Attack MEDIUM relevance

Understanding Adversarial Transferability in Vision-Language Models for Autonomous Driving: A Cross-Architecture Analysis

David Fernandez Pedram MohajerAnsari Amir Salarpour Mert D. Pese
Published
April 30, 2026
Updated
April 30, 2026

Abstract

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly used in autonomous driving because they combine visual perception with language-based reasoning, supporting more interpretable decision-making, yet their robustness to physical adversarial attacks, especially whether such attacks transfer across different VLM architectures, is not well understood and poses a practical risk when attackers do not know which model a vehicle uses. We address this gap with a systematic cross-architecture study of adversarial transferability in VLM-based driving, evaluating three representative architectures (Dolphins, OmniDrive, and LeapVAD) using physically realizable patches placed on roadside infrastructure in both crosswalk and highway scenarios. Our transfer-matrix evaluation shows high cross-architecture effectiveness, with transfer rates of 73-91% (mean TR = 0.815 for crosswalk and 0.833 for highway) and sustained frame-level manipulation over 64.7-79.4% of the critical decision window even when patches are not optimized for the target model.

Metadata

Journal
SAE Technical Paper 2026-01-0170, SAE WCX 2026
Comment
9 pages, 2 figures. Accepted at SAE WCX 2026

Pro Analysis

Full threat analysis, ATLAS technique mapping, compliance impact assessment (ISO 42001, EU AI Act), and actionable recommendations are available with a Pro subscription.

Threat Deep-Dive
ATLAS Mapping
Compliance Reports
Actionable Recommendations
Start 14-Day Free Trial