GHSA-2f7j-rp58-mr42: OpenClaw: info disclosure exposes host filesystem paths
GHSA-2f7j-rp58-mr42 MEDIUMOpenClaw's Gateway connect success snapshot leaked configPath and stateDir metadata to any authenticated low-privilege client in versions up to 2026.4.1, exposing host filesystem layout and deployment details that clients had no business reason to see. While this is not a direct authorization bypass or code execution, in AI agent deployments those paths frequently co-locate with API keys, model configurations, and runtime secrets — meaning the disclosure meaningfully accelerates chained attacks. There is no public exploit, no EPSS data, and it is not in CISA KEV, keeping immediate real-world risk moderate, but the 37 prior CVEs in this package signal persistent security debt. Upgrade to openclaw 2026.4.2 immediately; if patching is delayed, demote or revoke non-admin client credentials as an interim control and audit configPath and stateDir for co-located sensitive material.
What is the risk?
Medium risk overall. CWE-200 information disclosure with no standalone exploitation path, but high reconnaissance value in AI agent deployments where config and state directories routinely contain API keys, tokens, and model artifacts. Exploitation requires only a valid low-privilege authenticated account — no special skills, no novel technique. The 37 prior CVEs in the same package indicate a pattern of security debt that warrants elevated scrutiny of openclaw's security posture beyond this single advisory.
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| OpenClaw | npm | <= 2026.4.1 | 2026.4.2 |
Do you use OpenClaw? You're affected.
How severe is it?
What should I do?
5 steps-
Upgrade openclaw to >= 2026.4.2 immediately — the fix limits connect snapshot metadata to admin-scoped clients only.
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If patching is delayed, restrict Gateway connect access to admin-scoped clients; revoke or demote non-admin client credentials.
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Review Gateway access logs for non-admin connect events prior to patch date and treat unexplained connections as potentially having harvested filesystem metadata.
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Audit the directories referenced by configPath and stateDir for co-located sensitive material (API keys, tokens, model weights) and rotate credentials as a precaution.
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Monitor for follow-on activity targeting paths that may now be known to an adversary.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is GHSA-2f7j-rp58-mr42?
OpenClaw's Gateway connect success snapshot leaked configPath and stateDir metadata to any authenticated low-privilege client in versions up to 2026.4.1, exposing host filesystem layout and deployment details that clients had no business reason to see. While this is not a direct authorization bypass or code execution, in AI agent deployments those paths frequently co-locate with API keys, model configurations, and runtime secrets — meaning the disclosure meaningfully accelerates chained attacks. There is no public exploit, no EPSS data, and it is not in CISA KEV, keeping immediate real-world risk moderate, but the 37 prior CVEs in this package signal persistent security debt. Upgrade to openclaw 2026.4.2 immediately; if patching is delayed, demote or revoke non-admin client credentials as an interim control and audit configPath and stateDir for co-located sensitive material.
Is GHSA-2f7j-rp58-mr42 actively exploited?
No confirmed active exploitation of GHSA-2f7j-rp58-mr42 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.
How to fix GHSA-2f7j-rp58-mr42?
1. Upgrade openclaw to >= 2026.4.2 immediately — the fix limits connect snapshot metadata to admin-scoped clients only. 2. If patching is delayed, restrict Gateway connect access to admin-scoped clients; revoke or demote non-admin client credentials. 3. Review Gateway access logs for non-admin connect events prior to patch date and treat unexplained connections as potentially having harvested filesystem metadata. 4. Audit the directories referenced by configPath and stateDir for co-located sensitive material (API keys, tokens, model weights) and rotate credentials as a precaution. 5. Monitor for follow-on activity targeting paths that may now be known to an adversary.
What systems are affected by GHSA-2f7j-rp58-mr42?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: agent frameworks.
What is the CVSS score for GHSA-2f7j-rp58-mr42?
No CVSS score has been assigned yet.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0007 Discover AI Artifacts AML.T0037 Data from Local System AML.T0084 Discover AI Agent Configuration Compliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
## Summary Before OpenClaw 2026.4.2, the Gateway `connect` success snapshot exposed local `configPath` and `stateDir` metadata to non-admin clients. Low-privilege authenticated clients could learn host filesystem layout and deployment details that were not needed for their role. ## Impact A non-admin client could recover host-specific filesystem paths and related deployment metadata, aiding host fingerprinting and chained attacks. This was an information-disclosure issue, not a direct authorization bypass. ## Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `<= 2026.4.1` - Patched versions: `>= 2026.4.2` - Latest published npm version: `2026.4.1` ## Fix Commit(s) - `676b748056b5efca6f1255708e9dd9469edf5e2e` — limit connect snapshot metadata to admin-scoped clients ## Release Process Note The fix is present on `main` and is staged for OpenClaw `2026.4.2`. Publish this advisory after the `2026.4.2` npm release is live. Thanks @topsec-bunney for reporting.
Exploitation Scenario
An attacker holding a low-privilege OpenClaw client credential — obtained via phishing, credential stuffing, or compromised CI/CD secrets — connects to the Gateway and receives the standard connect success snapshot. The response includes configPath (e.g., /opt/openclaw/config.json) and stateDir (e.g., /var/lib/openclaw/state). The attacker uses these precise paths to identify likely locations of API keys, agent tool configurations, and model files. With a second vulnerability (path traversal, SSRF, or a malicious skill as seen in AIID #1368), the attacker can now directly target those known paths rather than blindly probing the filesystem, significantly reducing time-to-exploit.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-200 — Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor: The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.
- [Architecture and Design] Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
References
Timeline
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