, remove unused ones, and apply least privilege. 5) Detection: log and alert on proxy requests containing a user_config field and on outbound connections from the proxy to unexpected or internal destinations. 6) Rotate provider API keys if suspicious outbound traffic is found.
What does CISA's SSVC say?
Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-59823?
LiteLLM Proxy before 1.83.9 has a server-side request forgery flaw: an authenticated caller with a valid virtual key can hide an api_base inside the user_config request body, evading the check that blocks top-level api_base and base_url. The proxy then builds its outbound router from that value, so the caller can steer server-side requests to internal or external hosts, potentially reaching metadata services, internal APIs or admin endpoints they could not otherwise access. Exploitation likelihood is low to moderate (EPSS 0.44%, top 64%), there is no public exploit or Nuclei template, it is not in CISA KEV, and CISA SSVC says TRACK. The concern is that LiteLLM often sits as a central AI gateway holding provider credentials, and this package already has 44 other CVEs, so issued virtual keys (including those held by internal teams or contractors) become a pivot into the network. Upgrade to litellm 1.83.9 or later, and until then restrict egress from the proxy and review who holds virtual keys.
Is CVE-2026-59823 actively exploited?
No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-59823 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.
How to fix CVE-2026-59823?
1) Upgrade litellm to 1.83.9 or later (fix in commit 47214be and PR #25827, advisory GHSA-hx8v-g79f-8w5f). 2) Until patched, apply egress filtering so the proxy can only reach approved LLM provider hosts, and block access to cloud metadata (169.254.169.254) and internal ranges; enforce IMDSv2 on AWS. 3) Add a WAF or API gateway rule rejecting request bodies containing user_config with api_base or base_url keys. 4) Audit and rotate virtual keys, remove unused ones, and apply least privilege. 5) Detection: log and alert on proxy requests containing a user_config field and on outbound connections from the proxy to unexpected or internal destinations. 6) Rotate provider API keys if suspicious outbound traffic is found.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-59823?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: LLM gateways and proxies, Model serving, Multi-tenant LLM API platforms, Agent frameworks.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-59823?
No CVSS score has been assigned yet.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0012Valid AccountsAML.T0049Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationAML.T0055Unsecured CredentialsCompliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. Prior to 1.83.9, an authenticated LiteLLM Proxy caller with a valid virtual key can place api_base inside the user_config request body to bypass is_request_body_safe, which blocks top-level api_base and base_url but previously did not inspect or reject user_config. Because user_config constructs the outbound router, the nested destination redirects a server-side request to an internal or external host selected by the caller and can expose endpoints the caller cannot otherwise access. This issue is fixed in version 1.83.9.
Exploitation Scenario
An adversary with a legitimate low-privilege virtual key (for example a contractor or a compromised internal app key) sends a chat completion request to the LiteLLM Proxy with user_config containing an api_base pointing at an internal service or the cloud metadata endpoint. The is_request_body_safe check inspects only top-level fields and passes the request. The proxy builds a router from the nested destination and issues the server-side request, returning internal data or sending its outbound credentials to an attacker-controlled host. The attacker then uses the harvested credentials or internal reachability to move laterally.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-918Server-Side Request ForgeryPrimaryCWE-918Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)PrimaryCWE-918Server-Side Request ForgeryCWE-918 — Server-Side Request Forgery: The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
- [Implementation, Operation] If there is a known list of applications, IP, hostname, and/or domains to which the product is allowed to communicate, then use allowlists to ensure that outgoing requests are restricted to these known entities. The allowlists could be in the application code or possibly enforced by firewalls or network segmentation [REF-1511].
- [Implementation, Operation] If the product is expected to be able to connect to arbitrary IP addresses or domains, consider using a denylist that includes private network addresses, internal domain names, etc. The denylist could be in the application code or possibly enforced by firewalls or network segmentation [REF-1511].
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
References
Timeline
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