AI Threat AlertCritical Evaluation of Quantum Machine Learning for Adversarial Robustness
three threat models-black-box, gray-box, and white-box. We implement representative attacks in each category, including label-flipping for black-box, QUID encoder-level data poisoning for gray
A Certified Robustness Framework for Backdoor Poisoning Attacks using $f$-Divergences
Machine learning systems trained on untrusted data are vulnerable to data and backdoor poisoning attacks, in which an adversary corrupts training and test samples to manipulate predictions at inference time
TriShieldRAG: A Three-Ring Defense-in-Depth Framework Against Knowledge Corruption in Retrieval-Augmented Generation
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) lets a large language model answer questions using documents retrieved from an external knowledge base at query time. This makes RAG useful for private data, fast
Security of Foundation-Model-Powered Embodied Agents: Attack Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation
poisoning, or adversarial examples, but these categories do not consistently identify where an adversary first enters the embodied control loop. We present a trust-boundary-centric survey of foundation-model
The Model Plants the Trigger: Answer-Side Backdoor Attacks in Multi-Turn Large Language Models
model to generate a specific, seemingly innocuous word. Once merged into the dialogue history, this self-generated word becomes the trigger. When a later harmful query arrives, the model detects
Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning from Partial Decryption Verifiable Threshold Multi-Client Functional Encryption
cooperate to train the model without directly exchanging their own private data, but the gradient leakage problem still threatens the privacy security and model integrity. Although the existing scheme uses
Surprise Alone Learns Lies: Evidence-Gated Continual Learning for LLMs from Streaming Claims
three models) but not from legitimate updates of the same kind of fact (AUC 0.53). It saves 43% of judge calls, but an attacker with access to the model
Surviving the Unseen: Predictive Defense for Novel Multi-Turn Multimodal Attacks
expansion of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) and their integration into autonomous agentic workflows has introduced a non-stationary attack surface. Empirical observations indicate that adversaries employ progressive, cross-modal
Critical-CoT: A Robust Defense Framework against Reasoning-Level Backdoor Attacks in Large Language Models
Large Language Models (LLMs), despite their impressive capabilities across domains, have been shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Prior backdoor strategies predominantly operate at the token level, where
PentestChain: A Cost-Aware, MCP-Orchestrated Framework for Automated Penetration Testing with Free-Tier LLMs
local Ollama model (qwen2.5-7b) first, then free-tier OpenRouter and Cerebras, with a rule-based fallback that always produces output-and exposes the full pipeline through a Model Context Protocol
What Guides the Agent? Adjudicating Unauthorized Behavior via Localizing Behavior-Guiding Instructions
input/output level, remains insufficient for detecting such dynamic inducements that arise during model reasoning. We propose Attnlocate, a runtime framework for fine-grained localization of context spans that genuinely influence
CrACK: Adversarial Attacks on Cross-Model Consistency in Collaborative Vision Foundation Models
Existing adversarial attacks target a single model and overlook this premise, leaving the inter-model interface entirely unguarded. We propose CrACK (Cross-model Adversarial Consistency attack), an inference-time attack
Catastrophic Learning: A New Attack Vector on Continual Learning Networks
threat model and propose six attack strategies: Label-Exchange, Tensor-Exchange, Attraction-Coincident, Attraction-Preceding, Repulsion-Coincident, and Repulsion-Preceding. The Attraction variants minimize the loss between the poisoned
Beyond Native Success: Auditing Deployment-Interface Exposure of CLIP Backdoors
Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training models are widely reused across downstream interfaces, including feature extraction, retrieval, reranking, and selection. Existing CLIP backdoor, however, usually validate attacks on a small attack
Density-aware Sample-specific Attack
derive principled criteria characterizing optimal sample-specific trigger construction under a Bayes-optimal model of the victim's training. Our analysis reveals that both attack success and clean-accuracy preservation
Weird Generalization and Inductive Backdoors: New Ways to Corrupt LLMs
contexts can dramatically shift behavior outside those contexts. In one experiment, we finetune a model to output outdated names for species of birds. This causes it to behave
DSBA: Dynamic Stealthy Backdoor Attack with Collaborative Optimization in Self-Supervised Learning
generalization capabilities, and its potential for privacy preservation. However, recent research reveals that SSL models are also vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Existing backdoor attack methods in the SSL context commonly
Color Matters: Trigger Color Affects Success in Federated Backdoor Attacks
Federated learning is vulnerable to backdoor attacks in which malicious clients inject poisoned updates while preserving benign-task performance. In this paper, we study a semantics-driven backdoor mechanism
Detecting Trojaned DNNs via Spectral Regression Analysis
approach that analyzes how a model's internal representations change during fine-tuning. Rather than attempting to reconstruct trigger conditions, MIST characterizes benign model evolution using pre-activation spectra
Agentic AI as a Cybersecurity Attack Surface: Threats, Exploits, and Defenses in Runtime Supply Chains
Agentic systems built on large language models (LLMs) extend beyond text generation to autonomously retrieve information and invoke tools. This runtime execution model shifts the attack surface from build-time