CVE-2026-62211: OpenClaw: credential redaction bypass via export
MEDIUMOpenClaw's trajectory export feature fails to properly redact credentials before handing data to lower-trust callers, letting an attacker with existing local, low-privilege access pull secrets that should stay inside the trusted boundary. There's no EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, no public exploit code, and no Nuclei template for this one, and the CVSS vector requires local access, low complexity, low privileges, and user interaction — this is not a remotely exploitable, mass-scannable bug, but it's a real problem for any environment running OpenClaw agents with shared or multi-tenant access, since agent trajectories routinely capture API keys, tokens, and other secrets touched during a session. Blast radius is currently unverified since downstream dependent counts aren't available, but any organization using OpenClaw's trajectory export for debugging, auditing, or handoff workflows should treat exported trajectories as potentially containing live credentials until patched. Patch to OpenClaw 2026.6.1 or later, and in the interim restrict who can invoke the trajectory export feature and audit any already-exported trajectory files for embedded secrets, rotating anything found.
What is the risk?
Medium severity (CVSS 5.0, C:H/I:N/A:N) reflecting a pure confidentiality break with no integrity or availability impact. The attack requires local access, low privileges, and user interaction, which meaningfully narrows the exploitable population to insiders, compromised low-privilege accounts, or malicious co-tenants on shared OpenClaw deployments — not opportunistic internet-wide scanning. No EPSS data, no KEV listing, and no public PoC or scanner template are available, so near-term mass exploitation is unlikely. However, the impact is high-value: successful exploitation directly yields credentials, which can be chained into further compromise (API abuse, lateral movement, data exfiltration), so the real risk is concentrated in multi-user or CI/CD-adjacent OpenClaw deployments where trust boundaries between callers actually matter.
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| OpenClaw | pip | — | No patch |
Do you use OpenClaw? You're affected.
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
1 step-
Upgrade OpenClaw to version 2026.6.1 or later, which fixes the redaction bypass. Until patched, restrict access to the trajectory export feature to trusted/high-privilege callers only, and review input path configuration for the export mechanism to close the misconfiguration the advisory references. Audit any trajectory exports already generated or shared for embedded credentials and rotate any secrets found. For detection, monitor for anomalous invocations of the export feature by low-privilege accounts or service identities that shouldn't normally use it, and log/alert on export requests that include unexpected input path parameters.
What does CISA's SSVC say?
Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-62211?
OpenClaw's trajectory export feature fails to properly redact credentials before handing data to lower-trust callers, letting an attacker with existing local, low-privilege access pull secrets that should stay inside the trusted boundary. There's no EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, no public exploit code, and no Nuclei template for this one, and the CVSS vector requires local access, low complexity, low privileges, and user interaction — this is not a remotely exploitable, mass-scannable bug, but it's a real problem for any environment running OpenClaw agents with shared or multi-tenant access, since agent trajectories routinely capture API keys, tokens, and other secrets touched during a session. Blast radius is currently unverified since downstream dependent counts aren't available, but any organization using OpenClaw's trajectory export for debugging, auditing, or handoff workflows should treat exported trajectories as potentially containing live credentials until patched. Patch to OpenClaw 2026.6.1 or later, and in the interim restrict who can invoke the trajectory export feature and audit any already-exported trajectory files for embedded secrets, rotating anything found.
Is CVE-2026-62211 actively exploited?
No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-62211 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.
How to fix CVE-2026-62211?
Upgrade OpenClaw to version 2026.6.1 or later, which fixes the redaction bypass. Until patched, restrict access to the trajectory export feature to trusted/high-privilege callers only, and review input path configuration for the export mechanism to close the misconfiguration the advisory references. Audit any trajectory exports already generated or shared for embedded credentials and rotate any secrets found. For detection, monitor for anomalous invocations of the export feature by low-privilege accounts or service identities that shouldn't normally use it, and log/alert on export requests that include unexpected input path parameters.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-62211?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: agent frameworks, AI agent orchestration, credential/secrets handling in agent workflows.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-62211?
CVE-2026-62211 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.0 (MEDIUM). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.15%.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0037 Data from Local System AML.T0055 Unsecured Credentials AML.T0083 Credentials from AI Agent Configuration Compliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
OpenClaw versions before 2026.6.1 contain a credential redaction bypass vulnerability in the trajectory export feature that allows lower-trust callers to access data that should remain within trusted boundaries. Attackers can exploit misconfigured input paths or feature accessibility to expose sensitive credentials and data through the export mechanism.
Exploitation Scenario
A lower-privilege user or service account with local access to an OpenClaw deployment — for example, a contractor account, a CI job, or a compromised low-tier credential — invokes the trajectory export feature, either directly or by manipulating an input path parameter the export mechanism exposes. Because the redaction logic doesn't correctly scope what should stay within the trusted boundary, the exported trajectory includes credentials (API keys, tokens) that were used during the agent's run rather than redacted. The attacker retrieves the export, extracts the leaked secrets, and uses them to escalate access — for instance, calling the same LLM API, cloud service, or internal tool the agent had access to, now under the compromised credential.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-532 Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File
Primary
CWE-532 Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File CWE-532 — Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File: The product writes sensitive information to a log file.
- [Architecture and Design, Implementation] Consider seriously the sensitivity of the information written into log files. Do not write secrets into the log files.
- [Distribution] Remove debug log files before deploying the application into production.
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N References
Timeline
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