External Experience Serving in Production LLM Systems: A Deployment-Oriented Study of Quality-Cost Trade-offs
expose different output-cost regimes. We compare no-experience baselines, random experience controls, global prompt injection, and retrieval-based selective injection, and analyze both task quality and serving cost
Analysis of LLMs Against Prompt Injection and Jailbreak Attacks
same time, LLMs are vulnerable to prompt-based attacks. Thus, analyzing this risk has become a critical security requirement. This work evaluates prompt-injection and jailbreak vulnerability using a large
Securing Web Agents with the Compile-Then-Execute Paradigm
inherently mix trusted and untrusted content. This design makes their control flow vulnerable to prompt injections embedded in webpages. We introduce Baya, a compile-then-execute web agent designed
GuardNet: Ensemble Strategies of Shallow Neural Networks for Robust Prompt Injection and Jailbreak Detection
Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed natural language processing, but they remain vulnerable to Prompt Injection (PI) and Jailbreak (JB) attacks. In addition, benchmark evaluations may be affected by contamination
ARGUS: Defending Against Multimodal Indirect Prompt Injection via Steering Instruction-Following Behavior
Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly vulnerable to multimodal Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks, which embed malicious instructions in images, videos, or audio to hijack model behavior. Existing defenses
INFUSE: A Unified Surface Benchmark for Indirect Prompt Injection in Agentic Systems
installation, and interaction with remote services. This growing autonomy expands their exposure to indirect prompt injection (IPI), where adversarial instructions embedded in external content are interpreted as legitimate task directives
Hijacking Large Audio-Language Models via Context-Agnostic and Imperceptible Auditory Prompt Injection
behavior manipulation remain underexamined. In this work, we reveal a previously overlooked threat, auditory prompt injection, under realistic constraints of audio data-only access and strong perceptual stealth. To systematically
GIF: Locally Sound Geometric Information Flow Control for LLMs
information flow induced by a given prompt under local regularity assumptions. We evaluate GIF on integrity and confidentiality tasks across multiple prompt-injection and privacy-leakage benchmarks. GIF achieves near
PIDP-Attack: Combining Prompt Injection with Database Poisoning Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems
applicability. In this work, we propose PIDP-Attack, a novel compound attack that integrates prompt injection with database poisoning in RAG. By appending malicious characters to queries at inference time
Mitigating Adaptive Attacks against Reasoning Models with Activation Consistency Training
prompts and adversarial rewrites, and evaluate its two main variants, output-level (BCT) and activation-level (ACT), across five reasoning models. We formulate both methods as a prompt injection defense
ICON: Indirect Prompt Injection Defense for Agents based on Inference-Time Correction
Large Language Model (LLM) agents are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious instructions in retrieved content hijack the agent's execution. Existing defenses typically rely on strict
Beyond the Benchmark: Innovative Defenses Against Prompt Injection Attacks
fast-evolving area of LLMs, our paper discusses the significant security risk presented by prompt injection attacks. It focuses on small open-sourced models, specifically the LLaMA family of models
VortexPIA: Indirect Prompt Injection Attack against LLMs for Efficient Extraction of User Privacy
integrated applications? To address this question, we propose \textsc{VortexPIA}, a novel indirect prompt injection attack that induces privacy extraction in LLM-integrated applications under black-box settings. By injecting
Piggybacking on Perception: Stealthy Concurrent Audio Prompt Injections against Multimodal LLM Agents
inevitably contain environmental noise beyond user control. In this paper, we investigate concurrent audio prompt injection attacks targeting multimodal agents. Distinct from traditional acoustic attacks on voice devices, we propose
StableJudge: A Lightweight Adversarial Defense Framework for LLM-as-a-Judge
review and recommendation. However, LLM-as-a-Judge pipelines are vulnerable to score-hijacking prompt injection embedded in evaluated content, which corrupts scoring signals and distorts induced rankings. Existing defenses
Combining Long-Term Memory and LLMs Comes at a High Cost: From Prompt Injection to Persistent Compromise
adoption of generative artificial intelligence in recent years has brought a parallel rise in prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. By embedding malicious instructions, these exploits manipulate language models to bypass
Toward Metacognitive One-Shot Indirect Prompt Injection: Strategy Abstraction Via Outcome-Conditioned Reflection
Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI), in which malicious instructions embedded in external observations manipulate subsequent agent decisions and actions. Most existing
Securing Large Language Models (LLMs) from Prompt Injection Attacks
increasingly being deployed in real-world applications, but their flexibility exposes them to prompt injection attacks. These attacks leverage the model's instruction-following ability to make it perform malicious
Document-Authored Control-Signal Impersonation: A Low-Cost Indirect Prompt Attack on RAG Safety Boundaries
signal when RAG prompt rendering collapses trusted and untrusted text into the same natural-language channel. We evaluate DACSI across six model settings, prompt-pressure levels, injection baselines, signal taxonomies
What Victims Take Away: Attack Reuse and Defense Revision after Prompt-Injection Attacks
reports show targets the attacks used against them, to help them repair their defenses. Prompt injections against large language models (LLMs) are plain text, so such records also hand targets