AI Threat AlertLog-To-Leak: Prompt Injection Attacks on Tool-Using LLM Agents via the Model Context Protocol
tools through the Model Context Protocol (MCP), but the natural-language metadata used to describe those tools creates a prompt-injection surface. Within this established tool-poisoning surface, we study
Security in the Fine-Tuning Lifecycle of Large Language Models: Threats, Defenses,Evaluation, and Future Directions
Language Models (LLMs) to downstream tasks, but its reliance on training data, parameter updates, and reusable components opens entry points for attackers. Threats have evolved from data poisoning and weight
Breadcrumbing Search Agents
single poisoned page, a mediated search interface can repeatedly steer how the agent gathers evidence and forms its final answer. Under a constrained tool-intermediary threat model, appending only
Adaptive Defense Orchestration for RAG: A Sentinel-Strategist Architecture against Multi-Vector Attacks
poisoning, the strongest ADO variants reduce attack success to near zero while restoring contextual recall to more than 75% of the undefended baseline, although robustness remains sensitive to model choice
Evaluating Adversarial Attacks on Federated Learning for Temperature Forecasting
high-resolution spatiotemporal forecasts that can surpass traditional numerical models, while FL allows institutions in different locations to collaboratively train models without sharing raw data, addressing efficiency and security concerns
Token-Level Generalization in LoRA Adapter Backdoors: Attack Characterization and Behavioral Detection
reliably backdoored through training data poisoning while preserving baseline task performance. On a Qwen 2.5 1.5B prompt-injection classifier, a small fraction of poisoned examples drives a clean-accuracy
SecureSplit: Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in Split Learning
trained model. To address this vulnerability, we introduce SecureSplit, a defense mechanism tailored to SL. SecureSplit applies a dimensionality transformation strategy to accentuate subtle differences between benign and poisoned embeddings
FedGuard-DC: Privacy-Preserving Federated Load Forecasting and Cyber-Attack Detection for Data-Center Loads in Transmission Systems
while only model updates are shared with the global controller. Optional differential privacy and robust trimmed-mean aggregation are included to evaluate privacy-utility behavior and poisoned-client resilience
SilentRetrieval: Hijacking Retrieval-Augmented Generation via Semantically-Preserving Adversarial Data Poisoning
perplexity. Cross-model evaluation across four target LLMs shows nontrivial effectiveness under a fixed trigger generator, and transfer tests against unseen retrievers, including ColBERT and commercial embedding models, yield
Multi-Targeted Graph Backdoor Attack
based attack. Our analysis on four GNN models confirms the generalization capability of our attack which is effective regardless of the GNN model architectures and training parameters settings. We further
RIFLE: Robust Distillation-based FL for Deep Model Deployment on Resource-Constrained IoT Networks
TinyML models, collaboratively train global models by sharing gradients with a central server while preserving data privacy. However, as data heterogeneity and task complexity increase, TinyML models often become insufficient
A Bag of Tricks for Defending Deep Learning-based Face Recognition Pipelines against Backdoor Attacks
crucial to system providers. This technical report targets the threat model most relevant to industry practitioners: although model training is performed in-house, training data is sourced from possibly-compromised
Rescuing the Unpoisoned: Efficient Defense against Knowledge Corruption Attacks on RAG Systems
poisoning) attacks in practical RAG deployments. RAGDefender operates during the post-retrieval phase, leveraging lightweight machine learning techniques to detect and filter out adversarial content without requiring additional model training
Robustness of Anomaly Detection Models for Industrial Control Systems under Training-Time Data Contamination
poisoning methods. Contamination budgets from 1% to 10% are evaluated using clean validation and test sets under a unified offline protocol. The results show that robustness is strongly model-dependent
Stealing Reasoning Traces from Proprietary LLM APIs
jailbreaking the more capable model directly. This vulnerability enables four distinct attack vectors. First, it circumvents anti-distillation mechanisms, allowing adversaries to extract a proprietary model's reasoning
Safety, Security, and Cognitive Risks in Neuro-Symbolic AI
threat model extending MITRE ATLAS with 11 NeSy-specific tactic extensions and a five-profile attacker taxonomy; (3) a symbolic-layer threat catalogue covering knowledge graph (KG) poisoning, ontology-merging
When Agents Handle Secrets: A Survey of Confidential Computing for Agentic AI
model inference. Agents accumulate sensitive context, hold credentials, and operate across pipelines no single party fully controls, enabling prompt injection, context exfiltration, credential theft, and inter-agent message poisoning. Current
Guarding the Guardrails: A Taxonomy-Driven Approach to Jailbreak Detection
poisoning. Second, we analyzed the data collected from the challenge to examine the prevalence and success rates of different attack types, providing insights into how specific jailbreak strategies exploit model
Are My Optimized Prompts Compromised? Exploring Vulnerabilities of LLM-based Optimizers
systematic analysis of poisoning risks in LLM-based prompt optimization. Using HarmBench, we find systems are substantially more vulnerable to manipulated feedback than to query poisoning alone: feedback-based attacks
Automatic Red Teaming LLM-based Agents with Model Context Protocol Tools
large language models (LLMs) has led to the wide application of LLM-based agents in various domains. To standardize interactions between LLM-based agents and their environments, model context protocol