CVE-2026-79411: Bagisto: privilege escalation to full admin via role change
HIGHCISA: ATTENDWebkul Bagisto 2.4.9, an open-source e-commerce platform, lets any backend user with only the settings.users.edit permission promote themselves to Administrator, because the user-update endpoint never checks whether the actor may grant the requested role or whether they are editing their own account. The flaw is rated high (CVSS 8.8) and is exploitable over the network with a single low-privilege request. Exploitation likelihood is currently modest: EPSS is 0.45% (63rd percentile), it is not in CISA KEV, and there is no public exploit or Nuclei template, though CISA SSVC rates it ATTEND and a public write-up exists. The AI/ML relevance is tenuous, since this is a general e-commerce admin panel rather than an AI framework, and the 'ml_ui' tag and the absence of tracked package mappings or dependents suggest it is only peripherally relevant to AI stacks. Treat it as a standard web-app patch: upgrade to a fixed Bagisto release once available, audit which accounts hold settings.users.edit, and review admin role-change logs for unexpected self-promotions.
What is the risk?
Medium-to-high for organizations running Bagisto 2.4.9. Exploitation needs an authenticated backend account but only minimal privileges and trivial complexity, with no user interaction. Impact is total admin compromise (confidentiality, integrity and availability all high). Likelihood is moderated by low EPSS (0.45%), no KEV listing and no public exploit or scanner template. Exposure is limited to organizations where untrusted or semi-trusted staff, contractors or compromised low-privilege admin accounts exist. AI/ML-specific risk is low; any exposure is indirect, for example if the store feeds AI-driven recommendation or personalization systems.
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| n/a | — | — | No patch |
Do you use n/a? You're affected.
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
1 step1) Check the Bagisto/Webkul release notes and upstream repository for a patched release and upgrade as soon as one is available; no fixed version is listed in the data we have. 2) Until patched, remove settings.users.edit from all non-essential roles and restrict backend access by IP, VPN or SSO. 3) Add a reverse-proxy or WAF rule alerting on POSTs to the admin.settings.users.update route that change role_id. 4) Audit the admin users table and logs for accounts whose role changed to Administrator, especially self-initiated changes. 5) If compromise is suspected, rotate payment gateway credentials, API keys and integration secrets, and review customer data access. 6) Enforce MFA on all backend accounts.
What does CISA's SSVC say?
Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-79411?
Webkul Bagisto 2.4.9, an open-source e-commerce platform, lets any backend user with only the settings.users.edit permission promote themselves to Administrator, because the user-update endpoint never checks whether the actor may grant the requested role or whether they are editing their own account. The flaw is rated high (CVSS 8.8) and is exploitable over the network with a single low-privilege request. Exploitation likelihood is currently modest: EPSS is 0.45% (63rd percentile), it is not in CISA KEV, and there is no public exploit or Nuclei template, though CISA SSVC rates it ATTEND and a public write-up exists. The AI/ML relevance is tenuous, since this is a general e-commerce admin panel rather than an AI framework, and the 'ml_ui' tag and the absence of tracked package mappings or dependents suggest it is only peripherally relevant to AI stacks. Treat it as a standard web-app patch: upgrade to a fixed Bagisto release once available, audit which accounts hold settings.users.edit, and review admin role-change logs for unexpected self-promotions.
Is CVE-2026-79411 actively exploited?
No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-79411 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.
How to fix CVE-2026-79411?
1) Check the Bagisto/Webkul release notes and upstream repository for a patched release and upgrade as soon as one is available; no fixed version is listed in the data we have. 2) Until patched, remove settings.users.edit from all non-essential roles and restrict backend access by IP, VPN or SSO. 3) Add a reverse-proxy or WAF rule alerting on POSTs to the admin.settings.users.update route that change role_id. 4) Audit the admin users table and logs for accounts whose role changed to Administrator, especially self-initiated changes. 5) If compromise is suspected, rotate payment gateway credentials, API keys and integration secrets, and review customer data access. 6) Enforce MFA on all backend accounts.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-79411?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: e-commerce admin panels, web application backends, ML-driven personalization integrations (indirect).
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-79411?
CVE-2026-79411 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.8 (HIGH). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.45%.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0012Valid AccountsAML.T0049Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationCompliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
Incorrect privilege assignment in the admin user-management component of Webkul Bagisto 2.4.9 allows an authenticated backend user holding only the settings.users.edit permission to escalate to full administrator. The user-update endpoint (route admin.settings.users.update, UserController::update()) does not verify that the actor is permitted to grant the requested role, does not prevent a user from changing their own role, and does not restrict assignment to roles whose permission set is a subset of the actor's own. By submitting a request that sets role_id to the Administrator role for their own account, a low-privileged administrator gains every admin-panel capability, including store configuration, payment gateway credentials, and customer PII.
Exploitation Scenario
An attacker obtains credentials for a low-privilege backend account that holds settings.users.edit, through phishing, credential stuffing or a malicious insider. They submit a user-update request for their own account with role_id set to the Administrator role. The server accepts it without authorization checks, and the attacker then exports customer PII, reads payment gateway credentials and API keys for any connected AI or analytics services, and alters store configuration to persist access.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HTimeline
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