459 results in 176ms
Paper2605.03213v1

When Agents Handle Secrets: A Survey of Confidential Computing for Agentic AI

model inference. Agents accumulate sensitive context, hold credentials, and operate across pipelines no single party fully controls, enabling prompt injection, context exfiltration, credential theft, and inter-agent message poisoning. Current

medium relevancesurvey
Paper2510.13893v2

Guarding the Guardrails: A Taxonomy-Driven Approach to Jailbreak Detection

poisoning. Second, we analyzed the data collected from the challenge to examine the prevalence and success rates of different attack types, providing insights into how specific jailbreak strategies exploit model

high relevancesurvey
Paper2510.14381v2

Are My Optimized Prompts Compromised? Exploring Vulnerabilities of LLM-based Optimizers

systematic analysis of poisoning risks in LLM-based prompt optimization. Using HarmBench, we find systems are substantially more vulnerable to manipulated feedback than to query poisoning alone: feedback-based attacks

medium relevanceattack
Paper2509.21011v1

Automatic Red Teaming LLM-based Agents with Model Context Protocol Tools

large language models (LLMs) has led to the wide application of LLM-based agents in various domains. To standardize interactions between LLM-based agents and their environments, model context protocol

high relevancetool
Paper2512.10637v2

Adaptive Intrusion Detection System Leveraging Dynamic Neural Models with Adversarial Learning for 5G/6G Networks

network security by providing robust, real-time threat detection and response capabilities. Unlike conventional models, which require costly retraining to update knowledge, the proposed framework integrates incremental learning algorithms, reducing

medium relevanceattack
Paper2604.23775v1

Vision-Language-Action Safety: Threats, Challenges, Evaluations, and Mechanisms

models, including architectures, training paradigms, and inference mechanisms. We then examine the literature through four lenses: Attacks, Defenses, Evaluation, and Deployment. We survey training-time threats such as data poisoning

medium relevancebenchmark
Paper2511.14989v2

Critical Evaluation of Quantum Machine Learning for Adversarial Robustness

three threat models-black-box, gray-box, and white-box. We implement representative attacks in each category, including label-flipping for black-box, QUID encoder-level data poisoning for gray

medium relevancebenchmark
Paper2610.34934v1

A Certified Robustness Framework for Backdoor Poisoning Attacks using $f$-Divergences

Machine learning systems trained on untrusted data are vulnerable to data and backdoor poisoning attacks, in which an adversary corrupts training and test samples to manipulate predictions at inference time

high relevanceattack
Paper2607.23838v1

TriShieldRAG: A Three-Ring Defense-in-Depth Framework Against Knowledge Corruption in Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) lets a large language model answer questions using documents retrieved from an external knowledge base at query time. This makes RAG useful for private data, fast

medium relevancetool
Paper2608.16843v1

Security of Foundation-Model-Powered Embodied Agents: Attack Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation

poisoning, or adversarial examples, but these categories do not consistently identify where an adversary first enters the embodied control loop. We present a trust-boundary-centric survey of foundation-model

high relevancebenchmark
Paper2610.07723v1

The Model Plants the Trigger: Answer-Side Backdoor Attacks in Multi-Turn Large Language Models

model to generate a specific, seemingly innocuous word. Once merged into the dialogue history, this self-generated word becomes the trigger. When a later harmful query arrives, the model detects

high relevanceattack
Paper2511.12936v1

Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning from Partial Decryption Verifiable Threshold Multi-Client Functional Encryption

cooperate to train the model without directly exchanging their own private data, but the gradient leakage problem still threatens the privacy security and model integrity. Although the existing scheme uses

medium relevancebenchmark
Paper2610.39840v1

Surprise Alone Learns Lies: Evidence-Gated Continual Learning for LLMs from Streaming Claims

three models) but not from legitimate updates of the same kind of fact (AUC 0.53). It saves 43% of judge calls, but an attacker with access to the model

medium relevanceattack
Paper2605.18988v1

Surviving the Unseen: Predictive Defense for Novel Multi-Turn Multimodal Attacks

expansion of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) and their integration into autonomous agentic workflows has introduced a non-stationary attack surface. Empirical observations indicate that adversaries employ progressive, cross-modal

high relevanceattack
Paper2604.10681v1

Critical-CoT: A Robust Defense Framework against Reasoning-Level Backdoor Attacks in Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs), despite their impressive capabilities across domains, have been shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Prior backdoor strategies predominantly operate at the token level, where

high relevancetool
Paper2609.18120v1

PentestChain: A Cost-Aware, MCP-Orchestrated Framework for Automated Penetration Testing with Free-Tier LLMs

local Ollama model (qwen2.5-7b) first, then free-tier OpenRouter and Cerebras, with a rule-based fallback that always produces output-and exposes the full pipeline through a Model Context Protocol

medium relevancetool
Paper2608.24022v1

What Guides the Agent? Adjudicating Unauthorized Behavior via Localizing Behavior-Guiding Instructions

input/output level, remains insufficient for detecting such dynamic inducements that arise during model reasoning. We propose Attnlocate, a runtime framework for fine-grained localization of context spans that genuinely influence

medium relevanceattack
Paper2609.07499v1

CrACK: Adversarial Attacks on Cross-Model Consistency in Collaborative Vision Foundation Models

Existing adversarial attacks target a single model and overlook this premise, leaving the inter-model interface entirely unguarded. We propose CrACK (Cross-model Adversarial Consistency attack), an inference-time attack

high relevanceattack
Paper2608.18976v1

Catastrophic Learning: A New Attack Vector on Continual Learning Networks

threat model and propose six attack strategies: Label-Exchange, Tensor-Exchange, Attraction-Coincident, Attraction-Preceding, Repulsion-Coincident, and Repulsion-Preceding. The Attraction variants minimize the loss between the poisoned

high relevanceattack
Paper2606.17815v1

Beyond Native Success: Auditing Deployment-Interface Exposure of CLIP Backdoors

Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training models are widely reused across downstream interfaces, including feature extraction, retrieval, reranking, and selection. Existing CLIP backdoor, however, usually validate attacks on a small attack

medium relevancebenchmark
PreviousPage 17 of 23Next