A new SiYuan API endpoint (/api/av/getAttributeViewSearchTarget) was registered with authentication only and no authorization checks, so anonymous or read-only users in publish mode can read database rows that publish filters deliberately hide, including rows from password-protected, forbidden and unlocked encrypted notebooks. The blast radius is narrow: the endpoint exists only on the development branch (commit 9b8e8956f, 2026-07-27), and no released stable version, including v3.7.3, is affected. The package has 3,047 downstream dependents and an OpenSSF Scorecard of 5.8/10, but there is no EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, no public exploit and no Nuclei template. The exploit is trivial though: the database ID is in the published page DOM and one POST request returns a row, so it is confidentiality-only and requires many requests to extract a whole database. Organizations that run development builds of SiYuan in publish mode should update to pseudo-version 0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2 (fixed in v3.8.0) or disable publish mode; everyone on stable releases can treat this as informational.
What is the risk?
CVSS 8.6 (High, scope changed, confidentiality High) is driven by unauthenticated network access with low complexity. Real-world risk is substantially lower because only development-branch builds between 2026-07-26 and 2026-08-12 are affected and no stable release shipped the endpoint. No known exploitation (not in KEV, no public exploit, no scanner template, no EPSS data). Exposure is limited to deployments with publish mode enabled on an exposed port (default 6808), which is the case where anonymous access is possible. The substring oracle across all columns lets an attacker confirm specific content without retrieving full rows.
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jupyter Notebook | go | >= 0.0.0-20260726161145-9b8e8956f997, < 0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2 | 0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2 |
Do you use Jupyter Notebook? You're affected.
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
1 step1) If running a development build of SiYuan from the window 2026-07-26 to 2026-08-12, upgrade to v3.8.0 or a build at or after 0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2. 2) Move production deployments to stable releases (v3.7.3 or later stable), which never contained the endpoint. 3) As a workaround, disable publish mode or restrict port 6808 with a firewall/reverse proxy and require authentication, or block POST /api/av/getAttributeViewSearchTarget at the proxy. 4) Detection: review access logs for POST requests to /api/av/getAttributeViewSearchTarget from anonymous or reader sessions, especially repeated requests with varying keywords. 5) Rotate any secrets stored in database rows of notebooks exposed through publish mode if suspicious access is found.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is GHSA-9cqf-hhrq-7v45?
A new SiYuan API endpoint (/api/av/getAttributeViewSearchTarget) was registered with authentication only and no authorization checks, so anonymous or read-only users in publish mode can read database rows that publish filters deliberately hide, including rows from password-protected, forbidden and unlocked encrypted notebooks. The blast radius is narrow: the endpoint exists only on the development branch (commit 9b8e8956f, 2026-07-27), and no released stable version, including v3.7.3, is affected. The package has 3,047 downstream dependents and an OpenSSF Scorecard of 5.8/10, but there is no EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, no public exploit and no Nuclei template. The exploit is trivial though: the database ID is in the published page DOM and one POST request returns a row, so it is confidentiality-only and requires many requests to extract a whole database. Organizations that run development builds of SiYuan in publish mode should update to pseudo-version 0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2 (fixed in v3.8.0) or disable publish mode; everyone on stable releases can treat this as informational.
Is GHSA-9cqf-hhrq-7v45 actively exploited?
No confirmed active exploitation of GHSA-9cqf-hhrq-7v45 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.
How to fix GHSA-9cqf-hhrq-7v45?
1) If running a development build of SiYuan from the window 2026-07-26 to 2026-08-12, upgrade to v3.8.0 or a build at or after 0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2. 2) Move production deployments to stable releases (v3.7.3 or later stable), which never contained the endpoint. 3) As a workaround, disable publish mode or restrict port 6808 with a firewall/reverse proxy and require authentication, or block POST /api/av/getAttributeViewSearchTarget at the proxy. 4) Detection: review access logs for POST requests to /api/av/getAttributeViewSearchTarget from anonymous or reader sessions, especially repeated requests with varying keywords. 5) Rotate any secrets stored in database rows of notebooks exposed through publish mode if suspicious access is found.
What systems are affected by GHSA-9cqf-hhrq-7v45?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: Knowledge management / notes platforms, Self-hosted web applications, RAG data sources (knowledge bases).
What is the CVSS score for GHSA-9cqf-hhrq-7v45?
GHSA-9cqf-hhrq-7v45 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.6 (HIGH).
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0036Data from Information RepositoriesAML.T0049Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationCompliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
### Scope note This endpoint does not exist in v3.7.3 or on master. It was introduced on the development branch by commit `9b8e8956f` on 2026-07-27 and is present on the current development head. No released stable version is affected. ### Summary `/api/av/getAttributeViewSearchTarget` is registered with `CheckAuth` only and performs no authorization of any kind. Given a database identifier and a keyword, it searches that database's rows and returns matching content, regardless of whether the caller may see the database, the rows, or the notebook holding them. Commit `64c26e74b` on 2026-07-26 closed a reader-reachable gap on `getAttributeViewFieldViews` by adding `CheckReadonly` at router line 536. `9b8e8956f`, the following day, registered this endpoint at line 535 without it. The new route returns more than the one that was just closed: row content rather than field-visibility metadata. ### Details **Route.** `kernel/api/router.go:535` on the development branch: ```go ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/av/getAttributeViewSearchTarget", model.CheckAuth, getAttributeViewSearchTarget) ``` No `CheckReadonly`, no `CheckAdminRole`. **Handler.** `kernel/api/av.go` parses its arguments and calls `model.GetAttributeViewSearchTarget(id, keywords)`. `IsReadOnlyRoleContext`, `publishAccess` and any encrypted-notebook check are all absent. The sink is `kernel/model/attribute_view_render.go:69`. **The adjacent routes make the omission stark.** Lines 533 to 541 all handle the same data class: | Line | Route | Guard | |---|---|---| | 534 | `getAttributeViewKeys` | `CheckAuth`, filters in-body for readers | | 535 | `getAttributeViewSearchTarget` | `CheckAuth`, nothing | | 536 | `getAttributeViewFieldViews` | `CheckAuth`, `CheckReadonly` | | 540 | `searchAttributeView` | `CheckAuth`, `CheckReadonly` | | 541 | `getAttributeView` | `CheckAuth`, `CheckReadonly` | The guard at 536 is the one added by `64c26e74b`. The new route sits directly above it without one. **Why this is not bounded by identifier guessing.** The closest functional sibling, `renderAttributeView`, applies two distinct reader protections: 1. A containing-document gate, `CheckAttributeViewBlockAccessableByPublishAccess`, which is the full gate including `CheckPublishAuthCookie`. 2. Per-item filtering, `FilterAttributeViewByPublishAccess`, using the `itemAccess` and `attributeAccess` maps. This strips rows bound to restricted blocks out of views the reader is otherwise entitled to see. The second layer is what makes this exploitable without guesswork. A reader takes a database block identifier from the published DOM of a page they are allowed to view, then queries this endpoint against that same database and receives precisely the rows `renderAttributeView` removed from the view they were served. `GetAttributeViewSearchTarget` reaches the same internal render function; it simply bypasses the API-layer gate. **Two aggravating properties.** `getAttributeViewSearchMatches` runs `strings.Contains` across every value of every key, and the response carries `MatchedKeyID` alongside the title. That is a substring oracle over every column, so a caller can test for content without needing to retrieve it wholesale. The path also branches on `IsEncryptedBox(tree.Box)` into `ParseAttributeViewInBox`, so it reads encrypted notebooks while they are unlocked. `isEncryptedNotebookDeniedForPublish` appears seventeen times across the block, ref, outline, search and filetree paths, and does not appear in `av.go` at all. **Extraction is iterative.** Each request returns a single row. Systematic recovery of a database therefore requires many requests rather than one bulk response. There is no rate limiting on the path, and the substring oracle narrows the search considerably, but I mention it so the effort is not overstated. ### Proof of Concept Precondition: a development-branch build, publish mode enabled (default port 6808), anonymous when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. A published page embedding a database whose view contains rows bound to blocks the reader cannot access. Step 1, take the database block identifier from the published page's DOM. It is present in the served markup. Step 2, confirm what the reader is supposed to see: ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/av/renderAttributeView {"id":"<database block id>"} → 200, rows bound to restricted blocks are absent ``` Step 3, retrieve them anyway: ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/av/getAttributeViewSearchTarget {"id":"<same database block id>","keywords":"<term>"} → 200, matching rows including those step 2 withheld, with MatchedKeyID identifying the column that matched ``` The differential between steps 2 and 3, on one session against one database, is the finding. ### Impact An anonymous reader in publish mode, or any publish `RoleReader`, reads the content of database rows that the publish filters deliberately withhold, including rows in documents that are hidden, password-protected or forbidden, and rows in encrypted notebooks while those notebooks are unlocked. The database identifier required is published in the DOM of pages the reader is entitled to view, so no enumeration or guessing is involved. The substring matching across all columns lets a caller confirm specific content without retrieving whole rows. Confidentiality only, with no integrity or availability impact. ### Suggested fix Add `CheckReadonly` at router line 535, matching lines 536, 540 and 541. If read-only roles are meant to use this endpoint, apply `CheckAttributeViewBlockAccessableByPublishAccess` and `FilterAttributeViewByPublishAccess` inside the handler as `renderAttributeView` does, and add the `isEncryptedNotebookDeniedForPublish` check that the block, ref, outline, search and filetree paths already carry. More generally, the attribute-view routes now split between middleware-gated and in-body-gated, and a new route defaults to neither. A registration-time convention, where any new `/api/av/` route is `CheckReadonly` unless it deliberately implements in-body filtering, would prevent this recurring.
Exploitation Scenario
An attacker finds a SiYuan instance in publish mode with anonymous access and opens a public page that embeds a database. They copy the database block ID from the served DOM, then POST to /api/av/getAttributeViewSearchTarget with that ID and a keyword such as 'password', 'api key' or a client name. The endpoint returns matching rows that renderAttributeView had filtered out, including rows tied to hidden or encrypted documents, along with the matching column ID. The attacker iterates over keywords to enumerate and recover the restricted database content one row at a time, with no rate limiting.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-862 — Missing Authorization: The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
- [Architecture and Design] Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- [Architecture and Design] Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:NReferences
Timeline
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