AI Threat AlertProactive Hardening of LLM Defenses with HASTE
enhance detection efficacy for prompt-based attack techniques. The framework is agnostic to synthetic data generation methods, and can be generalized to evaluate prompt-injection detection efficacy, with and without
CoDeL: Co-Evolutionary Defense against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM-based Agents
based agents increasingly rely on external tools and content, exposing them to indirect prompt injection (IPI). This threat has motivated a wide range of defenses, among which training-based defenses
Adaptive Evaluation of Out-of-Band Defenses Against Prompt Injection in LLM Agents
converged on a strategy for defending tool-using LLM agents against indirect prompt injection: rather than training the model to refuse malicious instructions, enforce security outside the model with
Exploiting Web Search Tools of AI Agents for Data Exfiltration
functionality and vulnerability to abuse. As LLMs increasingly interact with external data sources, indirect prompt injection emerges as a critical and evolving attack vector, enabling adversaries to exploit models through
The Innocent Courier: Covert Exfiltration Through Legitimate LLM Web Fetching
providing programming support. Existing work has extensively investigated security and privacy risks, such as prompt injections and the disclosure of sensitive data to chatbot providers. While various solutions were developed
Text Prompt Injection of Vision Language Models
vision language models has significantly raised safety concerns. In this project, we investigate text prompt injection, a simple yet effective method to mislead these models. We developed an algorithm
LivePI: More Realistic Benchmarking of Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injectio
increasingly deployed in local workflows with access to external tools. This creates indirect prompt-injection (IPI) risk: an agent may execute harmful instructions embedded in untrusted inputs such as email
Phishing Email Detection Using Large Language Models
based framework to detect phishing email attacks across multiple attack vectors, including prompt injection, text refinement, and multilingual attacks. We evaluate three frontier LLMs (e.g., GPT-4o, Claude Sonnet
The LLMbda Calculus: AI Agents, Conversations, and Information Flow
prompt, and parses the response as a new term. This calculus faithfully represents planner loops and their vulnerabilities, including the mechanisms by which prompt injection alters subsequent computation. The semantics
The Cognitive Firewall:Securing Browser Based AI Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Via Hybrid Edge Cloud Defense
autonomous browser agents exposes a significant attack surface in the form of Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI). Cloud-based defenses can provide strong semantic analysis, but they introduce latency and raise
AgentSentry: Mitigating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Temporal Causal Diagnostics and Context Purification
retrieval systems to autonomously complete complex tasks. However, this design exposes agents to indirect prompt injection (IPI), where attacker-controlled context embedded in tool outputs or retrieved content silently steers
The Verifiable Action Card: Trustworthy Human-in-the-Loop Control for Secure Autonomous Agents
browsers can execute security-sensitive actions under a user's authenticated session, making indirect prompt injection and deceptive confirmation interfaces a direct threat to action integrity. Existing human
CommandSans: Securing AI Agents with Surgical Precision Prompt Sanitization
access to numerous tools and sensitive data significantly widens the attack surface for indirect prompt injections. Due to the context-dependent nature of attacks, however, current defenses are often
Overcoming the Retrieval Barrier: Indirect Prompt Injection in the Wild for LLM Systems
rely on retrieving information from external corpora. This creates a new attack surface: indirect prompt injection (IPI), where hidden instructions are planted in the corpora and hijack model behavior once
Whispers of Wealth: Red-Teaming Google's Agent Payments Protocol via Prompt Injection
teaming evaluation of AP2 and identify vulnerabilities arising from indirect and direct prompt injection. We introduce two attack techniques, the Branded Whisper Attack and the Vault Whisper Attack which manipulate
CodeSentinel: A Three-Layer Defense Against Indirect Prompt Injection in Code Contexts
code context from repositories, documentation, issue threads, and coding-agent environments, creating an indirect prompt-injection surface where attackers hide instructions in comments, strings, identifiers, or decoy code. We propose
Red-Teaming Auto Mode: Improving Blocking Classifiers Against Malign Coding Agents
Codex). Prior evaluations of such monitors largely measure robustness to accidental harm or prompt injections from untrusted sources looking to hijack the agent. Less understood is how they hold
AgentTracer: Tracing Indirect Prompt Injection Attack through Fine-Grained Intention-Execution Alignment
agents interact with external resources to complete complex user tasks, exposing them to indirect prompt injection (IPI), where malicious instructions redirect agents toward attacker-intended tasks. Since IPI is difficult
The Landscape of Prompt Injection Threats in LLM Agents: From Taxonomy to Analysis
LLMs) has resulted in a paradigm shift towards autonomous agents, necessitating robust security against Prompt Injection (PI) vulnerabilities where untrusted inputs hijack agent behaviors. This SoK presents a comprehensive overview
Data Leakage Prevention in Agentic Applications via Preemptive Hardening
analyzes prompt templates, tool interfaces, and tool-invocation code to identify leakage-enabling patterns and generate actionable patches. The hardened application is then validated through adversarial prompt injection attacks