The Autonomy Tax: Defense Training Breaks LLM Agents
autonomously complete complex multi-step tasks. Practitioners deploy defense-trained models to protect against prompt injection attacks that manipulate agent behavior through malicious observations or retrieved content. We reveal
Context Dependence and Reliability in Autoregressive Language Models
unpredictable shifts in attribution scores, undermining interpretability and raising concerns about risks like prompt injection. This work addresses the challenge of distinguishing essential context elements from correlated ones. We introduce
Are LLMs Good Safety Agents or a Propaganda Engine?
approaches (erasing the concept of politics); and, 2) vulnerability of models on PSP through prompt injection attacks (PIAs). Associating censorship with refusals on content with masked implicit intent, we find
OpenClaw PRISM: A Zero-Fork, Defense-in-Depth Runtime Security Layer for Tool-Augmented LLM Agents
augmented LLM agents introduce security risks that extend beyond user-input filtering, including indirect prompt injection through fetched content, unsafe tool execution, credential leakage, and tampering with local control files
DualSentinel: A Lightweight Framework for Detecting Targeted Attacks in Black-box LLM via Dual Entropy Lull Pattern
APIs, but their trustworthiness may be critically undermined by targeted attacks like backdoor and prompt injection attacks, which secretly force LLMs to generate specific malicious sequences. Existing defensive approaches
DeepSeek TUI has SSRF via HTTP Redirect Bypass in fetch
An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data
serious risk to security and privacy. Adversaries may attack the AI model (e.g., via prompt injection) to exfiltrate user data. Furthermore, sharing private data with an AI agent requires users
PraisonAI: Unauthenticated Information Disclosure of Agent Instructions via /api/agents in
SearXNG MCP Server: DNS-resolved Private Hostname SSRF in `web
npm PraisonAI SandboxExecutor network-isolated mode does not block non
PraisonAI: Compute-bridged file tools allow shell command injection
Pi Agent: Potential XSS in HTML session exports via Markdown
PARSE: Provenance-Aware Retrieval Sanitization for Professional Domain LLM Agents
Prompt injection defenses evaluated on synthetic benchmarks do not generalize to real enterprise documents, which are longer, denser, and interleave legitimate authority language with factual content. We demonstrate this
KVEraser: Learning to Steer KV Cache for Efficient Localized Context Erasing
applications, where stale retrieved facts, incorrect tool observations, retracted user preferences, or harmful prompt injections may be identified only after prefill. Exact erasing must then recompute all tokens after
An Evaluation of Data Leakage Risks in Tool-Using LLM Agents in Realistic Scenarios
research on data leakage risks in agents has focused on adversarial data exfiltration through prompt injections and jailbreaks. However, sensitive information may also be exposed during non-adversarial use, creating
Rapid Poison: Practical Poisoning Attacks Against the Rapid Response Framework
helping the model generalize from the new attacks and quickly adapt. We reveal that prompt injection can infiltrate this pipeline to deliver poisoned samples into the classifier's training
SkillVetBench: LLM-as-Judge for Multi-Dimensional Security Risk Evaluation in Open-Source LLM Agent Skills
best static baseline (SKILLSIEVE) still misses 15%; for instruction-layer categories such as Prompt Injection and Memory Poisoning, conventional tools miss between 89% and 100% of threats (e.g., CODEBERT detects
GAS-Leak-LLM: Genetic Algorithm-Based Suffix Optimization for Black-Box LLM Jailbreaking
research has demonstrated that LLMs remain vulnerable to adversarial manipulation, particularly through jailbreaking and prompt injection techniques. In this work, we propose GAS-Leak-LLM a novel jailbreaking attack based
Does AI Reviewer See the Full Picture? Attacking and Defending Multimodal Peer Review
dataset spanning multiple scientific domains; (2) a unified suite of attacks, including black-box prompt injections and white-box perturbations, specifically designed to target both text (GCG) and figures