CVE-2026-61732: Decepticon: ChatML token injection yields sandbox RCE
GHSA-g5f9-3xfg-p9mfCRITICALCISA: ATTENDDecepticon, an autonomous red-team hacking agent, wraps web crawl results into LLM messages without neutralizing ChatML special-token literals, so a string planted on any target web page can forge an operator turn and make the agent run arbitrary commands inside its Kali sandbox. The CVSS is 10.0 (network, no privileges, no user interaction, scope changed), but EPSS is only 0.01221 (top 32%), there is no public exploit or Nuclei template, and it is not in CISA KEV, although CISA SSVC rates it ATTEND. Exposure is concentrated in teams running Decepticon against untrusted or attacker-influenced targets with self-hosted OpenAI-compatible backends (vLLM, SGLang, Ollama, LM Studio), where special tokens are not filtered by default. Upgrade decepticon, decepticon-core and decepticon-sdk to 1.1.17 or later, and until then run the agent only against trusted scope, on an isolated network, with no credentials or pivot access reachable from the sandbox.
What is the risk?
Severity is critical on paper (CVSS 3.1: 10.0), but real-world likelihood is moderate and conditional. An attacker needs no privileges or user interaction, only the ability to put text on a page the agent crawls. The attack depends on the BYOK model backend not stripping special-token literals, which is the default for most self-hosted inference servers. EPSS is low (0.01221, top 32%), there is no public exploit, no Nuclei template and no KEV listing, and SSVC says ATTEND. The scope-changed rating reflects that code execution happens in the agent's sandbox, which typically holds engagement tooling, API keys and network reach into the tested environment. Impact is highest for offensive-security teams and anyone who points the agent at internet-facing or hostile targets. The package has 95 downstream dependents and 134 other CVEs, which points to a weak overall security posture.
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| vLLM | pip | <= 1.1.16 | 1.1.17 |
| vLLM | pip | <= 1.1.16 | 1.1.17 |
| vLLM | pip | <= 1.1.16 | 1.1.17 |
| Decepticon | — | — | No patch |
| decepticon-core | — | — | No patch |
| decepticon-sdk | — | — | No patch |
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
7 stepsUpgrade decepticon, decepticon-core and decepticon-sdk to 1.1.17 or later (fix in commit 79ee2aa, PR #715).
Until patched, restrict the agent to trusted, in-scope targets and avoid crawling hostile or user-generated content.
Run the sandbox with least privilege: no host mounts, egress filtering, and no long-lived secrets or cloud credentials reachable from it.
Where possible, configure the model server or gateway to reject or escape special-token literals in user content (for example ChatML tokens such as <|im_start|> and <|im_end|>).
Use dedicated, rate- and spend-limited LLM API keys for the agent and rotate them if it has touched untrusted targets.
Detect by searching agent logs, tool outputs and crawled content for special-token literals, and by monitoring the sandbox for unexpected process execution or outbound connections.
Add a human approval step for command execution when running on untrusted targets.
What does CISA's SSVC say?
Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-61732?
Decepticon, an autonomous red-team hacking agent, wraps web crawl results into LLM messages without neutralizing ChatML special-token literals, so a string planted on any target web page can forge an operator turn and make the agent run arbitrary commands inside its Kali sandbox. The CVSS is 10.0 (network, no privileges, no user interaction, scope changed), but EPSS is only 0.01221 (top 32%), there is no public exploit or Nuclei template, and it is not in CISA KEV, although CISA SSVC rates it ATTEND. Exposure is concentrated in teams running Decepticon against untrusted or attacker-influenced targets with self-hosted OpenAI-compatible backends (vLLM, SGLang, Ollama, LM Studio), where special tokens are not filtered by default. Upgrade decepticon, decepticon-core and decepticon-sdk to 1.1.17 or later, and until then run the agent only against trusted scope, on an isolated network, with no credentials or pivot access reachable from the sandbox.
Is CVE-2026-61732 actively exploited?
No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-61732 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.
How to fix CVE-2026-61732?
1. Upgrade decepticon, decepticon-core and decepticon-sdk to 1.1.17 or later (fix in commit 79ee2aa, PR #715). 2. Until patched, restrict the agent to trusted, in-scope targets and avoid crawling hostile or user-generated content. 3. Run the sandbox with least privilege: no host mounts, egress filtering, and no long-lived secrets or cloud credentials reachable from it. 4. Where possible, configure the model server or gateway to reject or escape special-token literals in user content (for example ChatML tokens such as <|im_start|> and <|im_end|>). 5. Use dedicated, rate- and spend-limited LLM API keys for the agent and rotate them if it has touched untrusted targets. 6. Detect by searching agent logs, tool outputs and crawled content for special-token literals, and by monitoring the sandbox for unexpected process execution or outbound connections. 7. Add a human approval step for command execution when running on untrusted targets.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-61732?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: agent frameworks, autonomous offensive-security agents, LLM inference backends (self-hosted, OpenAI-compatible), BYOK deployments, tool-using LLM pipelines.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-61732?
CVE-2026-61732 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 10.0 (CRITICAL). The EPSS exploitation probability is 1.47%.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0050Command and Scripting InterpreterAML.T0051.001IndirectAML.T0053AI Agent Tool InvocationAML.T0054LLM JailbreakAML.T0069.000Special Character SetsAML.T0099AI Agent Tool Data PoisoningCompliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
Decepticon is an autonomous hacking agent for red teams. Versions prior to 1.1.17 wrap web crawl results — the output of agent reconnaissance against target services — into LLM messages without neutralizing ChatML special-token literals. Under the BYOK (Bring Your Own Key) deployment model, users configure their own LLM credentials to any OpenAI-compatible endpoint. Most open-source and self-deployed model providers (vLLM, SGLang, Ollama, LM Studio, text-generation-webui, etc.) do not filter special-token literals from user content in their default configurations. Those literals are parsed into structural role-boundary token IDs, meaning an attacker string planted in a target web page forges a new operator turn the model treats as authoritative, bypassing Decepticon's agent guardrails and resulting in arbitrary command execution inside the Kali Linux sandbox. Version 1.1.17 patches the issue.
Exploitation Scenario
An attacker anticipates that a security team or a rival will point an autonomous agent such as Decepticon at their infrastructure, or lures it there. They host a page containing text with ChatML literals that close the current message and open a new operator turn instructing the agent to run a shell command. When the agent crawls the page during reconnaissance, the result is wrapped into an LLM message unsanitized, and a self-hosted vLLM or Ollama backend tokenizes the literals into real role-boundary token IDs. The model treats the injected turn as authoritative, ignores the guardrails and executes the command in the Kali sandbox. The attacker then exfiltrates the user's LLM API key and engagement data, and uses the sandbox's network position to pivot into the operator's or the client's environment.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-74Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')PrimaryCWE-74Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream ComponentCWE-74Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream ComponentCWE-74 — Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection'): The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component.
- [Requirements] Programming languages and supporting technologies might be chosen which are not subject to these issues.
- [Implementation] Utilize an appropriate mix of allowlist and denylist parsing to filter control-plane syntax from all input.
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:HReferences
- github.com/BitterSecurity/Decepticon/commit/79ee2aaf22f4c36a5b1968f6ca3f8086b6e35b67x_refsource_MISC
- github.com/BitterSecurity/Decepticon/security/advisories/GHSA-g5f9-3xfg-p9mfx_refsource_CONFIRM
- github.com/BitterSecurity/Decepticon/pull/715
- github.com/BitterSecurity/Decepticon/releases/tag/v1.1.17
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-g5f9-3xfg-p9mf
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61732
Timeline
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