AI Component

Model

The model itself is an attack surface separate from the code that runs it. The model file is the first concern: pickle-based formats (PyTorch .bin, joblib, older HuggingFace) execute arbitrary code on load, so loading an untrusted model is loading untrusted code; safetensors solves this but adoption is incomplete. The model's behaviour is the second concern: adversarial examples bypass classifiers used as security controls, backdoor patterns planted during training survive deployment unless explicitly tested for, and model-extraction queries can clone proprietary fine-tunes. Production model registries (HuggingFace Hub, Ollama Library) have hosted backdoored variants of popular base models; HuggingFace now scans uploads for known-bad patterns, but defenses lag attacks. We track CVEs against model formats, model-loader libraries, and published research demonstrating new model-level attack classes against shipped commercial models.

417
Total CVEs
21
Pages
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Current
SeverityCVECVSS
HIGHCVE-2026-247478.8
HIGHCVE-2024-370588.8
CRITICALCVE-2024-343599.6
HIGHCVE-2025-626097.5
CRITICALCVE-2023-11779.8
HIGHCVE-2023-301727.5
CRITICALCVE-2023-27809.8
CRITICALCVE-2023-376510.0
HIGHCVE-2023-40337.8
HIGHCVE-2023-60157.5
CRITICALCVE-2023-60189.8
CRITICALCVE-2023-60149.8
HIGHCVE-2023-67538.8
HIGHCVE-2024-370528.8
HIGHCVE-2024-370538.8
HIGHCVE-2024-370548.8
HIGHCVE-2024-370558.8
HIGHCVE-2024-370568.8
HIGHCVE-2024-29287.5
MEDIUMCVE-2024-30995.4

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