API
AI APIs are the boundary between the application and the model. Self-hosted inference servers (vLLM, Triton, Ollama, TGI) and third-party gateways (LiteLLM, OpenRouter) expose OpenAI-compatible endpoints, and the same web-app vulnerability classes appear here: missing or weak authentication on /v1/chat/completions, broken authorization between tenants, lack of rate limiting that lets an attacker drain quota or burn GPU time, and overly permissive CORS that leaks API keys from browser-side calls. The blast radius is unusual: a single auth-bypass on an inference endpoint exposes both data and compute, and in the case of paid hosted models, directly costs money. We have seen production CVEs across most popular self-hosted servers in the last 18 months. Defenses: require auth on every endpoint, per-tenant rate limits, separate key scopes for read vs admin, and pin server versions aggressively.
| Severity | CVE | Headline | Package | CVSS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | CVE-2026-119706 | LMDeploy: unauthenticated RCE via pickle in /update_weights | lmdeploy | 9.8 |
| HIGH | CVE-2024-7557 | OpenShift AI: model auth bypass via exposed token | rhoai/odh-kf-notebook-controller-rhel8 | 8.8 |
| MEDIUM | CVE-2026-119763 | changelog.com: missing authz exposes unpublished content | 5.3 | |
| HIGH | CVE-2026-119337 | RAGFlow: missing authz lets users run others' agents | 7.1 | |
| CRITICAL | CVE-2026-62863 | MoLing: unauthenticated SSE enables browser-based tool calls | 9.6 | |
| MEDIUM | CVE-2026-62300 | Filecoin Pin: missing rate limits allow resource exhaustion DoS | 6.5 | |
| HIGH | CVE-2026-118782 | node-forge: PKCS#12 MAC bypass via zero iteration count | node-forge | 7.5 |
| MEDIUM | CVE-2026-59993 | picotls: HelloRetryRequest null deref crashes TLS clients | picotls | 6.5 |
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