GHSA-w673-8fjw-457c

## Impact An authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows could configure a Form Node with an unsanitized HTML description field or exploit an overly permissive iframe sandbox policy to perform stored cross-site scripting or redirect end users visiting the form to an arbitrary external URL. The vulnerability could be used to facilitate phishing attacks. ## Patches The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.24, 2.10.4 and 2.12.0. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability. ## Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only. - Disable the Form node by adding `n8n-nodes-base.form` to the `NODES_EXCLUDE` environment variable. - Disable the Form Trigger node by adding `n8n-nodes-base.formTrigger` to the `NODES_EXCLUDE` environment variable. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.

A malicious insider or compromised workflow editor account creates or modifies an n8n workflow. In the Form Node description, they inject an HTML payload with a credential-harvesting iframe or a JavaScript-based redirect. Legitimate employees receive a link to the internal n8n form—plausibly an AI data collection step or approval gate in an LLM pipeline—and are silently redirected to a convincing SSO phishing page. Harvested credentials are then used to pivot into cloud AI infrastructure, steal LLM API keys, or compromise connected SaaS integrations. The attack is amplified by the fact that the form URL originates from a trusted internal n8n instance.