AttackHIGH relevance

A Security Analysis of Verifiable Credential Verification Pipelines: Attack Surface Arising from JSON-LD/RDFC Canonicalization Compared with SD-JWT VC and mdoc

Naohiro FujieShigeya Suzuki(Global Research Institute, Keio University)
Published
November 3, 2026
Updated
November 3, 2026

Abstract

We evaluate, at implementation level and under an explicit threat model, the verification pipelines of three Verifiable Credential (VC) formats: SD-JWT VC; the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0 with the Data Integrity cryptosuite eddsa-rdfc-2022 (W3C VCDM); and mdoc (ISO/IEC 18013-5). For W3C VCDM we identify and exercise three structural attack surfaces from remote context resolution and RDFC-1.0 canonicalization: denial of service (DoS) via poison graphs, context injection through @context, and server-side request forgery (SSRF) reachable via malicious URLs, all at default settings. A poison graph, whose blank-node references are symmetric enough to force RDFC-1.0 into deep recursion, raises it to 278x the baseline from five blank nodes in 527 bytes, and to 13.5 s from eight. Every experiment ran in four environments sharing runtime and library versions; the multiple moves with the machine (251--424x for one input), not with its speed. Cost tracks that symmetry rather than the node count: an acyclic input with 1,500 blank nodes stays at 462--714x. A call limit separates the two: every attack family aborts at 16 or below, every legitimate credential completes at 1, but a shallow, wide recursion, such as the acyclic control, passes whatever the bound. DoS does not presuppose adversarial input: with production education schemas, canonicalization costs 23--34x a simple credential in one environment, 16--49x across four. Effective mitigations are a static document loader, which removes the retrieval latency and both remote-context surfaces; a context allowlist; and a call limit with a size bound. SD-JWT VC and mdoc need neither canonicalization nor external references, and our verifiers resisted every vector evaluated. These are not format-specific defects but properties of the pipeline and its configuration.

Metadata

Comment
23 pages, 2 figures, 11 tables. Companion paper: arXiv:2611.03493. Measurement kit and raw result files: https://github.com/fujie/vcbench

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