473 results in 142ms
Paper2606.30566v1

Forensic Trajectory Signatures for Agent Memory Poisoning Detection

leaves AUC unchanged at 0.990, confirming that memory poisoning induces a distributed trajectory signature rather than a single observable anomaly. Cross-model hold-out on 9 models (7B-120B parameters

medium relevanceattack
Paper2603.18103v1

STEP: Detecting Audio Backdoor Attacks via Stability-based Trigger Exposure Profiling

serious threat: an adversary who poisons a small fraction of training data can implant a hidden trigger that controls the model's output while preserving normal behavior on clean inputs

high relevanceattack
Paper2605.10600v1

Generate "Normal", Edit Poisoned: Branding Injection via Hint Embedding in Image Editing

returned to users. The second is a poison-based setting, where an attacker distributes a compromised text-to-image diffusion model whose output contains hidden content. We evaluate both attacks

high relevanceattack
Paper2604.23640v1

Prompt-Unknown Promotion Attacks against LLM-based Sequential Recommender Systems

enabling the training of an effective surrogate model that mimics the behaviors of the victim model. Leveraging the distilled prompt and surrogate model, we devise a promotion attack that adversarially

high relevancetool
Paper2607.25479v1

Architectural Backdoors in Vision-Language Model Supply Chains via Representation Steering

Vision--Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed through a model supply chain in which pretrained checkpoints, architecture definitions, text encoders, and exported computation graphs are distributed by third parties

medium relevanceattack
Paper2607.08137v1

Securing Autonomous Vehicle Systems via Twin-Aware Federated Reinforcement Learning

performance of \alg in the presence of poisoning attacks. We also validate the effectiveness of \alg using developed digital twins that model realistic highway environments to evaluate the control

medium relevanceattack

Open WebUI Vulnerable to IDOR: Retrieval API Bypasses Knowledge Base

CVSS7.5open-webuiView details
Paper2602.00183v1

RPP: A Certified Poisoned-Sample Detection Framework for Backdoor Attacks under Dataset Imbalance

propose Randomized Probability Perturbation (RPP), a certified poisoned-sample detection framework that operates in a black-box setting using only model output probabilities. For any inspected sample, RPP determines whether

high relevancebenchmark
Paper2510.20768v2

RAGRank: Using PageRank to Counter Poisoning in CTI LLM Pipelines

dominant architectural pattern to operationalize Large Language Model (LLM) usage in Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) systems. However, this design is susceptible to poisoning attacks, and previously proposed defenses can fail

medium relevanceattack
Paper2512.19286v2

GShield: Mitigating Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning

Learning models. In particular, it enables decentralized model training while preserving data privacy, but its distributed nature makes it highly vulnerable to a severe attack known as Data Poisoning

high relevanceattack
Paper2601.07395v1

MCP-ITP: An Automated Framework for Implicit Tool Poisoning in MCP

environments, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) was proposed and has since been widely adopted. However, integrating external tools expands the attack surface, exposing agents to tool poisoning attacks. In such

medium relevanceattack
Paper2610.01788v1

SAGE: Similarity-Based Cleaning of Poisoned Training Data from Verified Examples

clean and poisoned ones, i.e., each example verified either to be clean or poisoned through inspection by a forensic expert. The challenge is then to detect poisons based

medium relevancebenchmark
Paper2605.10253v1

Knowledge Poisoning Attacks on Medical Multi-Modal Retrieval-Augmented Generation

injected with, adversarial knowledge, which can perturb model outputs and undermine system reliability. To investigate this risk, prior studies have explored knowledge poisoning attacks in medical RAG systems. Nevertheless, most

high relevanceattack
Paper2509.24566v1

TokenSwap: Backdoor Attack on the Compositional Understanding of Large Vision-Language Models

corresponding textual answers. However, the poisoned samples exhibit only subtle differences from the original ones, making it challenging for the model to learn the backdoor behavior. To address this, TokenSwap

high relevanceattack
Paper2609.27155v1

The Like Trap: Multi-Stage Poisoning against Agents in Similarity-based Recommendation Systems

With recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) and LLM-based agents, these agents are becoming increasingly autonomous and gaining broader access to act on users' behalf on the internet

medium relevancetool
Paper2606.19660v1

A Layered Security Framework Against Prompt Injection in RAG-Based Chatbots

cannot prevent malicious payloads from reaching the model. Consequently, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) chatbots remain vulnerable to indirect injection, where a poisoned knowledge-base document compromises every user whose query

high relevancetool
Paper2608.04366v1

Combating Knowledge Corruption in Agent Systems: A Byzantine-Tolerant Secure Collaborative RAG Framework

address the hallucination issues in large language models, it also introduces new vulnerabilities to knowledge corruption attacks. Adversaries exploit these vulnerabilities by poisoning documents provided by RAG system to manipulate

medium relevancebenchmark
Paper2605.13796v1

Backdoor Threats in Variational Quantum Circuits: Taxonomy, Attacks, and Defenses

survey of backdoor attacks in VQCs, covering data-poisoning, compiler-level, and quantum-native mechanisms. We formalize key terminology and threat models, and review existing attack strategies along with their

high relevancesurvey
Paper2603.00711v1

IU: Imperceptible Universal Backdoor Attack

simultaneously controls all target classes with minimal poisoning while preserving stealth. Our key idea is to leverage graph convolutional networks (GCNs) to model inter-class relationships and generate class-specific

high relevanceattack
Paper2510.10932v4

DropVLA: An Action-Level Backdoor Attack on Vision-Language-Action Models

tuning. On OpenVLA-7B evaluated with LIBERO, vision-only poisoning achieves 98.67%-99.83% attack success rate (ASR) with only 0.31% poisoned episodes while preserving 98.50%-99.17% clean-task retention

high relevanceattack
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