MCP Tool Poisoning in Agentic AI Frameworks: A Cross-Framework Measurement Study

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) lets agentic AI frameworks connect language models to external tool providers, but it carries attacker-controlled content (tool descriptions, schema fields, and response data) into model context without validation. Prior benchmarks measure model compliance with poisoned instructions without confirming real execution. We present the first cross-framework measurement of MCP tool poisoning with real tool execution. A 25-class root-cause taxonomy unifies prior classifications, and the open-source tool mcpvenom drives a 9,720-cell susceptibility matrix across 12 frameworks, 18 models, and 45 attack scenarios, with a dual oracle that confirms exfiltration via canary HTTP receipt. The overall attack success rate is 22.9% (2,113 vulnerable cells). Of these, 64.9% dispatch an attacker tool call, 23.0% contact the attacker endpoint, and 12.1% verifiably exfiltrate a secret. Resistance is model-level: nine core frameworks cluster within 23 to 26% (chi-squared = 3.30, p = 0.91), and no framework implements intentional defense. Incidental framework properties mitigate in specific cases, and a regex description scanner rejects 20 of 45 scenarios at a 7.2% false-positive rate, so metadata scanning alone is a partial control. Model ASR ranges from 0.4% to 49.7%. Claude Opus 4.8 is vulnerable in 8 of 530 cells while issuing 223 explicit refusals. A code-level audit finds no intentional defense across twelve frameworks, and all five coordinated disclosures across four vendors were rejected.

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Accepted at the 19th Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security (AISec '26), co-located with ACM CCS 2026, The Hague, Netherlands. 12 pages, 3 figures, 9 tables; 4-page supplement included as ancillary file