Paper 2604.23775v1

Vision-Language-Action Safety: Threats, Challenges, Evaluations, and Mechanisms

models, including architectures, training paradigms, and inference mechanisms. We then examine the literature through four lenses: Attacks, Defenses, Evaluation, and Deployment. We survey training-time threats such as data poisoning

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Paper 2511.14989v2

Critical Evaluation of Quantum Machine Learning for Adversarial Robustness

three threat models-black-box, gray-box, and white-box. We implement representative attacks in each category, including label-flipping for black-box, QUID encoder-level data poisoning for gray

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Paper 2511.12936v1

Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning from Partial Decryption Verifiable Threshold Multi-Client Functional Encryption

cooperate to train the model without directly exchanging their own private data, but the gradient leakage problem still threatens the privacy security and model integrity. Although the existing scheme uses

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Paper 2605.18988v1

Surviving the Unseen: Predictive Defense for Novel Multi-Turn Multimodal Attacks

expansion of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) and their integration into autonomous agentic workflows has introduced a non-stationary attack surface. Empirical observations indicate that adversaries employ progressive, cross-modal

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Paper 2604.10681v1

Critical-CoT: A Robust Defense Framework against Reasoning-Level Backdoor Attacks in Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs), despite their impressive capabilities across domains, have been shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Prior backdoor strategies predominantly operate at the token level, where

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Paper 2606.17815v1

Beyond Native Success: Auditing Deployment-Interface Exposure of CLIP Backdoors

Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training models are widely reused across downstream interfaces, including feature extraction, retrieval, reranking, and selection. Existing CLIP backdoor, however, usually validate attacks on a small attack

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Paper 2605.27809v1

Density-aware Sample-specific Attack

derive principled criteria characterizing optimal sample-specific trigger construction under a Bayes-optimal model of the victim's training. Our analysis reveals that both attack success and clean-accuracy preservation

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Paper 2512.09742v1

Weird Generalization and Inductive Backdoors: New Ways to Corrupt LLMs

contexts can dramatically shift behavior outside those contexts. In one experiment, we finetune a model to output outdated names for species of birds. This causes it to behave

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Paper 2603.02849v1

DSBA: Dynamic Stealthy Backdoor Attack with Collaborative Optimization in Self-Supervised Learning

generalization capabilities, and its potential for privacy preservation. However, recent research reveals that SSL models are also vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Existing backdoor attack methods in the SSL context commonly

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Paper 2605.21146v1

Detecting Trojaned DNNs via Spectral Regression Analysis

approach that analyzes how a model's internal representations change during fine-tuning. Rather than attempting to reconstruct trigger conditions, MIST characterizes benign model evolution using pre-activation spectra

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Paper 2602.19555v1

Agentic AI as a Cybersecurity Attack Surface: Threats, Exploits, and Defenses in Runtime Supply Chains

Agentic systems built on large language models (LLMs) extend beyond text generation to autonomously retrieve information and invoke tools. This runtime execution model shifts the attack surface from build-time

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Paper 2604.19083v1

ProjLens: Unveiling the Role of Projectors in Multimodal Model Safety

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable success in cross-modal understanding and generation, yet their deployment is threatened by critical safety vulnerabilities. While prior works have demonstrated

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Paper 2601.11207v1

LoRA as Oracle

Existing defenses for backdoor detection and membership inference typically require access to clean reference models, extensive retraining, or strong assumptions about the attack mechanism. In this work, we introduce

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Paper 2603.07835v1

DistillGuard: Evaluating Defenses Against LLM Knowledge Distillation

Knowledge distillation from proprietary LLM APIs poses a growing threat to model providers, yet defenses against this attack remain fragmented and unevaluated. We present DistillGuard, a framework for systematically evaluating

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Paper 2511.06212v1

RAG-targeted Adversarial Attack on LLM-based Threat Detection and Mitigation Framework

Artificial Intelligence has become a valuable solution in securing IoT networks, with Large Language Models (LLMs) enabling automated attack behavior analysis and mitigation suggestion in Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS

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Paper 2512.19297v1

Causal-Guided Detoxify Backdoor Attack of Open-Weight LoRA Models

Backdoor Attack (CBA), a novel backdoor attack framework specifically designed for open-weight LoRA models. CBA operates without access to original training data and achieves high stealth through

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Paper 2603.03108v1

RAIN: Secure and Robust Aggregation under Shuffle Model of Differential Privacy

achieving robustness under adversarial behavior remains challenging. Modern systems increasingly adopt the shuffle model of differential privacy (Shuffle-DP) to locally perturb client updates and globally anonymize them via shuffling

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Paper 2606.18356v1

SafeClawBench: Separating Semantic, Audit-Evidence, and Sandbox Harm in Tool-Using LLM Agents

Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code

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Paper 2512.13501v1

Behavior-Aware and Generalizable Defense Against Black-Box Adversarial Attacks for ML-Based IDS

often fall short in practice. Most are tailored to specific attack types, require internal model access, or rely on static mechanisms that fail to generalize across evolving attack strategies. Furthermore

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Paper 2512.23307v1

RobustMask: Certified Robustness against Adversarial Neural Ranking Attack via Randomized Masking

Neural ranking models have achieved remarkable progress and are now widely deployed in real-world applications such as Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG). However, like other neural architectures, they remain vulnerable

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