Paper 2510.05709v1

Towards Reliable and Practical LLM Security Evaluations via Bayesian Modelling

prompts are designed imperfectly, and practitioners only have a limited amount of compute to evaluate vulnerabilities. We show the improved inferential capabilities of the model in several prompt injection attack

medium relevance benchmark
Paper 2510.23675v3

QueryIPI: Query-agnostic Indirect Prompt Injection on Coding Agents

high-privilege system access, creating a high-stakes attack surface. Prior work on Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) is mainly query-specific, requiring particular user queries as triggers and leading

high relevance attack
Paper 2602.18514v1

Trojan Horses in Recruiting: A Red-Teaming Case Study on Indirect Prompt Injection in Standard vs. Reasoning Models

automated decision-making pipelines, specifically within Human Resources (HR), the security implications of Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) become critical. While a prevailing hypothesis posits that "Reasoning" or "Chain-of-Thought

high relevance attack
Paper 2603.15417v1

Amplification Effects in Test-Time Reinforcement Learning: Safety and Reasoning Vulnerabilities

labels. However, this reliance on test data also makes TTT methods vulnerable to harmful prompt injections. In this paper, we investigate safety vulnerabilities of TTT methods, where we study

medium relevance defense
Paper 2604.24118v1

AgentVisor: Defending LLM Agents Against Prompt Injection via Semantic Virtualization

data with privileged execution exposes them to severe security risks, particularly direct and indirect prompt injection. Existing defenses face significant challenges in balancing security with utility, often encountering a trade

high relevance attack
Paper 2602.22450v1

Silent Egress: When Implicit Prompt Injection Makes LLM Agents Leak Without a Trace

URLs and calling external tools. We show that this workflow gives rise to implicit prompt injection: adversarial instructions embedded in automatically generated URL previews, including titles, metadata, and snippets

high relevance attack
Paper 2606.22864v1

When AUC 0.998 Is Not Enough: A Candidate Evaluation Protocol for Hidden-State Probes of Indirect Prompt Injection in Multimodal Computer-Use Agents

model's internal activations -- has emerged as an attractive evaluation tool for flagging indirect prompt injection (IPI) in multimodal computer-use agents before the agent emits a corrupted action

high relevance benchmark
Paper 2605.19159v1

On the Geometric Limits of Transformer Defenses against Obfuscation Attacks: Latent Embedding Collapse & Performance Robustness Gap

Prompt injection attacks pose significant risks to language model safety, yet existing defenses are typically evaluated using classification performance. We show that high detection performance does not imply representational robustness

high relevance attack

agent, would cause the agent to follow attacker-controlled instructions (indirect prompt injection). Combined with other AI chat features available in untrusted workspaces, this enabled attack

@theia/ai-ide View details
Paper 2603.15714v1

How Vulnerable Are AI Agents to Indirect Prompt Injections? Insights from a Large-Scale Public Competition

data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness

high relevance attack
Paper 2510.03204v1

FocusAgent: Simple Yet Effective Ways of Trimming the Large Context of Web Agents

computational cost processing; moreover, processing full pages exposes agents to security risks such as prompt injection. Existing pruning strategies either discard relevant content or retain irrelevant context, leading to suboptimal

medium relevance benchmark
Paper 2601.10923v2

Hidden-in-Plain-Text: A Benchmark for Social-Web Indirect Prompt Injection in RAG

amplifying both their usefulness and their attack surface. Most notably, indirect prompt injection and retrieval poisoning attack the web-native carriers that survive ingestion pipelines and are very concerning

high relevance benchmark
Paper 2602.20720v1

AdapTools: Adaptive Tool-based Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Agentic LLMs

powerful for complex task execution. However, this advancement introduces critical security vulnerabilities, particularly indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Existing attack methods are limited by their reliance on static patterns

high relevance tool
Paper 2602.03117v2

AgentDyn: A Dynamic Open-Ended Benchmark for Evaluating Prompt Injection Attacks of Real-World Agent Security System

However, the external data which agent consumes also leads to the risk of indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in third-party content hijack agent behavior. Guided

high relevance benchmark

Open WebUI: Cross-origin postMessage confirmation bypass via action:submit

open-webui View details
Paper 2512.20986v1

AegisAgent: An Autonomous Defense Agent Against Prompt Injection Attacks in LLM-HARs

understanding. However, the reliability of these systems is critically undermined by their vulnerability to prompt injection attacks, where attackers deliberately input deceptive instructions into LLMs. Traditional defenses, based on static

high relevance attack
Paper 2510.00451v1

A Call to Action for a Secure-by-Design Generative AI Paradigm

Large language models have gained widespread prominence, yet their vulnerability to prompt injection and other adversarial attacks remains a critical concern. This paper argues for a security-by-design

medium relevance attack
Paper 2512.23128v1

It's a TRAP! Task-Redirecting Agent Persuasion Benchmark for Web Agents

professional networking. Their reliance on dynamic web content, however, makes them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks: adversarial instructions hidden in interface elements that persuade the agent to divert from

medium relevance benchmark
Paper 2602.05484v1

Clouding the Mirror: Stealthy Prompt Injection Attacks Targeting LLM-based Phishing Detection

phishing site. While these approaches are promising, LLMs are inherently vulnerable to prompt injection (PI). Because attackers can fully control various elements of phishing sites, this creates the potential

high relevance attack
Paper 2512.23557v1

Toward Trustworthy Agentic AI: A Multimodal Framework for Preventing Prompt Injection Attacks

GraphChain. Nevertheless, this agentic environment increases the probability of the occurrence of multimodal prompt injection (PI) attacks, in which concealed or malicious instructions carried in text, pictures, metadata, or agent

high relevance tool
Previous Page 10 of 28 Next