GHSA-gp79-m99v-gjmh: OpenClaw — MEDIUM

Q: Is GHSA-gp79-m99v-gjmh actively exploited?

No confirmed active exploitation of GHSA-gp79-m99v-gjmh has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.

Q: How to fix GHSA-gp79-m99v-gjmh?

Update to patched version: OpenClaw 2026.5.6.

Q: What is the CVSS score for GHSA-gp79-m99v-gjmh?

No CVSS score has been assigned yet.

### Summary Mattermost handlers could fall open when channel type was missing. In affected versions, a Mattermost event missing channel type metadata could continue without applying the intended DM policy decision. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change...

Full CISO analysis pending enrichment.

What systems are affected?

Package	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Range	Patched
OpenClaw	npm	<= 2026.5.5	`2026.5.6`
4 dependents 41% patched ~3d to patch Full package profile →

Do you use OpenClaw? You're affected.

How severe is it?

CVSS 3.1

N/A

EPSS

N/A

Exploitation Status

No known exploitation

Sophistication

N/A

What should I do?

Patch available

Update OpenClaw to version 2026.5.6

Which compliance frameworks are affected?

Compliance analysis pending. Sign in for full compliance mapping when available.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is GHSA-gp79-m99v-gjmh?

### Summary Mattermost handlers could fall open when channel type was missing. In affected versions, a Mattermost event missing channel type metadata could continue without applying the intended DM policy decision. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed. ### Impact When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could process a Mattermost event that should have been gated by channel policy. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path. ### Patched Versions The first stable patched version is `2026.5.6`. ### Mitigations keep Mattermost bot access restricted and review channel metadata errors until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.

Is GHSA-gp79-m99v-gjmh actively exploited?

No confirmed active exploitation of GHSA-gp79-m99v-gjmh has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.

How to fix GHSA-gp79-m99v-gjmh?

Update to patched version: OpenClaw 2026.5.6.

What is the CVSS score for GHSA-gp79-m99v-gjmh?

No CVSS score has been assigned yet.

What are the technical details?

Original Advisory

### Summary Mattermost handlers could fall open when channel type was missing. In affected versions, a Mattermost event missing channel type metadata could continue without applying the intended DM policy decision. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed. ### Impact When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could process a Mattermost event that should have been gated by channel policy. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path. ### Patched Versions The first stable patched version is `2026.5.6`. ### Mitigations keep Mattermost bot access restricted and review channel metadata errors until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.

Weaknesses (CWE)

CWE-636 Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open') Primary

CWE-636 — Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open'): When the product encounters an error condition or failure, its design requires it to fall back to a state that is less secure than other options that are available, such as selecting the weakest encryption algorithm or using the most permissive access control restrictions.