CVE-2026-77254: MCP Atlassian: missing auth exposes Jira/Confluence
CRITICALPoC AVAILABLECISA: ATTENDMCP Atlassian before 0.22.0 lets any network caller reach the HTTP MCP endpoint without a per-user identity, and the tool handlers then act with the operator's global Jira or Confluence credentials (CWE-306, CVSS 9.1). This is an unauthenticated, low-complexity network attack that exposes confidential and writable Atlassian data, which often holds incident records, architecture documents and secrets pasted into tickets. Exploitation likelihood is modest on paper (EPSS 0.0062, around the 52nd percentile) and it is not in CISA KEV, but public PoC code exists and CISA SSVC rates it ATTEND, so treat it as a priority. The package has only one tracked downstream dependent but 38 other CVEs, which points to a recurring security debt in this project. Upgrade to 0.22.0 now, and until then do not expose streamable-http transport beyond localhost or a trusted network; put an authenticated reverse proxy or mTLS in front, and rotate the Atlassian tokens the server uses if it was reachable.
What is the risk?
High to critical for any deployment using streamable-http transport that is reachable over a network without an independent authentication boundary. The attack needs no privileges, no user interaction and has low complexity (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), giving high confidentiality and integrity impact (C:H/I:H) and no availability impact. Blast radius equals the permissions of the operator's service account, which is frequently broad. Exposure is lower where the server runs over stdio or sits only behind an authenticating gateway. Real-world exploitation is not confirmed (not in KEV, low EPSS), but a public PoC lowers the barrier.
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| MCP Atlassian | pip | — | No patch |
Do you use MCP Atlassian? You're affected.
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
1 step1) Upgrade mcp-atlassian to 0.22.0 or later (fix in PR #1448, commit b041733). 2) Until patched, run with stdio transport or bind streamable-http to 127.0.0.1 only, and place an authenticating reverse proxy, VPN or mTLS in front of any network-exposed instance. 3) Use least-privilege, read-only Atlassian service accounts or API tokens for the operator identity, and rotate tokens on any instance that was network-reachable. 4) Inventory MCP servers with network scans for open MCP HTTP endpoints, and review Jira and Confluence audit logs for unexpected activity from the service account, especially bulk reads, issue edits and page changes from unfamiliar times. 5) Review reverse proxy and server access logs for requests to the MCP endpoint lacking Authorization headers.
What does CISA's SSVC say?
Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-77254?
MCP Atlassian before 0.22.0 lets any network caller reach the HTTP MCP endpoint without a per-user identity, and the tool handlers then act with the operator's global Jira or Confluence credentials (CWE-306, CVSS 9.1). This is an unauthenticated, low-complexity network attack that exposes confidential and writable Atlassian data, which often holds incident records, architecture documents and secrets pasted into tickets. Exploitation likelihood is modest on paper (EPSS 0.0062, around the 52nd percentile) and it is not in CISA KEV, but public PoC code exists and CISA SSVC rates it ATTEND, so treat it as a priority. The package has only one tracked downstream dependent but 38 other CVEs, which points to a recurring security debt in this project. Upgrade to 0.22.0 now, and until then do not expose streamable-http transport beyond localhost or a trusted network; put an authenticated reverse proxy or mTLS in front, and rotate the Atlassian tokens the server uses if it was reachable.
Is CVE-2026-77254 actively exploited?
Proof-of-concept exploit code is publicly available for CVE-2026-77254, increasing the risk of exploitation.
How to fix CVE-2026-77254?
1) Upgrade mcp-atlassian to 0.22.0 or later (fix in PR #1448, commit b041733). 2) Until patched, run with stdio transport or bind streamable-http to 127.0.0.1 only, and place an authenticating reverse proxy, VPN or mTLS in front of any network-exposed instance. 3) Use least-privilege, read-only Atlassian service accounts or API tokens for the operator identity, and rotate tokens on any instance that was network-reachable. 4) Inventory MCP servers with network scans for open MCP HTTP endpoints, and review Jira and Confluence audit logs for unexpected activity from the service account, especially bulk reads, issue edits and page changes from unfamiliar times. 5) Review reverse proxy and server access logs for requests to the MCP endpoint lacking Authorization headers.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-77254?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: agent frameworks, MCP servers, tool-calling agents, enterprise knowledge integrations, AI coding assistants.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-77254?
CVE-2026-77254 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.1 (CRITICAL). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.62%.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0036Data from Information RepositoriesAML.T0049Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationAML.T0053AI Agent Tool InvocationAML.T0085.001AI Agent ToolsAML.T0101Data Destruction via AI Agent Tool InvocationCompliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, requests to the HTTP MCP endpoint without a per-user identity are allowed to reach tool handlers, which then use globally configured Jira or Confluence credentials. A network caller can perform operations with the operator account's permissions unless the deployment has an independent authentication boundary. The advisory traces the vulnerable input and processing flow through streamable-http, UserTokenMiddleware, _get_fetcher, and global credentials, which identify the affected entry points, controls, and code paths. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.
Exploitation Scenario
An attacker scans internal or internet-facing ranges for an MCP Atlassian server running streamable-http. They send MCP tool-call requests with no user token. Because the server falls back to the globally configured Jira and Confluence credentials, the attacker lists projects, searches Confluence for credentials, runbooks and architecture documents, and reads security tickets. They then modify issues or pages, for example inserting malicious instructions or links into documents that other AI agents or staff will later consume, or altering ticket status to hide activity. All actions are attributed to the service account.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-306 — Missing Authentication for Critical Functionality: The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
- [Architecture and Design] Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability. Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port. In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate
- [Architecture and Design] For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:NReferences
- github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/commit/b041733473f95119dd539542a43c280737a8e460x_refsource_MISC
- github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/pull/1448x_refsource_MISC
- github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/releases/tag/v0.22.0x_refsource_MISC
- github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-vc8m-84rp-53hxx_refsource_CONFIRM
Timeline
Related Vulnerabilities
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