CVE-2026-73606: SiYuan: publish password bypass leaks block references
GHSA-vg99-7gj7-2fr5MEDIUMPoC AVAILABLECISA: TRACK*SiYuan's /api/block/getRefIDs endpoint filters results by visibility tier but skips the publish-password check, so an anonymous reader can learn that a password-protected document references a given block, along with the block identifiers involved. The impact is narrow: only identifiers and the existence of a relationship are exposed, with no document text or titles, and the CVSS score is a medium 5.8. Exploitation likelihood is low (EPSS 0.00325, about the 76th percentile), it is not in CISA KEV, and no public exploit or Nuclei template exists. Exposure is limited to deployments running SiYuan in publish mode with password-protected documents, though the Go kernel module has 3,047 dependents and 62 other CVEs, which points to a recurring authorization-hygiene problem. Upgrade to SiYuan v3.8.0 (kernel build 0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2 or later), and until then avoid relying on publish passwords to hide document relationships.
What is the risk?
Low-to-medium. The flaw is a confidentiality-only authorization gap (CWE-863) that is network-reachable, needs no privileges or user interaction, and is trivial to call. Impact is limited to disclosing block IDs and reference relationships, with no content, integrity, or availability effects. EPSS is low, there is no known exploitation, and no public exploit. Exposure depends on whether publish mode is enabled and password-protected documents are in use. The scope-changed CVSS reflects the crossing of an authorization boundary, not severe data loss.
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jupyter Notebook | go | < 0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2 | 0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2 |
Do you use Jupyter Notebook? You're affected.
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
5 stepsUpgrade the SiYuan kernel to v3.8.0 or a build at or after 0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2, which threads the request context into the filter so the password tier is evaluated.
Until patched, disable publish mode or restrict it to trusted networks, and do not treat publish passwords as the sole control for sensitive documents.
Move highly sensitive content to notebooks that are not published, or to encrypted notebooks.
Detect: review reverse-proxy and access logs for anonymous POST requests to /api/block/getRefIDs, especially bulk enumeration across block IDs.
Review the other 62 tracked advisories for this package and subscribe to the GitHub security advisories feed.
What does CISA's SSVC say?
Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-73606?
SiYuan's /api/block/getRefIDs endpoint filters results by visibility tier but skips the publish-password check, so an anonymous reader can learn that a password-protected document references a given block, along with the block identifiers involved. The impact is narrow: only identifiers and the existence of a relationship are exposed, with no document text or titles, and the CVSS score is a medium 5.8. Exploitation likelihood is low (EPSS 0.00325, about the 76th percentile), it is not in CISA KEV, and no public exploit or Nuclei template exists. Exposure is limited to deployments running SiYuan in publish mode with password-protected documents, though the Go kernel module has 3,047 dependents and 62 other CVEs, which points to a recurring authorization-hygiene problem. Upgrade to SiYuan v3.8.0 (kernel build 0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2 or later), and until then avoid relying on publish passwords to hide document relationships.
Is CVE-2026-73606 actively exploited?
Proof-of-concept exploit code is publicly available for CVE-2026-73606, increasing the risk of exploitation.
How to fix CVE-2026-73606?
1. Upgrade the SiYuan kernel to v3.8.0 or a build at or after 0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2, which threads the request context into the filter so the password tier is evaluated. 2. Until patched, disable publish mode or restrict it to trusted networks, and do not treat publish passwords as the sole control for sensitive documents. 3. Move highly sensitive content to notebooks that are not published, or to encrypted notebooks. 4. Detect: review reverse-proxy and access logs for anonymous POST requests to /api/block/getRefIDs, especially bulk enumeration across block IDs. 5. Review the other 62 tracked advisories for this package and subscribe to the GitHub security advisories feed.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-73606?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: Self-hosted knowledge management tools, Published documentation and notebook sites.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-73606?
CVE-2026-73606 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.8 (MEDIUM). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.33%.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0036Data from Information RepositoriesAML.T0049Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationCompliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
### Summary `/api/block/getRefIDs` filters its results for reader roles through a helper that checks only the visibility tiers. The password tier is not checked, because the helper does not receive the request context and therefore cannot evaluate the publish auth cookie. A reader who has not entered a document's publish password learns that the document references a given block. A function ten lines away in the same file does perform the full check, on the same input type. ### Details **Route,** identical at `eef105683` (`kernel/api/router.go:235`) and dev `a7ae96ce` (`:245`): ```go ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/block/getRefIDs", model.CheckAuth, getRefIDs) ``` No `CheckReadonly`, no `CheckAdminRole`. **The filter chain.** `getRefIDs` (`kernel/api/block.go:631`) checks `isEncryptedNotebookDeniedForPublish`, calls `model.GetBlockRefsInBox`, then for read-only roles: ```go publishIgnore := model.GetInvisiblePublishAccess(publishAccess) refDefs, originalRefBlockIDs = model.FilterRefDefsByPublishIgnore(publishIgnore, refDefs) ``` `FilterRefDefsByPublishIgnore` (`kernel/model/publish_access.go:1324`) collects the reference and definition identifiers, resolves their block trees, and delegates the decision to `FilterBlockTreesByPublishIgnore` (`:1314`), whose entire body is: ```go for id, bt := range bts { if CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishIgnore) { ret[id] = bt } } ``` Inside that helper, `CheckPublishAuthCookie`, `GetPathPasswordByPublishAccess`, `checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess` and `password` all appear zero times. **The complete check exists in the same file.** `kernel/model/publish_access.go:431`: ```go func checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess(c *gin.Context, publishAccess PublishAccess, bt *treenode.BlockTree) bool { if bt == nil || IsEncryptedBoxDeniedByPublishAccess(bt.BoxID) { return false } publishIgnore := filterDisablePublishAccess(publishAccess) passwordID, password := GetPathPasswordByPublishAccess(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishAccess) return CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishIgnore) && (password == "" || CheckPublishAuthCookie(c, passwordID, password)) } ``` Same package, same file, same `*treenode.BlockTree` input. One takes the context and evaluates the password; the other does not receive it and structurally cannot. **Route-level contrast.** The adjacent `getChildBlocks` and `getTailChildBlocks` both carry `model.CheckAdminRole`. **Note on a prior assessment.** `getRefIDs` has been described as correctly filtered because it calls a publish-access filter. It does. The filter it calls covers the visibility tiers only. ### Proof of Concept Kernel 3.7.2, publish mode on port 6808, `Publish.Auth.Enable` false, anonymous client. A public document referenced from a second document whose publish tier was changed between runs. `getRefIDs` was called anonymously each time. | Tier of the referring document | Anonymous result | |---|---| | Public | reference returned (baseline) | | Password-protected | **reference still returned** | | Hidden | `[]`, filtered | | Forbidden | `[]`, filtered | The hidden and forbidden rows confirm the filter runs and works. The password-protected row is the defect. ### Impact An anonymous reader in publish mode, or any publish `RoleReader`, learns that a password-protected document contains a reference to a given block, without entering that document's password, and receives the block identifiers involved. Scoped precisely: the response carries identifiers only. `type RefDefs { RefID string; DefIDs []string }`, returned alongside `originalRefBlockIDs`, a map of identifier to identifier. There is no reference text, title or content. The disclosure is the existence of a relationship, plus identifiers usable as input to other endpoints. Confidentiality only. ### Suggested fix Thread `*gin.Context` into `FilterRefDefsByPublishIgnore` and `FilterBlockTreesByPublishIgnore`, and use `checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess` in place of the bare `CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore` call, so the password tier and the encrypted-box check are both applied.
Exploitation Scenario
An organization publishes a SiYuan knowledge base to staff and partners, with some AI red-team notes protected by a publish password. An anonymous visitor to the published instance calls /api/block/getRefIDs for a block ID taken from a public page. The response includes references from the password-protected document, even though the visitor never entered the password. The attacker maps which protected documents link to which public blocks and collects identifiers. They then use those identifiers to probe other endpoints for further exposure or to infer the structure of sensitive material.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-863 — Incorrect Authorization: The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
- [Architecture and Design] Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- [Architecture and Design] Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:NReferences
Timeline
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