CVE-2026-81940: Langflow: RCE via unsanitized flow display names
HIGHIBM Langflow, an open-source low-code framework for building LLM agent workflows, contains a code injection flaw (CWE-94) in how it processes special characters in flow display names, letting any authenticated user with low privileges execute arbitrary code on the server. This matters because Langflow instances typically hold live LLM provider API keys, RAG data sources, and agent tool credentials, so a single low-privilege account — a shared demo login, an over-provisioned collaborator, or a compromised credential — is enough to fully compromise the orchestration layer, not just one workflow. There's no EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public PoC or Nuclei template yet, so this isn't under active exploitation today, but Langflow has a track record of critical RCEs that were weaponized within days of disclosure. Given CVSS 8.8 and the low bar to trigger it (network access, low privileges, no user interaction), teams running multi-tenant or externally-reachable Langflow deployments should prioritize this over its raw score suggests. Patch to the fixed release referenced in IBM's advisory immediately, and in the interim restrict who can create or rename flows and isolate Langflow instances from sensitive credential stores.
What is the risk?
High risk despite the absence of confirmed in-the-wild exploitation. The requirement for PR:L (low privileges) rather than full anonymous access lowers the immediate blast radius somewhat, but Langflow deployments frequently grant flow-creation rights broadly to internal users, contractors, or demo accounts, effectively making this close to a low-friction path to RCE. AC:L and UI:N mean no complex conditions or victim interaction are needed once an account exists, and the full C/I/A:H impact means successful exploitation gives the attacker complete control of the affected service. The lack of a public exploit or scanner template buys defenders some time, but CWE-94 (code injection) bugs in widely-deployed AI orchestration tools tend to get reverse-engineered from vendor patches quickly.
How does the attack unfold?
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
1 step-
Upgrade Langflow to the fixed version referenced in IBM's advisory (any release beyond 1.11.5) as soon as it is validated in a test environment. Until patched, restrict flow creation/rename privileges to trusted administrators only, avoid exposing Langflow instances directly to the internet or untrusted user populations, and place the service behind network segmentation or a reverse proxy with strict access controls. Rotate any LLM provider API keys, database credentials, or agent tool secrets stored in or accessible from the Langflow instance as a precaution. For detection, monitor Langflow application logs for flow rename/create events containing unusual special-character sequences, and watch for anomalous outbound connections or child-process spawning from the Langflow server process.
What does CISA's SSVC say?
Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-81940?
IBM Langflow, an open-source low-code framework for building LLM agent workflows, contains a code injection flaw (CWE-94) in how it processes special characters in flow display names, letting any authenticated user with low privileges execute arbitrary code on the server. This matters because Langflow instances typically hold live LLM provider API keys, RAG data sources, and agent tool credentials, so a single low-privilege account — a shared demo login, an over-provisioned collaborator, or a compromised credential — is enough to fully compromise the orchestration layer, not just one workflow. There's no EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public PoC or Nuclei template yet, so this isn't under active exploitation today, but Langflow has a track record of critical RCEs that were weaponized within days of disclosure. Given CVSS 8.8 and the low bar to trigger it (network access, low privileges, no user interaction), teams running multi-tenant or externally-reachable Langflow deployments should prioritize this over its raw score suggests. Patch to the fixed release referenced in IBM's advisory immediately, and in the interim restrict who can create or rename flows and isolate Langflow instances from sensitive credential stores.
Is CVE-2026-81940 actively exploited?
No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-81940 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.
How to fix CVE-2026-81940?
Upgrade Langflow to the fixed version referenced in IBM's advisory (any release beyond 1.11.5) as soon as it is validated in a test environment. Until patched, restrict flow creation/rename privileges to trusted administrators only, avoid exposing Langflow instances directly to the internet or untrusted user populations, and place the service behind network segmentation or a reverse proxy with strict access controls. Rotate any LLM provider API keys, database credentials, or agent tool secrets stored in or accessible from the Langflow instance as a precaution. For detection, monitor Langflow application logs for flow rename/create events containing unusual special-character sequences, and watch for anomalous outbound connections or child-process spawning from the Langflow server process.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-81940?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: agent frameworks, LLM orchestration pipelines, low-code AI development platforms.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-81940?
CVE-2026-81940 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.8 (HIGH). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.55%.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0012 Valid Accounts AML.T0049 Exploit Public-Facing Application AML.T0050 Command and Scripting Interpreter Compliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.11.5 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to improper neutralization of special characters in flow display names.
Exploitation Scenario
An attacker who has obtained low-privileged, authenticated access to a Langflow instance — for example via a shared team account, a trial/demo login, or stolen credentials from an unrelated breach — creates or edits a flow and sets its display name to a crafted string containing specially-encoded characters that Langflow fails to properly neutralize (CWE-94). When the server processes or renders this display name, the injected payload is executed as code in the context of the Langflow backend process. From there, the attacker can read environment variables and configuration containing LLM API keys, tamper with other users' agent workflows, or use the foothold to move laterally into any systems the Langflow server can reach.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Primary
CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') CWE-94 — Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection'): The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.
- [Architecture and Design] Refactor your program so that you do not have to dynamically generate code.
- [Architecture and Design] Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which code can be executed by your product. Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H References
Timeline
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