AI Threat AlertPACE: Provenance-Aware Capability Enforcement for Tool-Using LLM Agents
Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents turn generated text into real side effects, so poisoned tool metadata, retrieved pages, memory, and reusable skills can steer the next call. Vetting
Poisoning the Pixels: Revisiting Backdoor Attacks on Semantic Segmentation
Semantic segmentation models are widely deployed in safety-critical applications
When Safety Becomes a Vulnerability: Exploiting LLM Alignment Homogeneity for Transferable Blocking in RAG
Augmented Generation (RAG) enhances the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) by incorporating external knowledge, but its reliance on potentially poisonable knowledge bases introduces new availability risks. Attackers can inject
Breaking the Stealth-Potency Trade-off in Clean-Image Backdoors with Generative Trigger Optimization
from benign task-related features, GCB enables a victim model to learn the backdoor from an extremely small set of poisoned examples, resulting in a CA drop of less than
KidnapRAG: A Black-Box Attack for Hijacking Reasoning in Agentic Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to poisoning attacks that inject malicious documents into the retrieval process to manipulate model outputs. Recent Agentic RAG systems are more robust
RAGPart & RAGMask: Retrieval-Stage Defenses Against Corpus Poisoning in Retrieval-Augmented Generation
exposed a critical vulnerability in RAG pipelines corpus poisoning where adversaries inject malicious documents into the retrieval corpus to manipulate model outputs. In this work, we propose two complementary retrieval
The Privacy Fallacy of Crowdsourced Fine-Tuning: Extracting Proprietary Data via Topic-Based Poisoning
only access to the deployed model. Experiments across four models and two datasets demonstrate substantial increases in training-data extraction: with only 50 poisoned examples, near-verbatim extraction reaches
Detecting and Localizing Segment-Level Poisoning in Multi-Source LLM-Agent Inputs
exposes them to segment-level poisoning attacks, in which an adversary controlling only a small subset of sources injects malicious content to manipulate model outputs. Existing defenses mainly rely
GuardRAG: A Post-Retrieval Defense against Poisoning Attacks in Retrieval-Augmented Generation
enhances the factual grounding of Large Language Models (LLMs) by incorporating external evidence, but also exposes them to corpus poisoning attacks. In particular, coordinated attacks can introduce multiple mutually reinforcing
AdversarialCoT: Single-Document Retrieval Poisoning for LLM Reasoning
generation (RAG) enhances large language model (LLM) reasoning by retrieving external documents, but also opens up new attack surfaces. We study knowledge-base poisoning attacks in RAG, where an attacker
InceptionRAG: Stealthy Poisoning Attack Against Retrieval-Augmented Generation
augmented generation (RAG) systems enhance large language models (LLMs) with external knowledge but have been demonstrated to be vulnerable to corpus poisoning. Existing poisoning attacks against RAG largely focus
Provable Watermarking for Data Poisoning Attacks
poisoning-concurrent watermarking, the watermarked poisoning dataset provably ensures both watermarking detectability and poisoning utility, certifying the practicality of watermarking under data poisoning attacks. We validate our theoretical findings through
NameTrap: Steering AI Coding Agents Toward Security Vulnerabilities via Variable Names
agents, reaching 75.0\% for certain agent--model configurations, and substantially outperforms random renaming, neutral renaming, and the prior identifier-poisoning attack XOXO. The attack remains effective under Traditional Chinese prompts
Decoding Deception: Understanding Automatic Speech Recognition Vulnerabilities in Evasion and Poisoning Attacks
Optimization. Further, the novelty of the paper includes how poisoning attack can degrade the performances of state-of-the-art models leading to misinterpretation of audio signals. Through experimentation
VENOMREC: Cross-Modal Interactive Poisoning for Targeted Promotion in Multimodal LLM Recommender Systems
language models (MLLMs) are pushing recommender systems (RecSys) toward content-grounded retrieval and ranking via cross-modal fusion. We find that while cross-modal consensus often mitigates conventional poisoning that
Graph-Aware Text-Only Backdoor Poisoning for Text-Attributed Graphs
platforms, an attacker may be able to quietly poison a small part of the training data and later make the model produce wrong predictions on demand. This paper studies that
Pmeta-TLA: Backdoor Attacks for Speech Classification Models via Meta-Learning with Timbre Leakage Attack
tool within it. We performed tests on data-poisoning backdoor attacks in keyword spotting tasks utilizing some deep neural network models. Experimental results indicate that the proposed strategy attains superior
Governance Architecture for Autonomous Agent Systems: Threats, Framework, and Engineering Practice
Autonomous agents powered by large language models introduce a class of execution-layer vulnerabilities -- prompt injection, retrieval poisoning, and uncontrolled tool invocation -- that existing guardrails fail to address systematically
ARBITRA: Robust Document-Level ATT&CK Extraction via Multi-Expert Argumentation
conflicting TTP statements, cross-report contamination, and semantic poisoning, ARBITRA limits mean precision degradation to roughly half that of frontier-model baselines for a more robust extraction
Selective Channel Restoration for Backdoored Vision-Language Models
Vision-language models (VLMs) exhibit strong multimodal capabilities but remain vulnerable to backdoors implanted through poisoned fine-tuning data. Existing defenses often require extensive parameter updates during fine-tuning