Hijacking Agent Memory: Stealthy Trojan Attacks Through Conversational Interaction

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly leverage long term memory to support persistent and autonomous task execution. However, this capability also introduces a new attack surface: memory poisoning, where adversaries

FuncPoison: Poisoning Function Library to Hijack Multi-agent Autonomous Driving Systems

Autonomous driving systems increasingly rely on multi-agent architectures powered by large language models (LLMs), where specialized agents collaborate to perceive, reason, and plan. A key component of these systems

Eyes-on-Me: Scalable RAG Poisoning through Transferable Attention-Steering Attractors

data poisoning and show that modular, reusable components pose a practical threat to modern AI systems. They also reveal a strong link between attention concentration and model outputs, informing interpretability

CODE: A Contradiction-Based Deliberation Extension Framework for Overthinking Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation

multi-step self-verification. However, recent studies have shown that reasoning models suffer from overthinking attacks, where models are tricked to generate unnecessarily high number of reasoning tokens. In this

Security in the Fine-Tuning Lifecycle of Large Language Models: Threats, Defenses,Evaluation, and Future Directions

Language Models (LLMs) to downstream tasks, but its reliance on training data, parameter updates, and reusable components opens entry points for attackers. Threats have evolved from data poisoning and weight

Adaptive Defense Orchestration for RAG: A Sentinel-Strategist Architecture against Multi-Vector Attacks

poisoning, the strongest ADO variants reduce attack success to near zero while restoring contextual recall to more than 75% of the undefended baseline, although robustness remains sensitive to model choice

Evaluating Adversarial Attacks on Federated Learning for Temperature Forecasting

high-resolution spatiotemporal forecasts that can surpass traditional numerical models, while FL allows institutions in different locations to collaboratively train models without sharing raw data, addressing efficiency and security concerns

Token-Level Generalization in LoRA Adapter Backdoors: Attack Characterization and Behavioral Detection

reliably backdoored through training data poisoning while preserving baseline task performance. On a Qwen 2.5 1.5B prompt-injection classifier, a small fraction of poisoned examples drives a clean-accuracy

SecureSplit: Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in Split Learning

trained model. To address this vulnerability, we introduce SecureSplit, a defense mechanism tailored to SL. SecureSplit applies a dimensionality transformation strategy to accentuate subtle differences between benign and poisoned embeddings

SilentRetrieval: Hijacking Retrieval-Augmented Generation via Semantically-Preserving Adversarial Data Poisoning

perplexity. Cross-model evaluation across four target LLMs shows nontrivial effectiveness under a fixed trigger generator, and transfer tests against unseen retrievers, including ColBERT and commercial embedding models, yield

Multi-Targeted Graph Backdoor Attack

based attack. Our analysis on four GNN models confirms the generalization capability of our attack which is effective regardless of the GNN model architectures and training parameters settings. We further

RIFLE: Robust Distillation-based FL for Deep Model Deployment on Resource-Constrained IoT Networks

TinyML models, collaboratively train global models by sharing gradients with a central server while preserving data privacy. However, as data heterogeneity and task complexity increase, TinyML models often become insufficient

Open WebUI: Redis Cache Keys tool_servers and terminal_servers

Rescuing the Unpoisoned: Efficient Defense against Knowledge Corruption Attacks on RAG Systems

poisoning) attacks in practical RAG deployments. RAGDefender operates during the post-retrieval phase, leveraging lightweight machine learning techniques to detect and filter out adversarial content without requiring additional model training

Safety, Security, and Cognitive Risks in Neuro-Symbolic AI

threat model extending MITRE ATLAS with 11 NeSy-specific tactic extensions and a five-profile attacker taxonomy; (3) a symbolic-layer threat catalogue covering knowledge graph (KG) poisoning, ontology-merging

When Agents Handle Secrets: A Survey of Confidential Computing for Agentic AI

model inference. Agents accumulate sensitive context, hold credentials, and operate across pipelines no single party fully controls, enabling prompt injection, context exfiltration, credential theft, and inter-agent message poisoning. Current

Guarding the Guardrails: A Taxonomy-Driven Approach to Jailbreak Detection

poisoning. Second, we analyzed the data collected from the challenge to examine the prevalence and success rates of different attack types, providing insights into how specific jailbreak strategies exploit model

Are My Optimized Prompts Compromised? Exploring Vulnerabilities of LLM-based Optimizers

systematic analysis of poisoning risks in LLM-based prompt optimization. Using HarmBench, we find systems are substantially more vulnerable to manipulated feedback than to query poisoning alone: feedback-based attacks

Automatic Red Teaming LLM-based Agents with Model Context Protocol Tools

large language models (LLMs) has led to the wide application of LLM-based agents in various domains. To standardize interactions between LLM-based agents and their environments, model context protocol

Adaptive Intrusion Detection System Leveraging Dynamic Neural Models with Adversarial Learning for 5G/6G Networks

network security by providing robust, real-time threat detection and response capabilities. Unlike conventional models, which require costly retraining to update knowledge, the proposed framework integrates incremental learning algorithms, reducing