When Agents Handle Secrets: A Survey of Confidential Computing for Agentic AI
model inference. Agents accumulate sensitive context, hold credentials, and operate across pipelines no single party fully controls, enabling prompt injection, context exfiltration, credential theft, and inter-agent message poisoning. Current
Guarding the Guardrails: A Taxonomy-Driven Approach to Jailbreak Detection
poisoning. Second, we analyzed the data collected from the challenge to examine the prevalence and success rates of different attack types, providing insights into how specific jailbreak strategies exploit model
Are My Optimized Prompts Compromised? Exploring Vulnerabilities of LLM-based Optimizers
systematic analysis of poisoning risks in LLM-based prompt optimization. Using HarmBench, we find systems are substantially more vulnerable to manipulated feedback than to query poisoning alone: feedback-based attacks
Automatic Red Teaming LLM-based Agents with Model Context Protocol Tools
large language models (LLMs) has led to the wide application of LLM-based agents in various domains. To standardize interactions between LLM-based agents and their environments, model context protocol
Adaptive Intrusion Detection System Leveraging Dynamic Neural Models with Adversarial Learning for 5G/6G Networks
network security by providing robust, real-time threat detection and response capabilities. Unlike conventional models, which require costly retraining to update knowledge, the proposed framework integrates incremental learning algorithms, reducing
Vision-Language-Action Safety: Threats, Challenges, Evaluations, and Mechanisms
models, including architectures, training paradigms, and inference mechanisms. We then examine the literature through four lenses: Attacks, Defenses, Evaluation, and Deployment. We survey training-time threats such as data poisoning
Critical Evaluation of Quantum Machine Learning for Adversarial Robustness
three threat models-black-box, gray-box, and white-box. We implement representative attacks in each category, including label-flipping for black-box, QUID encoder-level data poisoning for gray
A Certified Robustness Framework for Backdoor Poisoning Attacks using $f$-Divergences
Machine learning systems trained on untrusted data are vulnerable to data and backdoor poisoning attacks, in which an adversary corrupts training and test samples to manipulate predictions at inference time
TriShieldRAG: A Three-Ring Defense-in-Depth Framework Against Knowledge Corruption in Retrieval-Augmented Generation
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) lets a large language model answer questions using documents retrieved from an external knowledge base at query time. This makes RAG useful for private data, fast
Security of Foundation-Model-Powered Embodied Agents: Attack Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation
poisoning, or adversarial examples, but these categories do not consistently identify where an adversary first enters the embodied control loop. We present a trust-boundary-centric survey of foundation-model
The Model Plants the Trigger: Answer-Side Backdoor Attacks in Multi-Turn Large Language Models
model to generate a specific, seemingly innocuous word. Once merged into the dialogue history, this self-generated word becomes the trigger. When a later harmful query arrives, the model detects
Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning from Partial Decryption Verifiable Threshold Multi-Client Functional Encryption
cooperate to train the model without directly exchanging their own private data, but the gradient leakage problem still threatens the privacy security and model integrity. Although the existing scheme uses
Surprise Alone Learns Lies: Evidence-Gated Continual Learning for LLMs from Streaming Claims
three models) but not from legitimate updates of the same kind of fact (AUC 0.53). It saves 43% of judge calls, but an attacker with access to the model
Surviving the Unseen: Predictive Defense for Novel Multi-Turn Multimodal Attacks
expansion of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) and their integration into autonomous agentic workflows has introduced a non-stationary attack surface. Empirical observations indicate that adversaries employ progressive, cross-modal
Critical-CoT: A Robust Defense Framework against Reasoning-Level Backdoor Attacks in Large Language Models
Large Language Models (LLMs), despite their impressive capabilities across domains, have been shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Prior backdoor strategies predominantly operate at the token level, where
PentestChain: A Cost-Aware, MCP-Orchestrated Framework for Automated Penetration Testing with Free-Tier LLMs
local Ollama model (qwen2.5-7b) first, then free-tier OpenRouter and Cerebras, with a rule-based fallback that always produces output-and exposes the full pipeline through a Model Context Protocol
What Guides the Agent? Adjudicating Unauthorized Behavior via Localizing Behavior-Guiding Instructions
input/output level, remains insufficient for detecting such dynamic inducements that arise during model reasoning. We propose Attnlocate, a runtime framework for fine-grained localization of context spans that genuinely influence
CrACK: Adversarial Attacks on Cross-Model Consistency in Collaborative Vision Foundation Models
Existing adversarial attacks target a single model and overlook this premise, leaving the inter-model interface entirely unguarded. We propose CrACK (Cross-model Adversarial Consistency attack), an inference-time attack
Catastrophic Learning: A New Attack Vector on Continual Learning Networks
threat model and propose six attack strategies: Label-Exchange, Tensor-Exchange, Attraction-Coincident, Attraction-Preceding, Repulsion-Coincident, and Repulsion-Preceding. The Attraction variants minimize the loss between the poisoned
Beyond Native Success: Auditing Deployment-Interface Exposure of CLIP Backdoors
Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training models are widely reused across downstream interfaces, including feature extraction, retrieval, reranking, and selection. Existing CLIP backdoor, however, usually validate attacks on a small attack