API
AI APIs are the boundary between the application and the model. Self-hosted inference servers (vLLM, Triton, Ollama, TGI) and third-party gateways (LiteLLM, OpenRouter) expose OpenAI-compatible endpoints, and the same web-app vulnerability classes appear here: missing or weak authentication on /v1/chat/completions, broken authorization between tenants, lack of rate limiting that lets an attacker drain quota or burn GPU time, and overly permissive CORS that leaks API keys from browser-side calls. The blast radius is unusual: a single auth-bypass on an inference endpoint exposes both data and compute, and in the case of paid hosted models, directly costs money. We have seen production CVEs across most popular self-hosted servers in the last 18 months. Defenses: require auth on every endpoint, per-tenant rate limits, separate key scopes for read vs admin, and pin server versions aggressively.
| Severity | CVE | Headline | Package | CVSS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | CVE-2026-46339 | 9router: unauthenticated RCE exposes LLM API keys | 9router | 10.0 |
| CRITICAL | GHSA-3875-8gcx-7v46 | n8n: SSRF bypasses credential domain restrictions | n8n | 9.1 |
| MEDIUM | GHSA-m837-xvxr-vqwg | Flowise: hardcoded CORS wildcard enables drive-by credential abuse | flowise | - |
| HIGH | CVE-2026-47101 | LiteLLM: RBAC bypass enables proxy admin escalation | litellm | 8.8 |
| HIGH | CVE-2026-47102 | LiteLLM: privilege escalation to proxy_admin via /user/update | litellm | 8.8 |
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