SafeClawBench: Separating Semantic, Audit-Evidence, and Sandbox Harm in Tool-Using LLM Agents
Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code
Behavior-Aware and Generalizable Defense Against Black-Box Adversarial Attacks for ML-Based IDS
often fall short in practice. Most are tailored to specific attack types, require internal model access, or rely on static mechanisms that fail to generalize across evolving attack strategies. Furthermore
RobustMask: Certified Robustness against Adversarial Neural Ranking Attack via Randomized Masking
Neural ranking models have achieved remarkable progress and are now widely deployed in real-world applications such as Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG). However, like other neural architectures, they remain vulnerable
A Security Analysis of Verifiable Credential Verification Pipelines: Attack Surface Arising from JSON-LD/RDFC Canonicalization Compared with SD-JWT VC and mdoc
under an explicit threat model, the verification pipelines of three Verifiable Credential (VC) formats: SD-JWT VC; the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0 with the Data Integrity cryptosuite eddsa
SLDR: Defending Against Malicious Fine-tuning via Selective Layers Recovery and Dynamic Routing
Fine-tuning-as-a-service enables users to adapt aligned large language models (LLMs) to specialized tasks, but malicious fine-tuning can erode refusal behavior while preserving task performance
Towards Secure Retrieval-Augmented Generation: A Comprehensive Review of Threats, Defenses and Benchmarks
Augmented Generation (RAG) significantly mitigates the hallucinations and domain knowledge deficiency in large language models by incorporating external knowledge bases. However, the multi-module architecture of RAG introduces complex system
TinyGuard:A lightweight Byzantine Defense for Resource-Constrained Federated Learning via Statistical Update Fingerprints
label poisoning. Against adaptive white-box adversaries, Pareto frontier analysis across four orders of magnitude confirms that attackers cannot simultaneously evade detection and achieve effective poisoning, features we term statistical
DiscourseFlip: An Oblique Discourse-Level Opinion Manipulation Attack against Black-box Retrieval-Augmented Generation
increasingly influential, but their reliance on external corpora exposes new security risks from poisoned retrieval content. Existing RAG attacks are largely focusing on individual queries or narrow topic-local query
PenTiDef: Enhancing Privacy and Robustness in Decentralized Federated Intrusion Detection Systems against Poisoning Attacks
Systems (IDS) introduces new challenges related to data privacy, centralized coordination, and susceptibility to poisoning attacks. While significant research has focused on protecting traditional FL-IDS with centralized aggregation servers
DecoyTrace: Toxic Decoys for Active Defense in Decentralized Federated Learning
result, peer-to-peer networks become exposed to malicious updates containing backdoors or semantic poisoning, since such updates can remain close to benign ones in the parameter space while behaving
Adversarial Attacks on Multimodal Large Language Models: A Comprehensive Survey
Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) integrate information from multiple modalities such as text, images, audio, and video, enabling complex capabilities such as visual question answering and audio translation. While powerful
Cybercrime and Computer Forensics in Epoch of Artificial Intelligence in India
while Machine Learning offers high accuracy in pattern recognition, it introduces vulnerabilities regarding data poisoning and algorithmic bias. Findings highlight a critical tension between the Act's data minimization principles
Fool's Gold: Defensive Deception Against Safety-Removal Attacks on Open-Weight Models
Safety alignment in open-weight language models is trivially removable: abliteration projects a refusal-mediating direction out of the weights in minutes, and no release-time defense we are aware
Salami Attack: Stealthy Collusive Memory Poisoning against OpenClaw
adversaries may poison an agent's persistent memory to steer its behavior. Existing memory poisoning attacks mainly rely on individually malicious records, overlooking a compositional threat: multiple benign-looking memories
SMCP: Secure Model Context Protocol
large language models (LLMs) are moving away from closed, single-model frameworks and toward open ecosystems that connect a variety of agents, external tools, and resources. The Model Context Protocol
Pay Attention to the Triggers: Constructing Backdoors That Survive Distillation
often used by downstream users as teacher models for knowledge distillation, compressing their capabilities into memory-efficient models. However, as these teacher models may stem from untrusted parties, distillation
The Promptware Kill Chain: How Prompt Injections Gradually Evolved Into a Multistep Malware Delivery Mechanism
Prompt injection was initially framed as the large language model (LLM) analogue of SQL injection. However, over the past three years, attacks labeled as prompt injection have evolved from isolated
Detection of adversarial intent in Human-AI teams using LLMs
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in human-AI teams as support agents for complex tasks such as information retrieval, programming, and decision-making assistance. While these agents' autonomy
MemSecBench: Tracking Agent Memory Poisoning from Persistence to Consequence and Repair
backend. Evidence-based adjudication combines a deterministic write check, checkpoint-specific judge-model evaluations, and programmatic gates across seven lifecycle checkpoints. The experimental design spans a 24-configuration matrix
Isolation as a First-Class Principle for LLM-Agent System Safety: Concepts, Taxonomy, Challenges and Future Directions
brain'' of a system fundamentally expands the scope of analysis beyond a standalone model. Consequently, safety is no longer only about input--output content alignment. It also concerns system behavior